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ABSTRACT
Many countries have attempted telecommunications liberalization and privatization using 
different policy approaches, resulting in varying degrees and types of success. This thesis 
examines the impact and implications of telecommunications liberalization and 
privatization in the Kingdom of Bahrain. This research demonstrates that properly 
restructuring competition into the telecommunications market can promote the economic 
goals of the government such as increasing the private sector participation in the 
sustainable development of a modernised economy.
This study has shown that there is a direct correlation between the competitiveness of 
telecommunications market and the level of ICT infrastructure investment in that market, 
with both of these factors contributing to the competitive ability of that nation to attract 
multinational companies to set up their business. While there are positive results emerging 
from Bahrain’s overall privatization and liberalization reforms, a major weakness noticed 
relate to market regulation. The most important factor required for the effectiveness of a 
regulator in telecommunications market is the transparency with which that regulator 
conducts itself. Due to the lack of transparency, the independence of Bahrain 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority appears to be in question. This study found that 
even after five years after the market in Bahrain was “liberalised”, there is still only one 
effective competitor to the incumbent monopoly telecommunications operator, and that the 
competition is solely in the provision of mobile service.
The methodologies used in this thesis include documentary evidence, interviews with 
policy makers, industry players, and international organizations linked to 
telecommunications. In the absence of adequate data on the liberalization of monopolistic 
practices in the Gulf States, views of representative of customers, government policy 
makers, the regulatory body and the media are sought. The government policy makers are 
of the view that the role of the government in a liberalization process should be that of a 
facilitator and regulator rather than service provider and innovator. However, this research 
reveals that the Bahrain regulatory authority has not paid much attention to facilitate 
competition. The customer survey indicates that there is a lack of momentum in
telecommunications liberalization process in Bahrain. It was observed that the very 
structure of the Bahrain telecommunications liberalization model was not designed to 
promote competition and facilitate new entrants into the market. The alternative model 
prescribed in this thesis is designed to overcome the weakness noticed in the market 
regulation and provide the required impetus for achieving sustainable economic growth 
through liberalization.
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction to Telecommunications reform in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain
Introduction
Telecommunications networks are quickly becoming the nervous system of 21st century 
human interaction. These overlapping webs are relentlessly spreading further and 
penetrating deeper into societies worldwide as technological advances are constantly 
increasing the ease with which we can connect with any part o f the globe. Almost all 
aspects of people’s lives are being increasingly affected and facilitated through 
telecommunications, from business dealings to personal interactions, as well as access 
to government services, political pursuits, medical research and the drive towards 
scientific discovery and even the proliferation of the arts. As humans learn how 
telecommunications can remove the barriers that once limited our reach, our appetite for 
faster connections and improvements in products and services helps push advancement 
and innovation in information technologies and services even further. These 
advancements lead to telecommunications assuming an ever more essential role in our 
lives, with this cycle spurring telecommunications markets to sprint ahead as some of 
the fastest growing sectors in the world. Compounding the expansion of the industry has 
been the tendency of countries around the world to privatise and liberalise their 
telecommunications sectors, resulting in private ownerships for the majority of all 
telecommunications networks (Trends and developments in the telecommunications 
environment 2004).
Driven by the prevailing winds of privatisation and liberalisation, this rapid 
advancement of the telecommunications industry within developed nations is also being 
sought by nations in the developing world. Many governments in the developing world 
regard a modem telecommunications network as a means by which to encourage growth 
in their economies and alleviate the ills plaguing their societies, with privatisation and 
liberalisation of the sector being the foremost of means by which this modernisation is 
attempted. It is in this context which this thesis will explore the implications and affects 
of telecommunications privatisation and liberalisation on the economy and society of 
the Kingdom of Bahrain.
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The history of telecommunications liberalisation
Heavy-handed government management of telecommunications had been the precedent 
until the well into the later half of the 20th century, given how essential the services are 
to a prosperous economy. The advent of the telegraph in the 1800s led the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the other European empires to recognize that high-speed 
communication was an important engine of commerce and aided the central authority in 
asserting and maintaining effective control of far-flung colonies. The dawning 
prevalence of the welfare state and with it the trend towards protective trading practices 
led to widespread nationalisation or heavier state governance of telecommunications. In 
the UK the publicly owned post office and telegraph services were amalgamated into a 
single company under state ownership, while in the United States (US), with its pro­
market tendencies, the Bell Corporation became the monopoly operator for telegraph 
and telephone services.
This framework began to unravel in the last quarter of the 1900s, as struggling markets 
and a sluggish economic environment prompted many governments to alter their 
practice of allowing monopolies to rein in their national marketplaces. Margaret 
Thatcher and her Conservative Governments of the late 1970s and 80s were at the 
vanguard of the European movement to divest public services to the private sphere; 
among these services telecommunications was near the first to be up for sale. When 
parliament passed the Telecommunications Act in 1984, British Telecommunications 
(BT) became the private provider of services in the UK. Though effectively a monopoly 
in the domestic market, BT’s pricing powers were leashed by a regulator with minimum 
standards imposed on services. The privatisation of Cable & Wireless, which was firmly 
entrenched as an overseas long-distance provider, created competition for BT in this 
area of the communications market. The Conservatives later followed up these moves 
by further breaking open the market to bring in other private telecommunications 
companies (Genoud, C 2003, p. 3).
Across the Atlantic Ocean, policy makers in the US developed an awareness that the
quality and efficiency of telecommunications services had repercussions for the entire
economy, and that a monopoly provider was not optimal for the quality and efficiency
of the nation’s telecommunications services. Various laws were put in place to move
towards liberalising the sector, and in 1974 the federal government filed anti-trust
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legislation against AT&T, Bell’s parent company. An agreement between AT&T and 
the US department of Justice ended the monopoly in 1984 by breaking the integrated 
network up into eight separate companies (The History o f  AT&T  n.d., p. 1).
Although many other countries carried out policies of privatisation and liberalisation, in 
many ways the US and the UK set the pace for the rest of the world. 
Telecommunications liberalisation and the freedom it brought to the market can be seen 
as a major force behind the string of innovations that have been introduced into the field 
of communications. Among the more notable advancements are cellular networks for 
mobile phones, home PC use with Internet access and digital, satellite and fibre-optic 
infonnation distribution methods. In terms of international trade in telecommunications 
products and services, the market opened significantly in 1997 with the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Basic Telecommunications. Governments have 
generally recognized that liberalising their telecommunications sector leads to greater 
efficiency and technological advancement, and that this type of telecommunications 
environment is necessary for overall competitiveness in global economy. Indeed, the 
global economy itself has been, and continues to be, transformed by technological 
innovation and advancement in telecommunications, and from these has emerged the 
concept that the age in which we live is, or is becoming, an ‘information society’.
In search of the ‘information society’
The idea that the structure of human interaction and economy has so fundamentally 
altered due to advancements in telecommunications as to constitute the emergence of an 
‘information society’ finds it’s origins, according to Christopher May, in the work of 
Fritz Machlup. May posits that Machlup was the first to recognize and classify 
‘knowledge and information tasks separately from normal industrial and social 
activities’ (May 2002, p. 5). Machlup classified five sub-divisions — education; media of 
communication; information machines; information services and other information 
activities -  where there could be a determination of economic value.
‘This categorization, and the statistical measurement it enabled, allowed 
Machlup to claim in The Production and Distribution o f  Knowledge in the 
United States that in 1958 around 29 per cent of America’s gross national 
product came from these ‘knowledge industries’ (May 2002, p. 5).
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Peter Drucker expanded upon this idea when, in works published in 1968, he contended 
that in the post-WWII United States, ‘the base of our economy shifted from manual to 
knowledge work, and the centre of gravity of our social expenditure from goods to 
knowledge’, as well, that the ‘impact of cheap, reliable, fast and universally available 
information will easily be as great as was the impact of electricity’ (May 2002, p. 5)1.
As will be discussed in greater detail in this thesis, Bahrain, through enacting 
telecommunications privatisation and liberalisation legislation, is attempting to spur the 
transformation of the kingdom into an information society to diversify its primarily 
resource-based economy, modernise its business practices and raise the quality of life 
for its citizens.
Telecommunications research, smaller states and the tension between culture and 
communication
There has been a considerable body of research into privatisation and liberalisation of 
telecommunications services since the early 1980s, when there was the first movement 
towards modernising what were at the time generally state-owned and monopolistic 
services. Research has also been stimulated by technological change with the growth of 
cellular telephone systems and the internet and broadband. As shall be indicated in the 
following chapters, theory and evidence on the growth and impact of these services on 
major developed nations has been extensively considered and is still subject to much 
on-going research. Studies include major theoretical analysis such as the work by 
Castells and Kapur (cited in Galperin 2005.) also a considerable number of studies that 
look at the development of telecommunication industries in developing countries 
[Curwen and Whalley (2004), Kikeri (1992), Galal (1995)].
However there are much fewer accessible studies concerning the impact of the 
telecommunications revolution on smaller and less developed states. In particular the 
development of telecommunications in small but nevertheless economically developing 
regimes would seem to warrant attention. In this context the Kingdom of Bahrain 
presents a fitting area of study. In part this thesis concentrates on a study of
1 It should be noted that Christopher May himself in The Information Society: A Skeptical View, espouses 
‘that the information society does not imply a fundamentally new way o f organizing the economy, but is 
rather another (albeit recently emerging) form o f capitalist society’ (May 2002, p. 35), though the ‘new 
economy’ or ‘new paradigm’ is distinct from its predecessor in various important aspects.
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telecommunications in Bahrain as the author of this study is a Bahraini national living 
in Bahrain. This background ensures an interest in the development of the Kingdom and 
also enables access to the actors and institutions engaged in the economic development 
of the country in general, and specifically the Bahraini telecommunications industry.
The focus on Bahrain in this study also provides an analysis of a small but relatively 
wealthy regime which has potentially greater economic impact on the world economy 
than its population might suggest. Bahrain is in this respect not dissimilar from several 
other economically influential small states such as Abu-Dhabi in the Arabian Gulf or 
Singapore in the Far East that have established themselves as significant centres for 
commerce, initially on the basis of natural resources such as oil, but later through 
diversification into areas including banking, finance and tourism. Such activities require 
effective modem communications links that operate on a global scale.
As will be discussed later in this study, in addition to the economic pressures which 
drive the development of modem telecommunications systems in such smaller states 
there are, however, cultural and social issues that may create pressures for regulation 
and state controls over communications. Smaller states need to have a strong sense of 
their own culture and values to maintain their identity. In desiring to preserve a strong 
sense of nationhood within an area of growing consumer wealth, there can be anxiety 
regarding opening a culture to being swamp by the waves of cultural images and values 
spread from larger and more dominant players in the globalised market. For many this 
may come down to a fear that American cultural values in particular will overwhelm the 
traditional values of many smaller states in which affluence is sufficient to enabled 
many in the population to take advantage of effective means for securing global 
communication. Thus, in some regimes, while privatisation and liberalisation of 
telecommunications can be driven by concerns over economic development and 
diversification of the economy for long-term prosperity, there are groups who may be 
concerned that such developments will be at the price of loosing traditional community 
values and cultural independence.
Therefore, there exits the possibility in nations such as Bahrain for an underlying
tension between the demand to modernise the economy and communications and the
concern for cultural stability and the retention of respected traditions. Thus, as well as
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focusing on the economic aspects of telecommunications privatisation and 
liberalisation, this study will also treat these processes in regards to their social 
dimension.
Pressure for liberalisation in smaller economies
The role of the state in the Kingdom of Bahrain, most Arab countries and indeed most 
developing countries has been as the sole provider of essential services to their 
populations. Thus it has been as natural extension of the inherent authority of the state 
that it be the sole provider of telecommunications services. Given the heavy cost of 
infrastructure investment to setup and operate a telecommunications network, while the 
marginal cost of adding each new subscriber to the system is, relatively speaking, 
almost nothing, normal economic pricing mechanisms of charging fees based on the 
marginal cost of the service or product are hard to apply. Within states that already 
favour government provision of services this fosters a conception of 
telecommunications as a kind of natural state monopoly, and thus to ensure the service 
is generally accessible at a reasonable price, developing nations often assume the role of 
sole telecommunications providers for their citizens (Krairit 2001, p. 15).
The rapid development and expansion of telecommunications services and innovations 
in the developed world, combined with swift growth in many economies in the 
developing world, has created an increasingly interconnected global economy facilitated 
through telecommunications. This has fundamentally altered the function and 
importance of telecommunications in the economy and society (Petrazzini 1995, p. 15) 
According to Petrazzini, this shifting role of telecommunications eroded the legitimacy 
of the ‘natural monopoly’ conception of the sector and spurred the ideological transition 
towards privatisation and opening the market.
Throughout the 1980s in the developed world, many countries dramatically changed the 
way their telecommunications networks operated. Citing cumbersome state institutional 
mechanisms and the need for a flexible means of adapting to the latest 
telecommunications technologies, nations in the developed world pursued either 
privatisation, in following the example of the UK, or liberalisation, as was done in the 
US. Though the early successes were far from complete, as the regulations changed and
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policies were reshaped, the services and products offered in telecommunications sector 
diversified and the market grew.
When domestic telecommunications corporations in the developed world began to go 
international, developing countries came under pressure to invest and upgrade their own 
telecommunications networks, and although the nationalized telecommunications 
monopolies in the developing world were generally not performing well in the 1980s, 
this was by and large not the reason for reforms. Instead telecommunication 
restructuring was part of a broader package of reforms being instituted throughout the 
economies of many developing nations in the face of collapsing marketplaces and 
dwindling government revenues (Trends and developments in the telecommunications 
environment 2004, pp. 1-4). This is in contrast to the developed world, where the 
momentum for reforms came principally from the demands of the marketplace to 
modernise.
Early in the 1990s, nations around the Arabian Gulf, among other developing nations, 
began consultations with the IMF, the World Bank and governments in the developed 
world for recommendations on how best to restructure their telecommunications sector 
to encourage growth in their economies. The result was the gradual adoption of 
liberalisation practices to open up their telecommunications sectors to competition and 
the divesting of publicly owned telecommunications monopolies to encourage private 
investment. The results were mixed, with different levels of success achieved given the 
different fiscal realities and resources available in each nation. The progress of 
Singapore illustrates how a relatively competent and well-organized state with effective 
means of regulation greatly increases the likelihood of positive result from liberalisation 
and privatisation. As a report by the World Bank states:
Most privatisation success stories come from high-income and middle-income 
countries. Privatisation is easier to launch and more likely to produce positive 
results when the company operates in a competitive market, and when the 
country has a market-friendly policy environment and a good capacity to 
regulate. The poorer the country, the longer the odds against privatisation 
producing its anticipated benefits and the more difficult the process o f preparing 
the terrain for sale (Kikeri et al. 1992, p. 2).
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Privatisation and liberalisation are commonly associated with each other (Garrison 
2004, p. 3), but what they entail is not necessarily the same. Privatisation is the process 
by which a publicly-owned company is transferred to private control and ownership. 
Liberalisation is the process by which a monopoly market is opened to competition, 
whether or not that monopoly was controlled by the state or a private entity (Garrison 
2004, p. 3). The prime consideration for Bahrain is whether breaking the monopoly in 
the telecommunications market will bring economic gain to the Kingdom, and if the 
benefits have not yet been realized, what lessons can be learnt?
Bahrain embarked on major telecommunications reforms with the introduction of the 
Telecommunications Law on the 20 of January 2002, and has carried out major steps 
in the reform process to attract more private investment. This thesis will explore 
whether these efforts to liberalise the telecommunications market will bring greater 
benefits to the economy and society of Bahrain than the previous monopolistic 
telecommunications environment. In learning from the liberalisation experiences of 
other countries, has the government adopted the policies and regulations which best suit 
Bahrain and its objectives? While this thesis will evaluate telecommunications 
liberalisation in regard to its impact on the economy and efficiency, it will also consider 
the societal impact, which includes both employment and social values. Regarding 
employment, this study will show that a modem telecommunications system is essential 
infrastructure in attracting new businesses and allowing businesses already operating in 
the Kingdom to grow and provide more jobs for the local population, while in terms of 
societal values, this study will show that Bahrain has a well established framework of 
laws and structures that aim to ensure national security, sovereignty, national identity 
and the upholding of Islamic culture and values. This study will also discuss the need 
for there to be an independent and effective regulatory mechanism for 
telecommunications in the Kingdom in order for Bahrain to reap the ripest fruit from 
liberalisation of the sector.
Aims of the study
1. To ascertain the driving forces in Bahrain behind the establishment o f a privatised 
and liberalised telecommunications environment.
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2. To ascertain the extent to which privatisation, liberalisation and the regulatory 
environment of Bahraini telecommunications have been and will be beneficial to the 
Kingdom’s economic development. [In relation to this analysis, this thesis will also 
offer an alternative structure for telecommunications in Bahrain which -  based on the 
wide array of theoretical and empirical sources examined in this thesis -  would almost 
certainly be of greater future economic benefit to the Kingdom than the current 
scenario.]
In developing these aims the thesis will have the following objectives:
• A critical analysis of the literature regarding telecommunications
liberalisation and privatisation.
• An explanation of the route taken by Bahrain in the process of privatisation,
liberalisation and the regulation of telecommunications.
• To evaluate the effectiveness of this process for the wider economic
development of Bahrain.
Scope of the study
The thesis will bring into focus the impacts and implications of telecommunications 
liberalisation and privatisation in the Kingdom of Bahrain. As many countries have 
attempted these types of reforms using a diverse array of different policy approaches, 
resulting in varying degrees and types of success, it is essential to examine a number of 
these examples and garner from their experience lessons which can be applied to 
Bahrain and the objectives of the Kingdom as it undertakes its own reforms process. An 
examination of the theories underlying the ideology and practice of liberalisation and 
privatisation is also warranted and undertaken in this thesis.
As was discussed above, though liberalisation and privatisation are often related, they
are in fact different processes with features distinct from each other. Privatisation of the
telecommunications sector in Bahrain occurred in 1981, whilst the major reform
program the Kingdom has been undertaking in recent years is one of liberalisation. As
such, this thesis with examine both privatisation and liberalisation in regards to theory,
the experiences of other countries, and the experience of Bahrain. However, the
emphasis of the analysis will be devoted to the process of liberalisation, for several
reasons: (1) as it will be argued later in this thesis, it is liberalisation o f the
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telecommunications sector rather than privatisation which can result in more profound 
and sustainable benefits, because while privatisation is essentially just the transfer of 
ownership from the state to a private body, it is liberalisation which can more 
dramatically alter the market by allowing for the entry of competitors, spurring 
efficiencies, competitive pricing, increased services and advancements in technology; 
(2) as telecommunications privatisation in Bahrain was undertaken more than two 
decades ago its impact has largely been absorbed within the Kingdom and hence it is 
liberalisation and the implications of the reforms program now underway which is now 
more relevant to near and long-term prospects for economic and social change.
Structure of the thesis
This thesis is organized in the following structure: Chapter 1 is the introduction 
explaining the aims and scope of the study, the statement of problems, and the structure 
of the thesis; Chapter 2 presents a literature review of the theory related to this thesis; 
Chapter 3 reviews the growth of the telecommunications industry globally and the trend 
toward privatisation and dominance by multinationals; Chapter 4: The economic, 
political and historical background of Bahrain; Chapter 5: Liberalisation in an Islamic 
cultural context, regulation of information and viability for business; Chapter 6: 
Methodology; Chapter 7: Liberalisation policy and its application in the Bahrain 
telecommunications scenario; Chapter 8: Attitudes regarding privatisation and 
liberalisation among policy makers, industry players and consumers; Chapter 9: 
Analysis o f the driving forces behind telecommunications reforms in Bahrain and their 
benefits now and for the future, and the Conclusion chapter consolidates the findings 
and analysis of the study and concludes this thesis.
*  *  *
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Chapter 2: 
The theories of telecommunications reform
Introduction
Privatisation of a state-owned telecommunications operator is not a particularly new 
phenomenon. In the 1930s, for example, the Spanish Government sold the state 
telephone service to the Bell Company. However, liberalisation on a large scale is a 
more recent development and began on an influential scale in the United Kingdom in 
1984. Though this type o f reform has been introduced in many countries, the routes to a 
successful overhaul of the sector are still being uncovered. No one blueprint can or 
should be applied in every instance, which is especially the case in regards to 
liberalisation, as normally it involves a more radical change in the marketplace than 
privatisation. However, through the liberalisation and privatisation reforms which have 
been attempted, we can still learn what similarities existed in each situation and what 
the fundamental issues were.
Despite the overlap between the two processes, the forces driving liberalisation and 
privatisation are essentially distinct, and this must be considered in the formulation of 
new policies meant to guide the sector, as they may influence whether a nation achieves 
positive outcomes from either process. Privatisation, in relation to historical precedents, 
has generally been a precursor to future liberalisation efforts of a state. Therefore it is 
important, in this chapter, to examine the theoretical foundations of privatisation in 
order to solidly ground further discussions of privatisation and how it relates to 
liberalisation, which will take place later in this thesis. This chapter will also shed light 
on the fact that, contrary to popular ideas regarding privatisation, this process does not 
inevitably lead to benefits for the consumer.
The advent of privatisation
The Thatcher Government assumed control of the English parliament in London in 
1979 and shortly thereafter began to undertake sweeping privatisation reforms, widely 
regarded as the most significant in history and setting off a wave of government 
privatisation programmes around the globe. Thatcher’s privatisation wave was 
pervasive, first washing through areas of finance, commerce and industry, then carrying
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on to once stalwart domains of the state, such as education, hospitals, public transit, 
roads, airports, retirement funds, and the postal system. Privatisation was held out as the 
key to cutting government expenditure, injecting private sector efficiency into essential 
services and thereby eliminating wasteful spending. Indeed, as a World Bank study 
found, a properly structured privatisation programme can have considerable, long- 
lasting positive results. The study (Kikeri et al. 1992, pp. 1-5) examined twelve cases in 
four countries where state-owned enterprises (SEOs) were divested to private owners, 
and found that these had benefits across the entire economy, in eleven of these cases 
leading to greater productivity and increased growth.
However there is also the conception that state-owned services do offer greater benefits 
in certain cases where the government’s objective is to increase social well-being rather 
than maximize savings and efficiency, as welfare targets may be more easily achieved 
through government’s own agencies than regulating profit oriented private businesses. 
The theoretical work is not able to definitively show whether state-owned or private- 
owned services are of greater benefit to the general public. Some studies have shown 
the efficiency of private enterprises is greater than that of public enterprises (Mueller 
cited in Clarke & Cull 1997, p.4), and efficiency increases for government enterprises 
post-privatisation (Kikeri et al. 1992, p. 2; Megginson et al. 1994, pp. 403-452), though 
others would argue that while productive efficiency might increase with privatisation, it 
is uncertain whether overall economic efficiency is increased and it is questionable 
whether privatisation is the optimal way to further other government platforms 
(Czamanski 1999, pp. 10-11).
What is more certain is that privatisation is not some divine remedy that can be used to
vanquish all the ills associated with struggling publicly-owned enterprises. Privatisation
alone is not able to compensate for a market with weak regulations and without
competitors. In Britain, for example, the experience of rail privatisation should be a
salutary lesson against the dogmatic introduction of either privatisation or liberalisation
for any service. The sale of the rail network by the Major Government in Britain to a
monopolistic private owner of the infrastructure, including the track and the rights to
supply services on particular routes to other private companies, resulted in a serious
deterioration of service quality as many private companies owning a franchise of limited
duration failed to invest in new rolling stock and even more seriously Rail Track which,
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as a monopoly, owned the permanent way invested more in land and building 
development than track refurbishment. Such action contributed to several serious train 
crashes and eventually motivated the Blair Government to re-nationalise this aspect of 
the rail service (Brendan 2002, p. 1-3). It may be argued that where the market is 
competitive -  as increasingly is the case with new technology pushing forward new 
forms of communication -  and where an effective regulatory mechanism is present, 
private ownership yields substantial benefits. It cannot, however, always be assumed 
that all forms of privatisation and liberalisation will be effective. Privatisation, to be 
successful in achieving substantial, sustainable social and economic benefits, must 
move beyond simply the transfer of ownership from the public to private spheres, and 
must instead be used as a vehicle to implement deeper market reforms and reshape 
government’s role in the sector and the larger economy.
Defining privatisation
‘Privatisation’ can have several meanings. A constricted definition is the transfer of 
ownership and operation of a particular publicly owned enterprise to private ownership 
and operation. The state in effect relinquishes direct authority over the management of 
the company, passing this responsibility on to a private party. Privatisation can also 
refer to a sector, entailing that private interests are allowed to enter an industry or 
specific area of the economy that, in many cases, was previously under the control of a 
state-owned monopoly. An example of this could be private interests being granted the 
right to build and manage assets to generate electricity, but the utility is still under 
government control. At an even broader level, privatisation can be a process applied to 
the economy at large, where the first two types o f privatisation described above are 
applied across a wide spectrum. To ascertain how profound this type of privatisation 
will be, the level of government involvement in different areas o f the economy and the 
ambitiousness of the policy restructuring need to be examined. These three definitions 
are very much intertwined, with no hard and fast lines distinguishing one exactly from 
another.
Public choice theory
Understanding the shift in political and economic thinking among Western 
governments, or those influenced by the West, from tending to take many strategically
important private companies into public ownership from the 1920s through to the
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1970s, to the current and continuing trend now to privatise these companies, requires 
some understanding of the theoretical ideas that have underpinned this shift in political 
and economic culture. The principle motivating ideology is within the ‘New Right’ 
values that were increasingly popularised among conservative parties of Britain and the 
US during the rather economically depressed 1970s. In the context of privatisation these 
ideas are most firmly established within public choice theory.
Public choice theory, as a sub-set of economic study, effectively began emerging in 
academic discourse around the mid-point of the 1900s, and at its very basic was seen as 
a way to analyze taxation relative to public spending -  to analyze people’s actions in 
collective decision making in the same manner as one would in the general marketplace. 
It wasn’t until 1986 though that public choice theory entered the spotlight of general, 
widespread recognition when James Buchanan, a main proponent of the theory, was 
given the Nobel Prize in economics (Shaw n.d.).
Economists who study behaviour in the private marketplace assume that people 
are motivated mainly by self-interest. Although most people base some of their 
actions on their concern for others, the dominant motive in people’s actions in 
the marketplace -  whether they are employers, employees or consumers -  is a 
concern for themselves. Public choice economists make the same assumption -  
that although people acting in the political marketplace have some concern for 
others, their main motive, whether they are voters, politicians, lobbyists or 
bureaucrats, is self interest (Shaw n.d.).
Public choice theory is, however, in many respects a reworking of 18th and 19th 
century ideas regarding competition within a free market -  initiated by classical 
economists such as Adam Smith and Ricardo -  which dominated business and 
government thinking in most industrialising states of the 19th and early 20th century. 
The advent of social democratic values and the growth of state welfare economies 
eclipsed these ideas as predominantly divisive and unfair strategies for operating the 
macro-economy -  i.e. laissez-faire led to wealth for a few but deprivation and squalor 
for many, and without government regulation may not fully promote stable economic 
growth. Thus, Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ and, in Britain, the Attlee Government’s 
adoption of the Beveridge Report and nationalisation of businesses essential to the 
infrastructure of the economy created, post 1945, a much heightened degree of state 
intervention in the economy.
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Even in the 1930s these values were being challenged by the Viennese school of 
economists led by Ludwig von-Mises. When this school of thought was broken up by 
the advance into Austria of fascist values, scholars upholding the neo-liberal traditions 
became established in Britain and the United States and were able to gain further 
popularity for their ideas. The leading figure in these developments was perhaps 
Friedrich von-Hayek whose polemic The Road to Serfdom, written in 1944, while not 
widely accepted at the time, became the framework for later opposition to the concept 
of a mixed economy welfare state. Hayek argued that the rational individual will 
advantage themselves even if supposedly working for the public good and that 
efficiency and economic growth could only be fostered in a framework of perfect 
competition. [While many have been the economists who advocated government 
intervention to curb ‘market failures’ -  an example of this would be a monopoly which 
crushes competition and stifles development -  the followers of public choice theory 
would also point out that ‘government failures’ exist, whereby the results a certain 
government intends do not follow from the actions it initiates (Shaw n.d.).] Hayek 
recognised that inequalities would result from a classically free economy, but argued 
‘there is no such thing as social justice’, and that seeking equality would create more 
general damage to society and wealth creation than a society in which there were large 
disparities between the wealthy and the impoverished.
The ideas initiated in the 1930s by economists such as Hayek were later developed in
the US by economists such as Freidman and, importantly in the context of public
ownership and nationalisation, the works of the Virginia School of public choice
theorists. Arguing from a standpoint that each individual will seek to maximise their
own utility in the form of wealth, they argued that public sector bureaucrats will always
tend to arrange public services to benefit their own interests rather than the public they
supposedly serve. William Niskanen’s (1971, pp. 37-38) treatment of bureaucratic
motivations highlights the public choice model as it pertains to privatisation. His
analysis parallels that of New Right thinkers in that he defines personal utility in a
focused and monetary way and sees people as intrinsically out to maximize their utility.
This is where we can begin to grasp what Niskanen views as the problem with
bureaucracies; while people in business want to maximize profits, a bureaucracy is not
profit-driven, which begs the question: what is it exactly that a bureaucrat is looking to
29
maximize? It is Niskanen’s contention that a bureaucrat’s inclination to maximize is 
played out in attempting to secure the largest possible budget allocation for his 
bureaucracy.
As Shaw (n.d.) explains, salient among the posits of public choice theorists is the idea 
that there is little rational motivation for the individual voter to keep tabs on what their 
government is doing or to stay up-to-date regarding the latest issues because, 
effectively, their one vote in a nation of millions means almost nothing in relation to the 
final outcome of the election -  i.e. the expense in energy and effort to stay informed and 
aware of the goings-on in the political arena far exceed the return of casting a single, 
well-informed vote, especially when that vote carries no more value than the ill- 
informed voted of one’s neighbours who did not expend the same energy and effort. [It 
should be noted that this ‘ignorance incentive’, if  one can call it that, hardly exists in the 
private marketplace however, as one buys with one’s own money and one owns what is 
bought, and thus the impact of ones decision is relatively immediate and tangible].
[Bureaucrats] incentives explain why many regulatory agencies appear to be 
‘captured’ by special interests... Capture occurs because bureaucrats do not have 
a profit goal to guide their behaviour. Instead they usually are in government 
because they have a goal or a mission. They rely on Congress for their budgets, 
and often the people who will benefit from their mission can influence Congress 
to provide more funds. Thus interest groups -  who may be as diverse as 
lobbyists for regulated industries or leaders of environmental groups -  become 
important to them. Such interrelationships can lead to bureaucrats being 
captured by interest groups (Shaw n.d.).
According to Harrington, Vernon and Viscusi (2005, pp. 379-380), the concept of 
‘capture’ was given credibility by empirical observations from the US showing that, up 
until at least the 1960s, government regulations were distinctly pro-industry and by-and- 
large helped inflate profits for companies -  i.e. regulations tended to limit market entry 
for competitors and prop prices up above cost. The ‘capture’ of regulatory agencies will 
also be shown to be extremely relevant to the situation of Bahrain’s telecommunications 
sector, where more than six years after the liberalisation process was begun, the 
incumbent monopolist, Batelco, still dominates the industry and the TRA has not taken 
forceful action to create space within the industry to foster competition -  a move that 
would not be in the interests of Batelco.
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Niskanen depicts bureaus operating effectively as hierarchical authority structures, 
markedly different from the decentralized and innovative tendencies of the free market. 
While bureaus are essentially ‘non-profit’ organisations, they are also funded by a 
regular appropriation (Niskanen 1971, p. 15). Niskanen would describe a bureau as a 
means by which government expands upon the level of services supplied by the free 
market without contracting out to a private party in that free market. However, as 
Niskanen and public choice theory would hold, the employees o f these bureaus are no 
more inclined to act selflessly than any other actors in the economy, but instead of 
seeking direct monetary profits from their business, members of a bureau are concerned 
with their earnings, the perks of their job, authority and control, patronage, production 
within the bureau, simplicity in altering aspects of the bureau and general 
straightforwardness in running the operations of the bureau (Niskanen 1971, p. 38). 
Public choice theory also contends that highly motivated and politically influential 
special interest groups are able to warp the balance of bureaucratic activities and 
decisions disproportionately in their own favour, which is called ‘rent-seeking’ [i.e. 
politically influential special interest groups participate in ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour to 
‘capture’ bureaucratic institutions, agencies and functions of government]. The 
everyday dispassionate taxpayer will likely feel it is not worth their time and effort to 
fight a change in policy or legislation, while the parties which stand to benefit most 
from the changes will have every motivation to push a strong lobby effort on the 
bureaucrats. Those enforcing policy decisions may also become ‘rent-seekers’ as they 
fight changes that may erode their preferred status. As a result, Public Choice theory 
would contend that government policy and oversight is bloated and economically 
inefficient, and that in fact any positive ramifications garnered for the wider public 
through these policies and oversight are outweighed by the costs to society and the 
economy (Ricketts 2000, p. ix). Niskanen, after an exanimation of the research, notes 
that ‘all bureaus are too large. For given demand and cost conditions both the budget 
and the output of the bureau may be up to twice that of a competitive industry facing the 
same conditions’ (Niskanen 1971, p. 33).
It is important, given the context of this thesis, to note which aspects of public choice
theory hold relevance in their application to the circumstances of Bahrain. Classically,
public choice theorists have considered their arguments in the context of a country
where the centre of governmental power resides either partially or mostly in a
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democratically elected body, voted for by a large segment of the general population; this 
is not case in Bahrain. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, although in 
recent years there has been an arm of the legislature created whose members are voted 
into office by the populous -  in elections which are free and open, and with seats that 
are normally contested between a range of candidates -  the body of the legislature 
which they are elected to has only limited power. The constitution of the Kingdom 
upholds the monarchy as centre of power and the King as the voice of final authority in 
the affairs of the state.
The above deviation from the classical application of public choice theory in the context 
of Bahrain does not mean other aspects of the theory do not apply. For example, 
examinations of rent-seeking behaviour in the public choice theory model hold a great 
deal of significance in regards to the Bahrain scenario -  and in particular to the 
functioning of the Kingdom’s telecommunications sector, with the ‘special interest 
group’ in this case being Batelco. This will be discussed in further detail later in the 
thesis.
Economic neo-liberalism and social conservatism
In the evolution of the world’s economies to the contemporary markets of the 21st 
century, responsible governments have removed ‘unconstrained competition’ from the 
list of options by which to run their economic model -  i.e. ‘a firm is not allowed to blow 
up a rival’s factory or renege on agreements with customers. The government is relied 
upon to enforce property rights and contractual arrangements’ (Harrington et al. 2005, 
p. 61). It follows that what is in question is not whether the state should be involved in 
the national economy, but how pervasive such involvement should be.
In many developed countries, it is the public sector which is burdened with the blame
for all that is wrong in society. Bloated and unmanageable, overcommitted in all
directions and thus ineffective at properly fulfilling any of its obligations, a common
perception is that government breeds more woes than it resolves. Many proponents of
this view turn to privatisation as the answer, expounding the need for government to
divest of its flailing public services and allow the free market room to breathe
competition and efficiency into the provision of services. This has not been solely an
economic argument either, as some, including Peter Senker, have held that government
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privatisation reforms are often pursued far more for ideological concerns than as a 
response to fiscal realities (Senker 1989, p. 180).
Outside the United States, which never fully embraced the social democratic values of 
the welfare state, the United Kingdom was the leader in the type of neo-liberal politics 
which brought influence to bear upon countries in the developed world in the closing 
quarter of the 1900s. Decline in the British economy under post 1945 interventionist 
governments inclined ever increasing numbers of Conservative politicians to see value 
in the ideas of Hayek and the Virginia School economists. The Heath Government 
briefly initiated a process of privatisation but the failure of the strategic Rolls Royce 
aircraft engine company forced his government to retreat from the policy. Heath’s 
successor as Conservative leader, Mrs Thatcher, was far more resolute in seeking the 
longer term advantages of ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’ and her governments 
of the 1980s were strongly influenced by the neo-liberal politics of some of their New 
Right members. The New Right proponents struck at the foundational suppositions 
upon which popular governance had been based, seeking to withdraw state participation 
from the operation of the free economy and radically altering the functions of public 
institutions. Typical sentiments among the New Right can be found in Michael 
Sullivan’s (1992, p. 146) assessment of British welfare state:
The provision of health care, free at the point of use, encouraged demand that 
outstripped supply and caused a decline in medical standards; unemployment 
insurance schemes had encouraged absenteeism and work-shy behaviour; 
unified secondary education had led to a decline in standards by providing 
academic education for more children than can reasonably benefit from it; and 
all, by virtue of their financing out of taxation, had led to an unwarranted 
curtailment of individuals freedom to make decisions about their own lives and 
financial resources.
However, while Thatcher led the way on privatisation, behind the British Government’s 
moves was the example shown by the US that, under President Reagan, was shaking off 
much of Roosevelt’s New Deal legacy from the 1940s. As the US economy became the 
dominant world leader in terms of its size and global reach, its business and economic 
leaders became highly influential in the spread of privatisation. The economic and 
consequent military power of the United States also permeated the thinking of the major 
international organisations for economic regulation, in particular the WTO, the IMF and
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the World Bank. Access to the resources held by these agencies to bail out the 
economies of poorer states required those countries to adopt a more competitive 
liberalised economy, often regardless of internal political and cultural values that might 
counsel more substantive state control. Many smaller regimes, such as the Gulf States, 
could readily see that successful growth, even with their substantial oil wealth, was 
dependent on following the precepts of the world economic leader and moving towards 
more liberal economic policies.
The free economy, the strong state and the New Right
What drives privatisation? Is it legitimate to assess privatisation as simply a dogmatic 
preference for private ownership over ownership by the state? There is an evident 
problem for the proponents of New Right thinking: their ideal balance between the 
power of government and the freeness of economy is easily enough to propose in the 
hypothetical, but how to institute this in a practical context is a much more arduous. 
New Right thinkers have to provide an outline for how the state can be revamped to 
allow the regulations, structures and culture of a free economy to thrive, while at the 
same time checking those forces which would destabilize the market order. While New 
Right philosophy holds the government responsible for the deterioration of the market 
order, it is through the channels of government which the New Right must seek the 
public’s endorsement of their reform programme. The optimal degree of state 
involvement in the economy is not easy to ascertain, as a balance must be found 
between allowing private enterprise to operate without cumbersome state oversight and 
policing the private sector to guarantee the integrity of the markets is upheld. Without 
regulation to ensure market functions are properly maintained and private investment 
rights respected -  which likely entails extensive legislation -  the state could squander its 
authority, having its ability to look out for the general good eroded as it lets slip the 
reins of the market to private interests.
So what is the real driving force behind privatisation? Part of the answer lies in the
drive to modernise the economy. Effective and innovative legislative initiatives can
embolden markets to try and sharpen their competitive edge, creating an environment
where the overall objectives focus on establishing a modem, stream-lined economy. In
this scenario the government’s role is at the helm, ensuring the economy stays on
course, while it is the private sector powering the engines and propelling the economy
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forward. This is a difficult stance for the government to adopt, and was the source of a 
number of the most heated rows during Thatcher’s terms in office. And while the 
government withdrew its heavy hand from the sphere of private enterprise, its grip on 
public services tightened, defying the common notions of a laissez-faire state and 
helping define the New Right as a pervasive and modernising movement. In the 
following pages it is necessary to consider how far the state can stand aside from the 
economic process in capitalist countries in general and in telecommunications provision 
in particular, and leading from this the extent that regulation is necessary.
Is privatisation the right solution?
Most proponents of New Right public choice aims have come to recognise that 
privatisation by itself is not necessarily going to provide the competitive stimulus 
needed to promote efficient service delivery. The success of the privatisation process 
depends in large part on the competitiveness of the market and the effectiveness of the 
regulatory environment (Jackson et al. cited in The General Concepts o f  Privatisation 
n.d. p.32), with another important factor being the affluence of the country attempting 
the privatisation, with some studies showing that the poorer the country, the less likely 
it is that privatisation will achieve positive results (Kikeri et al. 1992, p. 1). As Parker 
and Kirkpatrick (2006, p. 193) articulate: ‘that effective privatisation of infrastructure 
programmes in developing countries requires efficient and effective regulation appears 
axiomatic’. However, effective liberalisation measures to ensure competition following 
on from privatisation may be a more significant spur to growth in many economic 
sectors.
The Bahrain telecommunications scenario is a case in point. Privatised in 1981, the
Bahrain Telecommunications Company (Batelco), the country’s only
telecommunications provider at the time, still has not met the expectations of consumers
in tenns of pricing and product and service selection. For instance until the late 1990s,
consumer product choice in regards to both fixed and mobile phones was limited to
buying what Batelco sold, as other private companies were not allowed to enter the
market. Also by virtue of being a monopoly operator, the consumer had no option but to
accept Batelco’s prices or go without telecommunications services. While the monopoly
situation for telephone equipment and mobile service has changed, Batelco still has a
monopoly with regards to fixed lines. From this perspective, it is revealing to examine
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the views of Jackson et al. (cited in The General Concepts o f  Privatisation n.d., p.32), 
who note that greater competition and restructuring the market are more important than 
change of ownership, with privatisation in-and-of-itself not being enough to foster 
major increases in efficiency levels. The Government of Bahrain, by launching 
telecommunications liberalisation reforms in recent years, had hoped to introduce 
competition. However, even after “liberalising” the telecommunications market in 
Bahrain, Batelco maintained its monopoly on fixed line service, continuing to earn huge 
profits and consumers still pay heavily for services. [It should be noted though, that 
private monopoly in the case of Bahrain has its upside too: Batelco continues to be one 
of the largest job providers for Bahrain, which could be viewed as a contribution to the 
economic growth of the country].
This scenario is consistent with Cook and Uchida’s (2001, p. 20) conclusion that if there 
is a weak regulatory regime in place after a government has earned large profits from a 
privatisation, also accompanied by little or no gain in economic efficiency, than the 
results regarding economic growth will likely be disappointing. Cook and Uchida 
(2001, p. 19), using data from 63 developing nations1, re-evaluated the supposed link 
between privatisation and economic growth, uncovering that the two are only minimally 
related, suggesting that privatisation could actually decrease economic growth. 
Furthermore, while the performance of a privatised SOE in a developing country may 
not improve post privatisation, it has also been show in some cases to actually decrease 
‘because limited regulatory capacity of governments would make arm’s length 
regulation of private monopolies cumbersome and, possibly, unworkable’ (Ramamurti 
1996, p. 38). These results are consistent with the conception of the broader market and 
regulatory climate, as well as the economic, social and political situation, affecting to 
what extent a market with thrive and an economy will grow post-privatisation.
Jochen Boekhoff, in his study ‘Telecommunications in Mexico, Uruguay and 
Argentina: A Tale of Contrasts’, use examples from Latin America to illustrate how it is 
possible for a SOTE to modernize and bring efficiency to a nation’s 
telecommunications sector much more effectively that a privatized and liberalized
1 There is no universally accepted and definitive definition for a ‘developing nation’, but general 
guidelines include a lower ranking on the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI) -  which is a 
comparative measurement of life expectancy, education and standard of living -  a general lack of modem 
infrastructure and an agricultural and/or natural resource dependant economy.
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marketplace. He notes that by 2003, Uruguay -  where a monopoly SOTE controls the 
sector -  had the highest penetration rate of telephone lines of any South American 
country. Argentina’s market was radically different its organization of companies:
The state-owned EnTel was entirely privatized in 1990. Two companies were 
formed, Telecom Argentina (with Telecom of France and Sted, Italy, as 
shareholders) and Telefonica de Argentina (with Telefonica of Spain as the main 
shareholder). International services were licensed to Starlet (owned by Telintar, 
Argentina), and cellular telephony outside the greater Buenos Aires area was 
licensed to Comprehensive Technologies, Inc. (CTI), with GTE Corporation and 
AT&T as shareholder. Inside Buenos Aires, two other companies, CRM (owned 
by Movicom, Bell South and Motorola) and Movistar (owned by Telecom 
Argentina and Telefonica de Argentina) won the license for the cellular network 
(Boekhoff 2005, pp. 73-74).
Yet even with the presence of so many companies in the telecommunications market in 
Argentina, competition was effectively non-existent and ‘infrastructure investments 
actually receded post-privatization’ (Boekhoff 2005, p. 74). Argentina and neighbouring 
Uruguay had, before 1990, comparable rates of telephone line penetration, but during 
the 1990s Uruguay surpassed Argentina in penetration rates: by 2002 Argentina had 
attained 22 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants while Uruguay had 28 (Boekhoff 2005, 
p. 74). Wait times for the installation of new connections was also markedly different 
between the neighbours, with Uruguayan customers experiencing almost no delays by 
1997, while Argentineans could expect extended delay periods even up until 2003. 
Mobile phone charges were just as unequal between the two countries: customers in 
Uruguay saw rates fall in line with the general global trend, while their neighbours in 
Argentina saw the privately owned telecommunications companies -  which generally 
operated as region-specific monopolies -  hold on to their the inflated tariff rates and 
charges for products and services. Even investors benefited more in the Uruguayan 
telecommunications market, earning US$7.5 per each dollar invested in the second half 
of the 1990s, while during the corresponding timeframe in Argentina investors took in 
US$4 per dollar invested.
Boekhoff remarked that Argentina endured capital flight and currency dollarisation, 
which stifled potential growth in the market, while ‘the territorial and functional 
confines of the privatized networks were not designed to create competition, and no 
anti-trust laws were applied’ (Boekhoff 2005, p. 75). By contrast, Uruguay’s
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government had a steady hand at the helm, guiding a quickly advancing 
telecommunications sector by investing where investment was needed to achieve its 
goals of establishing a nationwide, modernized telecommunications infrastructure. The 
most significant conclusion Boekhoff drew from this example is that is privatisation -  in 
and of itself -  is not necessarily preferable or more beneficial to a government owned 
and operated monopoly, even considering the quick pace of innovation and 
technological adaptation characterizing the global telecommunications industry (2005, 
p. 76).
An example of this from the developed world is offered by Muller and Toker in their 
examination mobile telecommunications development in Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
and Finland. They note that the phenomenal growth of mobile penetration rates and 
product development in Scandinavian countries in the early 1980s occurred within the 
context of heavy state involvement and ‘very often near monopoly situations’ (Muller & 
Toker 1994, pp. 197-198). Muller and Toker thus posit that Nordic countries illustrate 
that the parameters needed for successful telecommunications market development are: 
‘achieving international market size and having high pre-capita income -  which lower 
the relative cost of using cellular phones -  and effective marketing’ (Muller & Toker 
1994, p. 198).
Thomas and Max Thummel offer another sobering example of the limits o f privatisation 
in promoting general economic benefit, even in developed nations, in their study 
‘Privatization of Telecommunications in Japan’. Before 1985, Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone Corporation (NTT) was the monopolist SOTE. Partially privatized in 1985, 
in 1996 NTT and the Japanese regulatory authority inked a deal which would see NTT 
split, by 1999, into two companies responsible for the regional market and third 
company exclusively in the market of overseas calling. All three were held by a holding 
company which itself was semi-privatized, with these moves regarded as progress 
towards eventually fully privatizing NTT (Thummel T & Thummel M 2005, p. 77).
As the two Thummels note however, the stated goals of ‘simplification, improvement in
management efficiency and increased transparency’ were hardly realized. It had been
hoped that a more efficiently run company would translate into cheaper services for
customers, but instead the result was to the contrary: customers ended up paying more
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for local calls, public telephones and monthly contracts, and services that had 
previously been gratis were now charged for, such as directory assistance. More than 
half of NTT’s some 300,000 employees lost their jobs and those remaining saw their 
wages fall. However, the greatest failing of Japan’s privatisation experiment was that it 
failed in its primary aim of creating competition in the nation’s telecommunications 
industry, which the architects of the policy had hoped would then lead to greater 
competitive performance of the economy generally (Thummel T & Thummel M 2005, 
p. 77).
The Thiimmels attribute the poor results arriving from privatisation to ‘persistent 
monopoly structures’ that allowed NTT to dominate the entire domestic 
telecommunications market in Japan and stifle the entry of competitors, at the same 
time that the company was able to aggressively assert itself in the long-distance market. 
The authors then concluded that:
Privatisation will not increase efficiency and reduce prices through competition 
if it leaves monopolistic structures and practices in place. Supervision and 
intervention by established supervisory authorities such as the JFTC (Japan Fair 
Trade Commission) must be provided for in privatisation legislation... It is 
important in the first place, however, to fully assess the likely share of the 
market of a company to be privatized and its future role as a market player. In 
this way a privatization structure can be designed deliberately to avoid market 
dominance by the privatized company. Regulation to enforce competitive 
practices, ensure technological advances and prevent market control needs to 
form part of privatization.
The question of state ownership share in any partial privatization requires 
careful analysis in terms of its potential role as either an anti-monopoly, pro­
competition measure, or as a tool to ensure that social benefit provisions and 
commitments are upheld and not lost in the march to private profit.
However, privatisation, properly planned and executed, can produce significant benefits
for not just the industry, but the economy generally [examples abound, and
examinations of the American, British, European and other countries’ experiences with
privatisation and liberalisation of their telecommunications sector will be undertaken in
the next chapter]. Chief among these benefits are: increased investment in the sector,
improvements in service quality, cutting public expenditure and ‘innovation and
capacity building’ (Beisheim et al. 2005, p. 352). Regarding increased investments, this
often comes about given that the public purses are typically tight and large investments
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in new infrastructure in any given industry can be financially burdensome, and are thus 
avoided; in the private sector however, if there is an opportunity for future profit, 
companies will find it enticing to carry out the investment. Regarding improvements in 
services, ‘in the case of telecommunications, the quality of services has improved 
dramatically after privatisation, although it remains unclear what proportion of that 
effect has to do with private ownership and how much stems from technological 
progress’ (Beisheim et al. 2005, p. 353). In terms of cutting public expenditure, there 
exists the general understanding that privatization increases efficiency, in that 
privatisation usually eliminates previous limitations against shedding redundant staff. In 
regards to innovation and capacity building, the spur of competition has the tendency to 
motivate companies to develop faster and in ways more innovative than publicly own 
companies who feel complacently assured of their security in the marketplace -  i.e. 
competition pushes companies to try and ‘get ahead’ of their competitors by seeking out 
the newest and most advanced methods and products, and such is the modernizing 
effect of privatisation (Beisheim et al. 2005, p. 353).
This final possible result of privatisation, that it can push an industry to increased levels 
of innovation, could be the strongest of the arguments in favour of privatisation, as it 
intrinsically includes increased levels of technological aptitude -  i.e. a company needs 
to elevate its skills and knowledge capacity to capitalise on the advantages the latest 
technological advancements offer in order to attempt to get ahead of its competitors. 
(Beisheim et al. 2005, p. 353).
The stages o f  telecommunications reform.
In short, there are three steps that have generally been identified in the process of 
privatizing and liberalizing a nation’s telecommunications company (Ramamurti 1996, 
p. 34). The first stage is the telecommunications market is dominated by a state-owned- 
and-operated monopoly. The second step begins immediately after privatisation of the 
SOTE, either completely or in part, and the creation of a regulated private monopoly, 
and it is in this phase that the incumbent operator will fight to stay as a guaranteed 100 
per cent of the market share tends to allow for the greatest profit. It is common for the 
second stage to last between five and 10 years. In the third stage the ‘regulator will have 
to ensure that new entrants can interconnect with the monopolist’s network on
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reasonable terms and compete with it fairly’ (Ramamurti 1996, p. 34), thereby, in theory 
and in the optimal outcomes, resulting in a competitive market.
The political process of privatisation
Taking into account the above country examples, it is apparent that ownership can affect 
the performance of an enterprise considerably. Sunita Kikeri, John Nellis and Mary 
Shirley (2001) note that in nations both developed and developing, it is exceedingly 
hard to achieve and maintain a high level of performance from SOEs, and that 
governments in fiscal trouble will frequently attempt to increase the output and 
efficiency of these enterprises by hiring new management. The new managers are given 
incentives to ‘shake things up’ and carry out new cost-cutting and revenue-gaining 
measures, which are usually effective but only to a certain point.
As the crisis dissipates, so does political resolve. Political interference, a 
common and deadly disease of SOEs, tends to re-emerge -  and painfully 
achieved SOE reforms tend to backslide. SOEs thought to be well on the road to 
recovery have either stopped improving performance or suffered deterioration 
(Kikeri et al. 1992, p. 2).
According to William Garrison (2004, p. 7), political ideology contributes significantly 
to privatisation. This played out heavily in the UK as Thatcher’s privatisation plans 
were envisioned with an overall focus on withdrawing the public sector from the 
economy and revamping the institutions of Government. The vein of privatisation ran so 
deeply as to occupy a major portion of the Conservative Government’s platform from 
its election in 1979 until its eventual defeat in 1997. Though bom of the Thatcher 
Conservatives, privatisation became at least accepted, if  not actively promoted by the 
other parties in parliament (Pollitt 1999, p. 30).
As a policy choice however major privatisations, and of particular interest to this thesis,
major telecommunications reforms, are often considered contentious moves for a state
in the eyes of the public, thus requiring the commitment of the uppermost levels of
governments for the outcome to be successful. According to a 1997 World Bank report,
governments must also maintain transparency so that each step is fully accessible to
public scrutiny to ensure the fairness and the integrity of the process (Guislain 1997, p.
118). In the same report Pierre Guislain notes the importance of ‘efficient institutional
structures and mechanisms and of providing involved officials with the right set of
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incentives to ensure effective implementation of privatisation programs’ (Guislain 1997, 
p. 295). One way to do this is to create an arms-length government agency responsible 
for carrying out the steps towards privatisation. ‘International experience shows that 
clear responsibilities and mandates, streamlines process, access to resources and 
advisory services, political support, and accountability of the privatisation officials may 
matter more than the organization themselves’ (Guislain 1997, p. 296).
It would seem only natural however, for there to be some inclination among politicians 
and members of the public service to uphold the institutions they are associated with. As 
Pete Alcock discusses, this would tend to push public policies in a ‘pro-welfare’ 
direction, and ‘may explain, for instance, why the Thatcher Governments of the 1980s 
in the UK were unable, or unwilling, to replace the National Health Service in the 
country, although their New Right advisors had suggested that this should be a major 
policy aim’ (Papadakis & Gooby, cited in Alcock n.d., p. 13). As Alcock notes, there is 
significant evidence to imply that the forces guiding the process of politics influence the 
welfare policies of the state, regardless of the economic environment in which they 
function.
The need for regulation
The term the ‘invisible hand’, which purports that each autonomous person increases 
the general good through the pursuit of his own egoistic behaviour, was coined by the 
British scholar Adam Smith in his 1776 seminal work An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes o f  the Wealth o f  Nations. And while the historic successes of capitalist and free 
market economies would complement the theory that the ‘invisible hand’ is at play, 
transferring self-interested gains into wider benefits for the society, this may be limited 
to the economy of private goods, but not public goods.
Leon Felkins (1997, p. 8) illustrates this point using the fisheries. The example follows
that all the fish stocks in the sea are a ‘public good’, i.e. a commonly shared resource. A
fisherman’s income is based on the amount of fish he catches, so the inclination of
every self-interested fisherman is to catch as many fish as possible to maximize his
income. If a fisherman chooses to limit his catch, attempting to preserve the fish stocks
for the future, he will simply be decreasing his income and leaving more fish for the
others to catch as they maximize their own income. Consequently, every fisherman will
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fish as much as he can. Given that fish stocks are limited and need time to regenerate, 
this type of fishing effort will eventually collapse the stocks, leaving no fish for anyone 
to catch. Far from the invisible hand helping to spread widely the benefits of self- 
interested behaviour, in regards to ‘public goods’ it appears self-interested behaviour 
can lead to commonly shared hardship. Thus there appears to be an obvious need for 
regulation of the industries dependant on scarce resources, as unregulated competition 
can be a detriment to all involved.
Applied to telecommunications, aside from Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 
telecommunications companies need to make heavy capital investments to create mobile 
and fixed communications networks with national and international reach. In this 
context, a host of smaller businesses investing heavily in functionally identical yet 
operationally independent networks covering the same areas would likely be painfully 
costly, economically inefficient and ultimately unsustainable for all involved, while 
conflicts would unavoidably emerge as the individual enterprises battled for bandwidth 
control.
The pillars o f  regulation
One definition put forward for regulation is ‘a state imposed limitation on the discretion
that may be exercised by individuals or organizations, which is supported by the threat
of sanction’ (Stone cited in Harrington et al. 2005, p. 357). But what purpose should
market regulation serve? This needs to be defined in order for it to be possible to have
an effective regulation policy enforced in the market place. While it will obviously
differ for different industries, and needs to be adapted to the specific socio-political and
economic contexts of the various regions in which regulation is the enacted, it is
possible to identify common ‘themes’ for regulation among theorists. Nightingale
(1995, pp. 255-256) has suggested that, from the conventional perspective, the aims of
regulation are to prevent price gouging and glutinous profiteering by monopolists, to
ensure dominant firms ‘play fair’ in their captive markets, and to restrain companies
from ‘unscrupulous tactics’ in undermining rivals. He then posits that in the more
contemporary mindset, ‘the by-words of the modem regulator are such phrases as “open
to entry”, “breaking down the barriers to market forces” and “enforcing the pace of
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change’” (Nightingale 1995, p. 256). Similarly, Walden and Angel (2005, p. 25) hold 
that principle among the tenets of regulation is the need to restrain market exploitation 
by monopolistic entities, such as charging excessively for services or products, or, better 
put, charging substantially more for the service or product than the cost would be if  the 
market were competitive. Littlechild’s view is important to consider here, that being:
Competition is indisputably the most effective means -  perhaps the only 
effective means -  of protecting consumers against monopoly power. Regulation 
is essentially a means of preventing the worst excesses of monopoly; it is not a 
substitute for competition. It is a means of ‘holding the fort’ until the 
competition arrives. Consequently, the main focus of attention has to be on 
securing the most promising conditions for competition to emerge, and 
protecting competition from abuse. It is important that regulation in general... 
does not prejudice the achievement of this overall strategy (Littlechild 1983, p. 
11).
Following from this is the principle that regulation should not be used or applied where 
it is not needed -  a market characterized by a healthy, competitive dynamic should not 
be hamstrung with unnecessary intrusions, as this would warp the natural functioning of 
the business model. At the same time, in a sector in which competition is being choked 
and there is an apparent failure in aspects of the free market model, regulation should be 
used as a tool to form the framework in which competition can be realized. ‘It is 
important to thus recognize that the competitive playing field can be distorted by 
economic regulation and so due care must be taken in its implementation’ (Walden & 
Angel 2005, p. 25). Related to this, it is preferable that the systems initiated by the 
application of regulation have the affect of mimicking how it is a competitive market 
would function, if indeed one existed.
As well, the expenses incurred in the application of regulation ought to be kept lean. 
Given the hindrances posed to a nation’s industries through the application of overly 
stringent oversight by state institutions, a salient facet of privatisation logic is to 
decrease ‘detailed control over essentially business decisions’ (Walden & Angel 2005, 
p. 25). Market regulation ought to avoid being so heavy as to have its results appear 
similar to what would be arrived at under a state-owned-and-operated industry.
In regards to the regulation of network industries -  such as telecommunications -  Finger 
(2005, p. 294) notes that ‘responsibility for insuring public policy objectives falls back
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from the operators to the political authorities’, and that there are five objectives which 
ought to be aimed for in the regulation of these industries. The following list, taken 
from a section o f Finger’s paper entitled ‘The Five Main Objectives of Regulation in the 
Network Industries’ (Finger 2005, p. 294-295) illuminates these goals:
1 -  Liberalization means competition: The most important regulatory function to 
be provided in a liberalized environment is, thus, to regulate competition, 
including stimulating it i f  it does not emerge spontaneously. Where competition 
in the market is not possible... competition regulation should seek instead to 
create competition fo r  the market -  fo r  example, by awarding a franchise to 
operate the grid fo r a fixed period through a competitive bidding process. Thus, 
competition regulation does apply to all network industries, as well as to all 
liberalized sectors.
2 -  Liberalisation requires unbundling, and unbundling means fragmentation: 
Consequently, a second, most important, function o f regulation is to ensure the 
system ’s integrity. This matters most where coherence o f the network is a pre­
condition fo r  the provision o f the public service -  fo r  example, in railways 
(coherence between infrastructure and train operators), gas and electricity 
(coherence between production, transport and distribution), and water. 
Regulation here must ensure that the different components are well articulated 
(e.g. that competing trains can access the rail infrastructure, but without 
overloading it).
3 -  Political authorities must also ensure that the system evolves and learns 
from  experience: Once different segments o f  an infrastructure system are 
unbundled, the actors start to behave strategically (i.e. furthering their own 
commercial interests rather than those o f  the system). Regulation must therefore 
also ensure that the system adapts to changing demands and technology. 
Telecommunications services must keep up with technological advances; the 
electricity system must ensure security o f  supply. This challenging regulatory 
function requires substantial capacity and competence in the regulator.
4 -  The regulator must ensure that both ‘services in the general interest ’ (for 
citizens) and ‘universal services’ (for consumers) continue to be provided, as 
operators no longer have an interest to provide such services by themselves, 
given that these public services are, in general, less lucrative than commercial 
services. This is especially the case in the access o f  the poor to basic services. 
Using the example o f  water services, Sudhoff shows that a poverty-oriented 
regulation policy is possible through binding guidelines on price, supply and 
competition... But there is essentially a need fo r  reliable and strong public 
authorities.
5 -  Finally, there is the function o f  regulating access to, and the use of, the 
scarce (public) resource. Such scarce resources do not exists in all sectors, and 
regulation here is limited to specific sectors, such as the water sector (water as 
a scarce resource), the air transport sector (regulation o f  scarce airspace), and 
the telecommunications and audiovisual sector (regulation o f  spectrum).
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Government’s role in regulation and accountability
Who does the regulating is also important to consider. Given the large number of 
articles this author has read in the course of this study which considered the options for 
regulation in a free market, in none did there appear to be strong support for the 
supposition that the optimal situation is one where government would assume for itself 
constant and direct legislative oversight in the regulation of a privatized industry, and in 
particular telecommunications. This, of course, is not to say that there are not those who 
believe in heavy, direct and spontaneous state dictation of the rules by which a nation’s 
privatized telecommunications market is to function -  it would appear, however, that 
this point of view is either in the minority or that its advocates are asserting themselves 
less forcefully in the general body of literature on the subject. The apparent judgment of 
the overwhelmingly majority those who have studied telecommunications privatisation 
and liberalisation -  despite all the other difference they may have -  is that if  there is to 
be a regulator in a free market at all, then it should be an agency at arm’s length from 
the political wrangling, cyclical turnover and ideological instabilities of the elected 
representatives of the populous -  that is independent, or at least semi-independent 
enough from government to offer market participants a semblance of consistency in 
policy and procedure through the inevitable inconstancies inherent in democratically 
elected governments.
This, however, brings about the question of regulator accountability -  which will be
shown to be a major concern regarding the Bahraini situation. Baldwin and Cave
examined the issue of regulator accountability in the UK, though their findings can be
used guidelines in the broader context. Among their suggestions was that regulators be
required to report annually before a special committee appointed by the government and
have hearings made public, as ‘such scrutiny would enhance democratic accountability’
(Baldwin & Cave 1999, p. 287). Another suggestion they offer involves obliging the
regulator to present ministers with regular ‘rolling plans of action’ for approval, with
the ministers then laying out guidelines for how to proceed, which would be taken
before parliament for acceptance. Baldwin and Cave contend that this type of
accountability structure would keep government from interfering in the process of
regulation on a day-to-day basis, while allowing for ‘regulatory regimes to be assessed
against performance targets and would prevent regulators from pursuing their own
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personal, ideological or bureaucratic agendas’ (Baldwin & Cave 1999, p. 288). Though 
Baldwin and Cave admit their system is not without its own potential shortfalls, it could 
be regarded as a possible solution to the threat of regulatory ‘capture’, described above. 
They also further suggest that the government could require more stringent cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) on the part of the regulator -  i.e. require that the regulator scrutinize 
each major reform it plans to implement, submit a report detailing the possible costs and 
benefits resulting from the reform and only allow the implementation reforms 
forecasted to bring about net benefit (Baldwin & Cave 1999, p. 86). Among the possible 
positive effects of CBA are improved regulator rational in decision-making and 
increased transparency of the regulatory process, though among the potential faults of 
CBA is the danger of slowing the pace of regulatory reform to the point where it is 
unresponsive to emerging issues in the industry.
Examples o f  regulatory mechanisms
Having discussed a portion of the literature and theories concerning regulation, it would 
be useful to discuss forms of regulation which have been attempted. One of these is 
known as ‘rate-of-retum’ regulation. The basic premise of this form of regulation is that 
there is an optimal -  or ‘fair’ -  level of return a company should be able to obtain from 
its capital investments, and that prices paid by the consumer should be set to allow for 
this. Thus a company’s capacity for profit is capped relative to what is deemed its 
allowable rate of return on capital (Walden & Angel 2005, p. 25). The trouble with this 
form of regulation is that it warps the context in which business decisions are made: in 
seeking to maximize profits, a company would be motivated to grow its capital 
investment base to manipulate its allotted rate of return. Although operational 
inefficiency is not naturally in a company’s interest, if  the cost of inefficiency due to the 
acquisition of redundant or unneeded capital investments is less than the increased rate 
of return -  i.e. profit -  that company is allotted as a result o f the extra capital 
investments, then it is in the company’s interest to load up on capital investments to 
point where the inefficiency vs. rate-of-return equation balances out to profit 
maximization. The damage this form of regulation can cause to the natural market 
mechanisms of an industry sector and its economic efficiency is thus obvious. Another 
issue identified with rate-of-retum regulation is it targets the entire business operation, 
as opposed to being able to select judiciously those segments where regulation is most
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required -  i.e. areas where monopoly market abuses are apparent (Walden & Angel 
2005, p. 26).
Seeking to address the evident flaws in rate-of-retum regulation, Professor Stephen 
Littlechild of Birmingham University arrived at the now widely recognized ‘RPI-X’ 
formula.
This formula caps a selected basket of the incumbent’s prices for a period of 
four to five years. These prices can then increase annually by the Retail Price 
Index (RPI) minus the X factor with the later being set by the regulator in the 
light of the presumed movement of productivity and costs within the industry. 
Within this four to five year period, the regulated company can then keep any 
extra profits generated by increased efficiency. And at the end of the review 
period, new price controls can be implemented which take account of the 
efficiency gains in the previous period (Walden & Angel 2005, p. 26).
The RPI-X formula thus allows companies to profit from increased efficiency, thus 
motivating this type of behaviour -  as opposed to straight rate of return regulation, 
which can motivate inefficient acquisition of capital. The RPI-X formula is not overly 
complicated or complex to apply and can be targeted to those specific areas of the 
industry which are deemed to be in need of regulation to avoid monopoly abuse. The 
formula is not without its own difficulties however, as setting the rate and duration of 
the price cap requires reliable estimates on prospective future developments in the 
market -  information not always readily accessible to regulators.
Natural monopoly
Regulation is necessary where a service can only be established as a natural monopoly. 
The case of British Rail cited above is particularly relevant in this context. In 
telecommunications, the large operational economies of scale have contributed to the 
monopolistic character of the sector [i.e. while the initial capital investment needed to 
set up a telecommunications network can be massive, the marginal cost o f connecting 
each additional subscriber through that network is relatively small; with each new 
customer that is acquired, the average cost of running the network drops, with 
significant profits resulting once there is a wide subscriber base].
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In the history of the US, natural monopolies and their regulation by government often 
came about in what could be considered ‘infrastructural industries’ such as 
transportation, communication, banking, energy, etc. -  i.e. industries deemed to be 
necessary for the rest of the economy and national commerce to function. In regards to 
telephony, the federal government sanctioned the sector as being in the realm of a 
‘natural monopoly’, and set up agencies to regulate the industry and ensure the growth 
of the network from coast to coast. According to Horwitz (1989, p. 12) ‘The FCC 
attended to the public interest in telecommunications largely by protection of the 
existing structures o f telephony and broadcasting (and the corporation which provided 
those services)’. To see to it that goods and services were able to pass efficiently 
through the networks of these infrastructural industries, legislation was enacted to 
enforce ‘common carrier regulatory controls on the means of circulation’ (Horwitz 
1989, p. 13). The main idea behind common carrier law was that the service must be 
offered at a non-exploitive cost and access must be granted on a non-discriminatory 
basis.
Non-discrimination would ensure that carriers would serve the needs of 
commerce rather than inhibit commerce. Part of the provision of non- 
discriminatory access to their services meant that common carriers were 
mandated to interconnect their lines with other carriers. Most often carriers were 
characterized by economies of scale and were granted monopoly franchises. 
Among other things, such franchises were granted the right to take private 
property for public use... These legal tools facilitated the construction of an 
overall network. Regulatory oversight would ensure non-discriminatory service 
and ‘fair’ rates. Regulation thus took advantage of certain efficiencies deriving 
from the monopolistic organization of capital while presumably protecting 
against the abuses that monopoly power could bring. The key to common carrier 
law -  and the regulation of infrastructure industries generally -  rests in the fact 
that it satisfies the contradictory demand for a unified plan of national 
development within a system of private property (Horwitz 1989, p. 13).
It should be noted, however, that the relevance ‘natural monopolies’ once held faded 
through the 1900s and continues to shed importance today as the lines that once solidly 
distinguished the realms of certain products and services from others have begun to blur 
with technological advancements, while information regarding options for the 
substitution of these products and services has become ever more expansive and 
available to consumers. As Robinson (2003, p. 168) notes: ‘Simply put, few of us are as 
hostage to any monopolist as we might have been a century ago’; examples include
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being able to -  in some markets -  substitute fixed-line telephone services with cellular, 
fixed wireless or cable telephony, or should electricity utility charges become exorbitant 
or the service below acceptable, consumers can buy their own generators. The level of 
service substitution options there are -  substitutions which allow an avenue of relief 
from the grip of monopoly power -  have been growing in number as the wheels of 
technological innovation have spun through the years.
Risks o f  over-regulation
There are a substantial number of theorists who discuss the dangers of ‘over-regulating’ 
an industry -  i.e. the dangers of governments or regulators imposing so many 
preconditions, demands and limits upon participants in a certain industry as to warp its 
business dynamics and destroy the benefits which would otherwise accrue from 
competition. Crandall and Hausman make just such a claim regarding the 1996 
Telecommunications Act in the US. The proponents of this piece of legislation asserted 
that, in opening up local telecommunications markets to competition, it expanded upon 
previous moves by the American Government which saw long-distance markets 
exposed to competition; the cumulative effect being the establishment of economic 
environment conducive to the ‘deployment of advanced telecommunications and 
information technologies and services to all Americans’ (Crandall & Hausman 2000, p. 
74). However, the 1996 Telecommunications Act dramatically expanded the scope of 
regulation. Among other things it increased the range of services falling under the 
umbrella of universal service obligations, as well as mandated that regulators ‘establish 
cost-based wholesale prices for incumbents’ facilities so that entrants may lease those 
facilities and be relieved of the burden of building their own facilities’, which in turn 
led to years of protracted legal and regulatory battles (Crandall & Hausman 2000, pp. 
74-75). Although competition did begin to develop after the legislation was enacted, 
Crandall & Hausman contended that it was at an excruciatingly slow place, and that had 
the regulation been less pervasive and complicated, benefits for the users of 
telecommunications services would have been more profound and faster to arrive.
The enormous welfare gains that are potentially available from the development 
of these new services and from the movement of prices of traditional 
telecommunications services to competitive levels are being squandered in the 
belief that detailed regulation is the best route to competition. A much less 
regulatory regime stressing open entry and simplified reciprocal compensation
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for interconnection would have been far more effective in promoting entry and 
investment (Crandall & Hausman 2000, p. 75).
The strategic importance o f  the industry
The need to regulate an industry in the private sector may also be a consequence of its 
strategic importance to the economy. Indeed in many instances this factor has, in the 
first half of the 20th century, been a major reason behind the nationalisation of the 
industry. In Britain for example the nationalisation of the coal or rail industries were in 
a large measure a consequence of the failure of the then private sector to deliver 
efficiency in businesses vital to the national economy. In the context of this thesis 
telecommunications also has an important strategic role, especially given that 
communications on a world wide basis is crucial to financial markets. The successes 
and failures of the telecommunications sector are not limited to that sector, but impact 
across the broad spectrum of the entire economy. This has led more proactive 
governments to establish policies to secure a strong telecommunications sector, which 
had implied a state-owned telecommunications enterprise (SOTE) as a monopoly in the 
sector until Thatcher brought the privatisation agenda to prominence.
Effective regulation of telecommunications is imperative for a state seeking to give the 
commerce and business on which it relies the competitive advantage of mass, 
worldwide, instant communication. In the context of Bahrain, as shall be argued, this 
concern is extremely relevant as the Kingdom, as well as other Gulf States such as 
Qatar, are attempting to establish themselves as both regional and global financial hubs. 
A substandard telecommunications network could have devastating consequences for 
the future prospects of Bahrain’s economy.
Telecommunication, the information society and the advancement of capitalism
‘Society is often seen as the sum of the communications that take place within it’, (May 
2002, p. 9) thus advancements in the ways and means by which a society communicates 
-  i.e. communication technologies -  have the potential to reshape the functioning 
mechanisms and operations of that society. In The Coming o f Post-Industrial Society 
(1974), Daniel Bell illuminated the changing dynamics that innovations in 
communication technology would bring to societal structures. Specifically he what saw 
as salient about the ‘post-industrial society is the change in the character of knowledge
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itself (Bell 1974, p. 24). One aspect of the modem information society, especially in 
regards to the World Wide Web, is it empowers individual actors in the realm of “mass” 
communication; theoretically, anyone with a computer and access to the internet can 
have audience of hundreds of millions of people almost instantaneously. ‘This idea of 
the rise of the individualized knowledge-adept social actor is one of the most repeated 
elements of the information age’ (May 2002, p. 7). Marshall McLuhan, who coined the 
phrase ‘the medium is the message’, helped popularize the idea that the ever-rolling 
wave of technological advancements in communications fields alters our perspective of 
the world -  technology changes how a society sees itself, the environment around it, 
and even has the ability to redefine what the boundaries of a society are considered to 
be.
In regards to the theoretical underpinnings of how advancement in telecommunications 
technology affects the markets and the globalized economy of the modem day, an 
interesting point of view is taken up by May and his reading Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels’ The Communist Manifesto, relative to the role communication plays in 
facilitating capitalism. In the third volume of the Manifesto, entitled Capital, Marx 
examines the ‘circulation of capital from money to commodity and back to capital 
again, which allows the extraction of surplus and therefore the accumulation of wealth’ 
(May 2002, p. 37). The idea goes that capital is invested in production, the fruits of 
production are then sold for more than the original investment and a surplus, or profit, is 
made -  adding to the originally allotment and thus able to be reinvested.
The faster the circulation (the more times in any given period an amount of 
capital can be used to produce commodities), the higher the possible overall 
capital accumulation. This leads [Marx] to note that ‘the chief means of reducing 
the time of circulation is improved communication’. While in this instance Marx 
was concerned with physical communication, roads, railways and shipping, this 
was due to the physicality of the products capitalism focused on at the time. In 
the age of information products, a similar relationship between informational 
products/services, the speed of communication and possibilities for capital 
accumulation can be observed. Thus the move to business models which have 
promised instantaneous ICT-mediated delivery of services or products is 
intended to radically shorten the cycle Marx observed, from laying out money 
for production (of goods and services) to getting it back in payment (with 
profit). But even material goods’ cycles can be shortened by the deployment of 
powerful ICTs (May 2002, p.37)
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May then uses the example of Dell computers, where customers can put together the 
constituents of their order the Dell website, which is feed directly into Dell’s processing 
and production mechanisms, increasing delivery speed (thus decreasing wait time for 
the circulation of payment money back to Dell), resulting in Dell being an incredibly 
profitable company. [It should also be noted that the ‘do it yourself customer order 
website also reduced labour cost of having to employ a human to do the same job]. 
Thus, through May’s treatment of Marx, it would seem to be evident that increased 
communications capacity (which, in the ‘information society’, is through ICTs,) directly 
affects the economic cycle and offers increased potential for wealth accumulation.
Normative issues
Stability and equality
While there may be reservations about the effectiveness of privatisation and 
liberalisation establishing an efficient and effective service, the most bitter objections to 
New Right theory concern normative rather than economic and managerial issues. In 
many regimes left wing opposition to privatisation relates to fears that privatisation and 
liberalisation will be socially divisive, allowing the wealthy to gain from competitive 
forces producing more advanced and efficient services but at a cost that puts these 
services out of reach of the poorer sectors of the community. The trickle down effect 
also has no value to critics who are arguing that any society should, as its priority, 
secure equal access to resources and opportunities for all within society. In this context, 
therefore, the objections in many states to privatisation have been most severe from 
socialist groups who are unable to accept on normative grounds the inegalitarian 
tendencies of a free market.
To offset this, regulatory systems may be established, not only to prevent private 
interests from making excessive profits from a monopoly position or from the formation 
of cartels between major competitors, but also to ensure the means that will enable the 
services concerned to reach all sectors of the population, either through subsidy or 
enforced price controls. In the context of telecommunications this can therefore involve 
requirements that a basic level of service provision, for example through low 
technology fixed lines, is widely available and can be supplied cheaply. In regimes 
where parts of the country are remote and inaccessible, regulation may be necessary to
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force suppliers to provide telephone services to such areas even though the cost of such 
provision would not be commercially viable for the companies concerned.
In the context of telecommunications in Bahrain there has been, as will be argued in 
more detail later, relatively little opposition to privatisation within an oil-rich Gulf State 
that has sufficient income to provide effective social services for at least its indigenous 
population, if  not the many migrant workers attracted to the Kingdom. Public 
anticipation of price reductions, improved services and new job opportunities is also 
aiding acceptance of the telecommunications reform agenda.
Cultural preservation
A second normative challenge to privatisation in countries such as Bahrain concerns 
opposition to cultural change which may be viewed by some as an opposition to the 
encroachment of Western or more specifically American values. This factor relates 
more specifically to telecommunications than any other form of state owned activity and 
fears of cultural invasion are particularly fanned by the advent of the internet and the 
World Wide Web. In the context of a devoutly Muslim Kingdom, those citizens who 
wish to retain traditional values may well be concerned at the erosion of what they see 
as fundamental social values through exposure to the morals of a secular Western way 
of life.
While traditional Islamic beliefs infonn large segments of society in Bahrain, this does 
not equate to inherent animosity toward Western culture. Relative to its neighbours in 
the region, Bahrain is a tolerant Kingdom with a healthy acceptance of diversity, largely 
attributed to hundreds of years as a major centre for foreign trade passing through the 
Arabian Gulf. Today many Bahrainis prefer to dress in fashionable Western clothing 
rather than the traditional Arab garb and women, who are assuming ever more 
significant social-economic and political roles, often choose not to where the hijab in 
public. Just over one third of the total population of some 700,000 people are foreign 
expatriates (Population Indicators 2006), and while at times this can give rise to some 
measure of tension, generally the result has been to breed a more liberal national 
temperament. Consequently, while there is a degree o f concern that exists, and will be
2 Traditional Muslim headscarf worn by women
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discussed more fully in later chapters, people in Bahrain generally do not appear to be 
overtly alarmed that their social-value system faces immanent erosion in the wake of the 
Internet and other telecommunications services.
Theories o f  regulation
Given the economic and business concerns that may emanate from excessive 
privatisation as indicated in the preceding paragraphs, governments can rarely privatise 
major strategic businesses without recourse to some form of regulation to try and limit 
the worst excesses of a laissez faire economy.
The framework for regulation has, however, generally been developed in most countries 
not on any meta-organisational level as a function of the state that must be planned as a 
consistent whole with clear aims and objectives. For the most part regulatory systems 
emerge with the decision to privatise and liberalise on a piecemeal basis to suit the 
particular economic and political concerns of critics of the specific business in question. 
Thus, in the pioneering development of privatisation in Britain, regulatory systems were 
developed specifically on an industry by industry basis within the legislation dealing 
with a specific privatisation. The consequence has been regulators that are specific to 
the problems of a specific industry, but also a very variable quality in the extent that 
regulation may be effective.
A particular concern for governments in relation to the regulatory process is whether the 
regulator has only the technical function of a referee, in the context of awarding 
contracts to what are likely to be monopolistic businesses, or whether the regulator has a 
major role in ensuring many of the normative critiques of privatisation are assuaged; i.e. 
a regulator who will have a substantive role in controlling the commercial policies of 
the businesses concerned to avoid profiteering or the unequal distribution of essential 
services. Simplistically these differences can be classed as light or heavy touch 
regulation but in practice the position may be more complex, as in certain services 
where, for example, new competitors can easily enter the field, such as care homes for 
the elderly, a light touch may be sufficient in respect to price but arguably for an 
essential service affecting health and safety a more heavier presence in the context of 
health and safety.
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In the context of telecommunications within developed states such as Britain and the 
US, regulation tends more toward the light touch of the referee between a few large 
competitors, especially in relation to fixed line provision. The issues related above 
concerning scarcity of resources necessitate controls over the award of contracts to 
supply fixed lines, in the context of efficiency and disruption of the environment, and in 
the context of radio communications to the limits to which wavebands can be 
technically made available. Thus, regulators such as the Office o f Communications in 
Britain are involved as a relatively impartial umpire of a bidding process for the right to 
provide fixed lines or wavebands. The process has been used by the central government 
as an uncontroversial method of gaining revenue through the sale of contracts and hence 
arguably develops a function over and above simply ensuring that the best provider 
secures the limited resources available.
In the functioning of a market regulator, among the most important factors regarding its 
effectiveness, as identified by the International Telecommunication Union, is the quality 
o f ‘transparency’:
Transparency is a means of ensuring fairness in the regulatory process... The 
principle of transparency translates into the practice of making regulatory 
decisions in an open, objective manner that allows regulators to explain the 
reasoning behind their decisions and to be held accountable for their actions. 
Transparency not only helps the public and the regulated industry, it can help the 
regulators as well. Transparency allows regulators to gain information and 
consult all stakeholders, thus building some political consensus for their 
decisions. It also allows regulators to justify their actions by citing the facts 
provided to them and by making cogent arguments that those actions will serve 
the public interest. Transparency may inoculate regulators from charges that 
they have rendered arbitrary decisions, behind closed doors, for reasons of 
personal gain or to benefit a certain company (ITU cited in Sanchez and Hwa 
2003, p. 14).
As will be discussed in later chapters, the issue of transparency is among the major 
factors playing a role in the effectiveness of the telecommunications regulator in 
ensuring competition in the Kingdom of Bahrain.
A further normative concern may also involve pricing policy for the service where 
liberalisation has not been brought to bear on the supply o f the service. This proved to 
be a considerable issue in Britain until the 1990s when liberalisation, partly through the
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technological developments of cellular phones and multi-service cable provision 
through fibre optics, enabled telecommunications to be provided through a variety of 
media. Here again the establishment of competition has ensured that regulation is 
largely through a light touch.
However a further issue for telecommunications regulation can relate to the normative 
concerns and particularly the control of what is to be communicated. Within this 
context, at least until the attack on the World Trade Centre, liberal democratic 
governments could scarcely for ideological reasons be seen to interfere in the freedom 
of communication. These regimes are, however, also among the culturally more secure 
of nations and hence generally have few fears concerning the undermining of traditional 
values. The pressures to regulate, or even ensure that telecommunications are state 
owned within smaller countries with more to fear from what may be termed cultural 
imperialism, puts a further strain on the role of the regulator. For some regimes such as 
Iran, which is ideologically open in its opposition to Western cultural values, these 
factors underline a strongly controlled regulation of communication to the extent that 
privatisation is hardly a credible alternative. Within Bahrain, as in other Gulf States, the 
picture is more problematic. On the one hand an attachment to Western values is 
popular and economically good practice, and hence too great a restraint on 
communication may not help attract the commerce or Western military support 
necessary for the integrity of small nations, in terms of population. However, to move 
too far in the direction of opening society to the mass communication networks of the 
West can also be seen as damaging to the traditions and customs of the society. In 
Chapter 5 the thesis considers this dilemma in more detail as it relates to Bahrain.
Privatisation in developing countries relative to developed countries 
When considering theories if privatisation and liberalisation in application to real-world 
circumstances, it is important to recognize the differing contexts that exists between 
developed and developing nations.
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In developing countries, concerns about the accessibility and affordability of 
infrastructure services are expected to be even more pronounced than in rich 
economies. The majority of the population lack access to safe and affordable 
water services, telecommunications and reliable public transport and energy 
supplies. Privatisation may hurt the poor when prices have to be increased to 
make supplies economic, making the services even less affordable’ (Parker & 
Kirkpatrick 2006, p. 194).
Things such as ‘universal service’ agreements, though theoretically coherent and 
positive from the standpoint of general social welfare, might not carry the same 
implications in a developing nation, as they do not consider that the very poor do not 
have the financial recourses to pay for the service, and will thus not seek it out. As well, 
areas not already ‘on the grid’ will need to receive infrastructure investments to access 
the service. Government subsidies have, in the past, been held out as the solution to 
these issues of affordable access, but have in implementation often been shown to lack 
focused approach and fail in their desired goals (Estache 2001 & World Bank 2004 as 
cited in Parker & Kirkpatrick 2006, p. 194). ‘Too often the gainers from subsidies and 
cross-subsidies have been middle-and-higher-income groups, especially where, as 
normal, they control political power’ (Parker & Kirkpatrick 2006, p. 194).
This affects the dynamics of regulator’s role in developing countries as there is a much 
greater public perception that social welfare goals ought to be achieved through 
regulation, rather than the popular conception being that the regulator ought to be 
limited to addressing economic concerns relating to efficiency, competition and market 
viability. External impediments to carrying out the role of regulation more common in 
developing nations than developed includes the elevated risks of ‘social unrest and 
political intervention’ should the regulator be seen to be failing in its perceived 
obligations (Parker & Kirkpatrick 2006, p. 195). As well, an internal hindrance more 
prevalent for regulators in developing nations than developed is a lack of qualified and 
experienced staff to carry out their mandated role, while assessing the impact of 
different policy approaches can also be made difficult by the lack of mechanisms 
through which to gather the necessary statistical data for analysis.
Conclusion
In reviewing the selection of theories and literature on privatisation in this chapter, it 
becomes evident that the degree to which privatisation is successful in bringing about
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positive results is significantly dependant on the social and political situation under 
which privatisation is attempted, and the regulatory and competitive environment which 
exists and is enforced in the marketplace. This may help to explain the relative success 
of privatisation efforts in developed countries and the less-than-successful results of 
privatisation Cook and Uchida found in developing countries in specific regard to 
general economic growth and prosperity, as was discussed earlier. While the 
examination of the New Right theories like those of William Niskanen outlined the 
hypothesis that inefficiencies and flaws intrinsic in public services lead to greater 
general harm than benefit, and that the remedy for this is privatisation, the practical 
application of this is far more complex -  one cannot simply sell a broken down car to a 
another owner and then claim it is fixed. The efficiency of privatisation policy 
implementation, the effectiveness of regulatory structures -  regarding both resources 
and competition to spur improvements -  and the steadfast will o f the politicians are all 
key pieces of the privatisation puzzle. It is important to emphasize the role o f regulation 
and how, as was pointedly shown in this chapter, an unregulated, laissez-faire approach 
to a public resource will likely lead to general disutility. In regard to Bahrain, as will be 
discussed in later chapters, it is weakness in market regulation and leading from that a 
stifling of competition, which play a significant part in the current telecommunications 
situation. It is an accepted principle that a regulator should be an institution at arms- 
length from government, but what are more ccontentious issues are the type of 
regulation chosen, the influence of industry stakeholders upon the regulator -  i.e. 
‘capture’ -  and, related to this, how the regulator is held accountable.
The very nature of the telecommunications industry make it strategically essential for 
every government pursuing economic development in the modem world to ensure the 
sector is well run. As Bahrain seeks to attract the businesses necessary to establish itself 
as a financial hub of the future, telecommunications has to be a significant component 
of the overall strategy. This, combined with possible infringement o f modem 
communications on the value system of the Kingdom, lend telecommunications policy 
in Bahrain an elevated degree of politicization and complexity.
A look into the expansion of the telecommunications industry globally, the general
trend of reforms and the dominate positions held by multinational companies will
provide insight into the situations of various countries that participate in the global
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commerce of fast-flowing information and finances. This will also illuminate the degree 
to which liberalisation of telecommunications sectors globally results from 
technological necessity or political ideology, and are thus among the topics discussed in 
the next chapter.
*  *  *
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Chapter 3:
The growth of the global telecommunications industry, 
multinational dominance and the trend to privatise and liberalise
Introduction
Sweeping structural changes in telecommunications markets world wide have lured 
capitalists to invest far beyond their national borders, embracing the advancements of 
the modem economy through Information and Communications Technology (ICT). The 
ICT sector seems unrelenting in its innovative advancement and the effects are rippling 
through the world economy, distinguishing the sector as far more than a market isolated 
unto itself, but more the nervous system which connects the players in all markets. This 
modem economy seems bom of the marriage between ever-more sophisticated products 
and services, and the increasing global marketplace they help to facilitate. It is difficult 
to overstate how fast the ICT market is growing: the Internet drew some 50-million 
people to log on to the World Wide Web within its first four years, with that number 
still increasing at a dramatic rate ( World Employment Report 2001: Life at Work in the 
Information Economy 2001), while worldwide ICT spending is predicted to top US$3.2- 
trillion in 2007, up from $2.4-trillion in 2003 (IT and E-Business in Europe: Spending 
Trends 2004).
Such massive expansion is not without its growing pains however, as regulators must 
acclimatize quickly to the rapidly shifting markets over which they are responsible so as 
not to stifle advancements by the application o f outdated and, at best ineffective and at 
worst detrimental, policies. A coherent strategy to shape the positive progressive 
development of ITC infrastructure and services within a nation can spur ‘sustainable 
development in the fields of public administration, business, education and training, 
health, employment, environment, agriculture and science’, (World Summit on the 
Information Society 2005, p. 11).
The exceptional growth o f new telecommunications technology has not been uniform 
however. International Labour Organisation (ILO) points out in the 2001 report Life at 
Work in the Information Economy how national income level is a significant 
determinant o f the degree o f ITC penetration and there is a clear disparity between 
developed and developing nations in regard to internet use [i.e. the accessibility and cost
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o f telecommunications are key factors in the frequency o f internet use and 
telecommunications are costlier and less available in developing nations. It should also 
be noted that more conservative governments often attempt to stem the free flow of 
information and it has been shown that Internet use is higher where political and civic 
freedoms and more prevalent (Hultin n.d., pp. 1-2)]. At the same time however, growth 
in the availability of ICT services in developing countries can help close the economic 
disparity gap with developed countries as the benefits of investments in enhanced 
telecommunications networks and services are appropriated across the entire economy, 
including, but not limited to: ‘...the ability to control a greater pan o f production and 
organizational activities... lower fixed and variable cost for information acquisition... 
[and] increased arbitrage abilities’ (Direct Effects o f Telecommunications on Economic 
Development 2004).
Thus, this chapter will examine the relationship between new technology and the 
liberalisation of telecommunications markets in the developed and developing worlds, 
how technology has facilitated a dominant role for multinational companies in a global 
market, and the successes and failures o f nations in regulating and structuring their 
telecommunications environment.
The changing nature of telecommunications provision
The World Bank highlights what it finds to be the engine o f telecommunications 
privatisation in a 2004 study:
Underlying the trends in private participation in telecommunications have been 
major technological and other developments that have facilitated the emergence 
of competition. Technological changes in the past decade have reduced entry 
costs, allowed major reforms in the market structure, and spurred competition. 
The growing demand for more and better telecommunications services in 
developing countries in a context of tight fiscal constraints has prompted 
governments to turn to private investment for expanding and modernising 
networks -  and to reform legal and regulatory frameworks to allow private 
participation and competition. And their commitments to sector reform have 
been strengthened by international agreements. By 2001, 63 developing 
countries are signing up with the World Trade Organization’s Basic Agreement 
on Telecommunications, which created binding commitments for its signatories 
to liberalize telecommunications.
As the privatisation wave was spreading around the globe and country after country
began reforming their public service, the telecommunications sector, despite its size and
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significance, was usually among the first targets o f privatisation. Why is this? What 
changed the conception o f telecommunications from that o f being a state controlled 
monopoly to one o f being a private, market driven sector? A 1995 article in The 
Economist titled ‘Death of Distance’ examined how the widespread introduction of 
fibre-optic-based technologies made it much easier for competitors to enter the 
telecommunications market as service providers, thus helping to alleviate the 
apprehension that divesting o f the government monopoly would merely result in the 
creation of a private one (cited in Jerram et al. 1998, p. 10). The benefits o f ‘optical 
fibre’ networks over copper wire networks is directly related to the means by which 
they carry information, with the earlier using reflected pulses o f light and the later 
depending on electron transmission through a conductor. Aksh Optifibre Ltd., an Indian 
company specialising in fibre-optics, discusses the specific advantages o f the 
technology on their website and a number o f their points are quoted below:
Low transmission loss and wide Bandwidth: Optical Fibres have lower 
transmission losses and wider bandwidth than copper wires. This means that 
with optical fibre cable systems more data can be sent over longer distances, 
thereby decreasing the number of wires and reducing the number o f repeaters 
needed for these spans. This reduction in equipment and components decreases 
the system cost and complexity, a major advantage to telecom companies in 
terms of economics.
Small size and Weight: The low weight and the small (hair sized) dimensions o f  
fibres offer a distinct advantage over heavy, bulky wire cables in crowded 
underground city ducts or in ceiling-mounted cable trays. Once again, cost 
effectiveness for telecom companies.
Signal Security: By using an optical fibre a high degree o f data security is 
afforded, since the optical signal is well confined within the waveguide (with 
any emanations being absorbed by an opaque jacketing around the fibre). This 
makes fibre attractive in applications where information security is important, 
such as banking, computer networks and military systems. This is major 
requirement for telecom companies today more than ever due to the widely 
practiced and booming e-commerce scenario.
Low cost o f  raw material: Silica is the principal material o f which optical fibres 
are made. This raw material is abundant and inexpensive, since it is found in 
ordinary sand, which is a welcome factor to telecom companies due to cost 
savings compared to copper cables.
Fibre-optic technology has therefore played a major roll in reducing the barriers to entry 
for competitors in the telecommunications market in regard to costs, especially in
reducing the cost of infrastructure investments.
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Other barriers to market entry o f equal significance however concern state regulations 
governing telecommunications. In this regard, Donya Krairit (2001, p. 12) states that 
‘the term “liberalisation” is the commitment and actions taken by a government to open 
telecommunications markets to new providers and competition’, and in this context the 
American and British examples are worthy of some examination:
Telecommunications in the United States
The Bell Corporation, long the dominant private player o f US telecommunications, 
became the subject o f a US Department of Justice antitrust suit for illegally 
manipulating market competition in the mid 1970s. The two sides reached an agreement 
resulting in the Bell network being separated in 1984 into seven regional 
telecommunications providers, known as the Regional Bell Operating Companies 
(RBOCs) and an independent long-distance provider, AT&T {The History o f  AT&T n.d., 
p. 1). The RBOCs, which were regulated private monopolies within their regions, were 
prevented by law from entering the long-distance market as their dominance over access 
to local network subscribers would have given them unfair competitive leverage 
{Growth and competition in US telecommunications 1993-1998 1999). This allowed 
competition to begin to take root in the long-distance sector. In the mobile sector the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the semi-autonomous government 
telecommunications regulator, granted two licenses in each region -  one to the local 
fixed-line operator and one to an independent competitor. This remained the case until 
1993 when regulations governing the limits of spectrum availability were eased 
{Growth and competition in US telecommunications 1993-1998 1999).
In 1994 the federal government adopted an agenda to reform the telecommunications 
sector through increased capitalisation and competition, with the aim o f facilitating 
better, faster, cheaper and more readily accessible telecommunications services for 
people and business. The 1996 Telecommunications Act then injected force into 
liberalisation process by effectively opening almost all areas of telecommunications to 
competition, granting the RBOCs the right to sell off parts of their networks and 
allowing competitors to market retail services {Growth and competition in US 
telecommunications 1993-1998 1999). The result in the US is that the 
telecommunications market has become increasingly competitive.
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Telecommunications in the United Kingdom
Britain, on the other hand, has had as wide an experience o f constitutional arrangements 
for telecommunications as any country in the world. The 1969 Postal Act amalgamated 
the government run postal and telecommunications services, creating a single umbrella 
SOE for both, called simply ‘The Post Office’, which lasted until the 1981 
Telecommunications Act split the two apart again, creating the separate companies of 
Royal Mail and British Telecom (BT) (Genoud 2003, p. 3). The 1984 
Telecommunications Act then forcefully pushed forward the Thatcher privatisation 
agenda by selling off just more than half of BT’s equity to private parties (the rest o f the 
British Government’s stake was sold in 1993, leaving the company entirely privately 
owned). The 1984 Telecommunications act also legally enshrined Mercury as the only 
domestic competitor to BT until 1991 and created the Office o f Communications (Oftel) 
to regulate the telecommunications industry in the UK (Genoud 2003, p. 3). In 1985 the 
first two mobile phone companies, BT Cellnet and Vodafone, began offering services, 
to be joined by Orange and Mercury One-to-One in 1993, though as Christophe Genoud 
notes in his 2003 paper, Comparative study on the effectiveness o f telecommunications 
regulators, the initial British attempts to create a competitive telecommunications 
market faltered:
The period between 1984 and 1991 is known as the ‘duopoly policy’ phase. This 
seven-year period was intended to give Mercury the time to build its own 
network and to become a solid competitor to BT. This strategy largely failed. In 
1991, BT had lost only 4% of its market share mainly in the profitable 
international business segment. As a consequence, the government undertook 
the so-called ‘duopoly review’ which resulted in the liberalisation o f the local 
and long distance markets for cable television operators, access providers (voice 
and data), utilities companies (electricity), and international simple resale 
operators.
The lack o f satisfying results from the UK’s experiment with telecommunications 
duopoly can be gleaned in Cave (2000, p. 94), who notes that Mercury ‘followed BT’s 
prices rigidly’, and only in specific areas o f the market -  namely commercial overseas 
calling -  did its rates differ at all from BT’s in an attempt to gain market share; it could 
be said Mercury was only reaching for the ripest o f the low hanging fruit. The policy 
shift after the duopoly review removed most legal restrictions on the entry o f other 
companies, leaving, on paper at least, the gates to the domestic and long-distance
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telecommunications markets open for competition. Hundreds o f licences have since 
been issued. However, this should not be seen as Oftel removing itself from a regulatory 
role o f influence in the market. From 1993-97 there was a steady tightening applied to 
BT’s price cap, which Oftel worked out under the RPI-X formula [as discussed in 
Chapter 2]. As well, with revenue from over-seas calling brought into the price-cap 
calculations in 1991, ‘regulation thus became more, rather than less, pervasive’ (Cave 
2000, p. 94; also see Thatcher 1999, pp. 100-103).
In 1997, with healthy growth of competition in telecommunications provision having 
been realized, Oftel responded by restructuring BT’s price controls program, removing 
all but one-third of the services that had been subject to the previous price-cap from 
falling under the new price-limit formula. These actions were seen as significant 
progress towards the goal of eventually eliminating price controls all together.
Cave notes (2000, p. 95) that ‘one o f the hallmarks o f normalising regulation in the 
telecommunications industry is the replacement o f specific price controls with general 
prohibitions on anti-competitive pricing’, which means the introduction o f price 
windows -  i.e. prices are allowed to fall within a range, book-ended by a minimum and 
maximum that can be charged -  and curbs on ‘price discrimination’ for similar services 
to dissimilar customers. Since 1994 BT has been required to supply separated accounts 
for each o f its divisional segments -  access, network and retail. The importance o f this 
concept -  and its potential application to the Bahrain situation as will be examined in 
Chapter 9 -  is that the telecommunications company, in setting prices between its retail 
and network segments, must uphold its non-discrimination commitments; in other 
words the amount ‘BT Network’ charges ‘BT Retail’ for use o f its services must be 
equal to the amount ‘BT Network’ charges competing operators buying similar services 
for interconnection. During the duopoly years the process for pricing interconnection 
fees between BT’s and Mercury’s networks was fairly straight forward: the two 
companies would sit down and attempt to come to an accord over what arrangements 
were to be made and at what cost, and if  there was no agreement forthcoming, Oftel 
would write the agreement and set the prices for them based on allocated historic costs, 
as the regulator did in 1985 and again in 1991. The new accounting regime thus 
morphed the regulator’s role regarding interconnection prices ‘into a more general
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problem of setting network or wholesales charges for the dominant firm’ (Cave 2000 p. 
97; also see Thatcher 1999, pp. 99-100).
Oftel also refined its approach to determining which of BT’s costs should be 
included in the network, and hence interconnection, charges. In 1995, it issued a 
new determination of standard charges which excluded a range o f cost... as a 
result o f these changes, and o f the tightening o f BT’s incentives to cut costs 
through the retail price cap, network charges fell by a third between 1993/4 and 
1995/96. A consultancy study carried out for BT in 1997 concluded that BT’s 
interconnection charges in the UK were the lowest o f 11 companies examined 
(Cave 2000, p. 97).
[It should be noted that the regulator’s role in setting network access pricing caps is not 
uncomplicated, and there are several issues that a regulator must consider to do so 
properly, among them: (1) whether price distinctions for the same service should be 
allowed based on what the final use o f the purchased service will be -  i.e. should a 
company selling data-transfer services across BT’s lines pay the same price for use of 
that line as a company offering long-distance call-back service? (2) What qualifications 
must be met for a company to purchase network connection at wholesale rates? (3) How 
far and wide should a price-cap be applied? i.e. in areas o f the market where there is 
little competition and potential for market distortion through monopolist power, the case 
for having a price cap if  far stronger than areas o f the market where there is thriving 
competition; (4) In the presence of both network and retail price caps, how should these 
be coordinated with each other? (Cave 2000, pp. 99-100).]
The British Government gave teeth to the regulation o f the telecommunications market 
with the 1998 Competition Act, whereby Oftel was given the power to fine companies 
up to 10 per cent of their revenue for unfair trade practices. As well, the 2003 
Communications Bill created the Office of Communications, drawing together four 
separate regulatory bodies and Oftel into one new ‘super-regulator’ (Genoud 2003, p. 
3). As a result, the UK has developed the second largest telecommunications market in 
Europe (behind Germany), and has fostered one of the most fiercely competitive 
telecommunications markets in the world.
Telecommunications Reform in continental Europe
Traditionally in European Union (EU) countries SOTEs were part o f one unified state- 
owned-and-operated Postal, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) agency. The initial
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collective challenge to the PTTs dominance over the telecommunications sector came 
when in the 1970s the European Commission (EC) proposed introducing some degree 
of competition into the market for telecommunications equipment, as previously PTTs 
had been the sole supplier (Bauer & Steinfield 1994, p. 25). However protective 
European governments scuttled the agreement before it could be enacted and despite 
growing pressures to liberalise for the sake o f technological and competitive gain, there 
was no common market for telecommunications equipment until the EC’s Terminal 
Equipment Directive was enacted in 1988 (Telecommunications Reform 1995, p. 20).
In an attempt to begin to forming a cohesive strategy for the continent, the EC created 
the Task Force on Information Technology and Telecommunications in 1983. This led 
to the establishment o f large networks of contacts between policy makers and 
telecommunications operators in the member states, offering policy advice and sharing 
information on all things related to telecommunications (Bauer & Steinfield 1994, p. 
26). These efforts gave birth to a 1985 recommendation that EC members begin to 
synchronize some basic aspects o f their telecommunications policies, resulting in the 
unanimous decision by EC states to adopt the Green Paper in 1988 which formally laid 
out their common objectives. Among these aims were breaking the PTTs exclusive 
rights over telecommunications equipment by opening that market to more competition 
and relaxing trade restriction in the value-added fields, while other issues addressed in 
the agreement regarded licensing, developing EC standards and the role o f regulators. 
Perhaps more significant however is the Green Paper laid the groundwork for far deeper 
liberalisation in telecommunications services by defining what was called the EC’s 
Open Network Provisions (ONPs).
The ONP included a series of directives which created the framework for how 
telecommunications provision would develop. Directive 90/387/EEC stated that the 
common goal was to have a number o f service providers able to access the 
telecommunications network infrastructure of the SOTEs or the private monopoly 
operators both within member states and between them (European Commission 1997). 
Directive 95/62/EC prohibits there being a legislated monopoly for service provision for 
a SOTEs within an EC member state, though it does not ban SOTEs altogether 
(European Commission 1997). Far from deregulating the sector, the liberalisation 
initiatives introduced in the Green Paper and the ONPs required a massive amount o f
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new regulation to break the SOTE monopolies and ensure the result lead to the creation 
of a competitive market where companies within the EC were able to enter adjacent 
markets on equal footing. While each country pursued implementation o f the ONPs in 
its own way, in 1990 EU countries agreed to adopt deadlines for their full 
implementation, with Denmark, Finland and Sweden the first to have liberalised their 
markets by 1996, Holland followed suit in 1997, then Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain in 1998, and Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal in 2000.
It should be noted that among EU members, differences in ‘cultures, economic 
conditions and geography’ made the application o f telecommunications reforms in a 
homogenous manner across all states untenable (Vallee cited in Steinfield 1994, p. 15). 
Societal differences meant customer adoption and use o f new telecommunications 
technologies progressed is significantly dissimilar manners; likewise, differences 
between states led them to employ a variety o f regulatory and bureaucratic mechanisms 
to administer their evolving telecommunications industries. General prosperity levels in 
each country also influenced customer usage rates and the levels o f capital accessible 
for new investment and development of the industry. Commenting on the EU’s reform 
process as it was unfolding in the 1990s, Steinfield noted that ‘the less favoured and 
more rural economies of Ireland, Portugal and Greece, for example, may not generate 
the same requirements for integrated broadband communications as in the United 
Kingdom, France or Germany’ (Steinfield 1994, p. 15). Steinfield also commented that 
the geographic realities and demographic spread of the population around each country 
would set the cost parameters o f new infrastructure and impact the feasibility o f various 
types of service provision.
The pre-existing and resulting telecommunications environments varied in significant 
ways depending on the country. Finland, which had vigorously and steadily begun 
introducing competition into its telecommunications market since 1985, is a prime 
example o f the modernising power o f liberalisation when combined with well thought 
out and effective policies. Liberalisation in Finland also did not mean the state 
disengaged itself from being a telecommunications operator either, as Sonera, which is 
state owned, along with Finnet (a consortium of more than 40 private local companies), 
are the two main participants in the country’s telecommunications market. As well as 
being among the first countries to pursue open markets for telecommunications, the
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Finnish Government’s strategy o f investing heavily in training and education to further 
ITC growth appears to have been very effective. According to the US Department o f  
Commerce (n.d.):
One striking aspect of Finnish life is how seamlessly information technology has 
been integrated into production, work and home life. Banks, schools, libraries 
and hospitals exist virtually as well as physically. Thanks to the early acceptance 
of strong encryption, e-business has developed briskly and reliably. Several of 
the world’s top Internet security companies are based in Finland. Online banking 
is so well established that individuals engaging in traditional banking are the 
clear minority.
The US Department o f Commerce also cites Finland’s Nokia as among the successes o f  
the country’s ITC policies, describing the company as ‘the world leader in wireless and 
wireline telecommunications, the world’s leading mobile phone supplier, and the top 
supplier of fixed telecom networks and services’, while the state-of-the-art 
telecommunications environment in Finland has also attracted foreign corporations such 
as Hewlett-Packard, ICL and Siemens to locate much of their research and development 
work in the country.
In Italy, one of the notable characteristics of market liberalisation was the surge in 
mobile phone usage through the later half of the 1990s: In 1994, Italy had a fixed-line 
penetration rate six per cent below the EU average and only 1.2-million mobile 
customers -  in 2001 Italy had 36.2-million mobile customers, a penetration rate o f  
sixty-three per cent, well above that for fixed lines and making Italy one o f the biggest 
mobile markets in the EU, with Telecom Italia Mobile’s 20-million subscribers the 
largest number for any company in Europe {Telecommunications Liberalization 
Strengthening Italy's Position in World Market 2001). The Telecommunications 
Industry Association attributes this to two factors: ‘(1) life style trends and fashion 
effects, and (2) competition among operators that began in 1995, after Omnitel had been 
awarded the second GSM mobile telephone license the year before’. Italy also added 
two more mobile operators to its market, Wind and Blu Spa, before 2000.
In France, the government began to recognize in the 1960s that the country was in
danger o f falling behind the rest of the modernized world -  and in particular the US -  in
terms o f technological advancement (Servan-Schreiber cited in Bartle 2005, p. 112); the
risk that American companies could exploit weakness in the French markets was also
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salient to policymakers. Thus, in the realm of telecommunications, the state devised, 
initiated and carried out a modernisation program to bring the country’s 
communications infrastructure up-to-date and increase penetration rates (which were 
below those of France’s comparable European neighbours). ‘The government saw the 
importance of a strong high-technology industry capable of competing in world 
markets. This investment programme was widely seen as successful, and by the late 
1980s the telecommunications infrastructure has been transformed to one o f the most 
advanced in the world’ (Humphreys and Hulsik cited in Bartle 2005, p. 112).
The French government o f the late 1970s had identified the trend toward the 
globalisation of telecommunications services and markets, as well the potential for the 
US, and specifically the IBM Corporation, to take an overriding lead in these 
developments. Uncomfortable with this idea, the response of the French state was to 
push forward a network overhaul, ‘computerising’ its telecommunications system and 
widely expanding the available range of options it offered users, with the central focus 
being the creation of Teletel, a sophisticated telecommunications information network.
Globalisation and the IT revolution, however, put the centralist approach under 
stress. Successful engagement with the international market was crucial for 
telecommunications operators but the telematics programme was unable to allow 
that. Although Teletel was successful in France, it became isolated from 
developments elsewhere and was unable to meet the increasing demand for new 
customised services for international business users. The limitations o f the 
national strategy became clear as French firms on their own were unable to meet 
the necessary technological sophistication without some form o f international 
collaboration. The state-led strategy, which involved using success in the 
domestic market as a springboard to international markets, proved ill suited to 
the diversification and internationalisation o f telecommunications (Bartle 2005,
p. 112).
It was through recognition of this fact that the idea o f private sector involvement in 
telecommunications began to gain momentum through the 1980s. Telecommunications 
liberalisation is France had to be approached more carefully by policy makers though, 
given the country’s history of militant trade union action against any perceived threat to 
workers’ rights, the pervasive welfare state, public institutions or any form o f  
government privatisation. Through the early and mid 1990s, Paris largely tried to cloak 
its plans for France Telecom -  the national carrier -  as lawmakers worked out how to 
resolve two o f the most contentious issues regarding privatising the SOTE: the US$20-
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billion in workers’ pension liabilities and the conversion o f the company’s employees 
from civil servants, who cannot be fired, to private sector workers (Friedman 1995). 
Elie Cohen, an economist at the National Centre for Scientific Research who helped 
work on France’s reforms policies, noted that these issues were less difficult to resolve 
than might have been expected because France Telecom was a fairly profitable 
company (cited in Friedman 1995). After the EC’s ONPs were implemented in 1998, 
some competition was introduced but France Telecom remains by far the biggest player 
in the market, with SFR becoming the only substantial alternative in either fixed or 
mobile networks, which has led EC and French regulators to censure France Telecom 
on a number o f occasions {France - Key Statistics, Telecom Market & Regulatory 
Overviews 2007). Today France’s telecommunications market remains the third largest 
in Europe (behind the UK and Germany), with significant growth in upgrades for 
mobile services and demand for those services, as well as a competitive Broadband 
market which helped lead France to have the highest number of Broadband subscribers 
in Europe in 2005 {France - Key Statistics, Telecom Market & Regulatory Overviews 
2007).
Laying the liberalisation groundwork
In studying the European telecommunications scenario, Cave and Prosperetti posit there 
are three ‘behavioural instruments’ required for regulation in the in the nascent steps a 
nation takes towards realising a liberalized telecommunications sector: retail price 
control, access price control and universal service obligation (Cave & Prosperetti 2000, 
p. 44-45).
Retail price control is regarded as being essential when the incumbent monopolist, or at 
least the principal player in the sector at the time, has an effective hold on the market at 
the ‘retail level’, as, should no price controls be implemented, the consumer will fall 
easy prey to excessive profiteering. This is a role that has been traditionally taken up by 
governments in Europe, ensuring their citizens -  the customers -  are protected. If and 
when competition comes to be a factor on the retail scene, ‘possibly from firms relying 
largely on infrastructure belonging to others’, price controls fade in their importance, as 
competition’s market mechanisms begin to protect the end user from inflated service 
and product costs (Cave & Prosperetti 2000, p. 44 ).
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Access price controls are needed to ensure that, in a market which has more than one 
network competing for customers, everyone who pays to be provided with 
telecommunications services can connect with everyone else who pays for similar 
services; companies need to be able access the networks o f other companies in order to 
be able to complete the calls of their subscribers.
This requires a system of interoperator wholesale or network access prices. 
Especially in the early stages o f competition, entrants will require significant 
access to the dominant incumbent’s network, and this relationship will almost 
inevitably necessitate regulatory intervention (Cave & Prosperetti 2000, p. 44- 
45).
[Cave and Prosperetti suggest that the need for access price controls will decrease as 
‘infrastructure is duplicated’; however, as this author noted in Chapter 2 o f this thesis, 
‘telecommunications companies need to make heavy capital investments to create 
mobile and fixed communications networks with national and international reach. In 
this context, a host o f smaller businesses investing heavily in functionally identical yet 
operationally independent networks covering the same areas would likely be painfully 
costly, economically inefficient and ultimately unsustainable for all involved’. Thus this 
author would question whether major development of infrastructure duplication would 
be optimal, or even healthy, for a nation’s telecommunications sector.]
The third behavioural instrument required in seeking to create a liberalised market, as 
suggested by Cave and Prosperetti, deals with universal service obligation (USO). 
Commonly, state authorities had compelled the national telecommunications champion 
to supply all comers of the country with services at the same, or similar, level o f cost to 
the customer, regardless of the fact that some areas -  such as cities -  are much easier 
and cheaper to wire into networks then residences in the far-flung country-side. New  
companies penetrating such a market and being exempt from USO would most likely 
aim for the low hanging fruit in the urban centres, where the relatively low cost o f  
service provision would make for relatively quick and easy profits. This, obviously, 
would put the incumbent USO-bound telecommunications company in a weaker market 
position with regards to maintaining competitiveness, and inevitably there would be 
calls for levelling the playing field. Cave and Prosperetti suggest one method for this 
would be to devise a cost-sharing equation, whereby all operators in the market would 
cover a percentage of the extra costs the incumbent operator bares by virtue o f USO.
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‘For universal service, the concern has been, first that it would be used as a pretext for 
delaying competition, and second that high USO contributions imposed on entrants 
would choke off competitors’ (Cave & Prosperetti 2000, p. 45).
The importance o f interconnection
The foundational role network access plays in the establishment and maintenance of  
competition in the telecommunications market is difficult to overstate. A pivotal aspect 
of any strategy aimed at fostering free market competition is a regulatory situation 
which ensures that competitors can link into ‘networks that they cannot duplicate’ 
(Cave & Prosperetti 2000, pp. 48). An example o f this is offered by Taylor and 
Williams (1995, pp. 116-117) as well as Thatcher 1999, p. 99), who illustrated how 
allowing rival companies interconnection to BT’s network was essential in establishing 
a competitive telecommunications market in the UK.
The price that entrants have to pay for access to the incumbent’s network is 
crucial to their commercial success, yet the incumbent has two motives for 
charging high access prices. The first is a simple desire to maximize monopoly 
profits; the second, which arises if  a network owner is also competing in the 
retail market, is the desire to raise its rivals’ costs and maintain a dominant 
position in that market (Cave & Prosperetti 2000, pp. 48-49).
Regulatory authorities have thus applied access pricing controls -  among these being 
calculated, pre-set tariffs the incumbent can charge other companies operating through 
specific areas of its communications web, instituting a general cap on returns relative to 
what it costs the incumbent to provide network access, or enforcing a policy o f non- 
discriminatory network access. Implicit in the justification of such moves by regulators 
or government is ‘the advantages of economies o f scale and scope that the incumbent 
enjoys are the consequence of previous public policy decisions and should therefore be 
equally available to new entrants’ (Taylor & Williams 1995, p. 117).
The foundations and principles ofglobal trade liberalisation
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed in 1947, laid the
foundation for the normalisation o f international trade relations in goods and services.
Its successor, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), came into being January 1, 1995 -
both stronger in mandate and broader in scope -  with the directive o f ‘liberalising and
managing the international trading system’ (Farrell 1999, p. ix), and to this end the
WTO was enshrined as a legal entity with powers far beyond those o f the GATT. In the
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first three years o f its inception, the WTO achieved 132 member countries, with another 
29 negotiating entry, establishing the organization as the global trade organisation and 
regulator.
There are four principles upon which the WTO bases it objectives for trade 
liberalisation; paramount among these is the principle o f non-discrimination, which 
involves two aspects: (1) an importing country needs to treat equally products and 
services regardless o f the country o f origin, which is known as the ‘most-favoured­
nation’ (MFN) clause; (2) inside a nation, foreign goods and services must be offered 
equal market footing as goods and services of domestic origin (Farrell 1999, pp. 1-2). 
The second WTO principle ‘establishes the right and duty to reciprocal exchange of 
market-access commitments’, which aims to encourage liberalisation by means of 
having nations ‘exchange concessions’ on tariffs and protections (Farrell 1999, pp. 2-3). 
The third principle relates to ensuring market access, while the fourth principle fortifies 
the requirement for fair competition -  i.e. firms ought to compete on a ‘level playing 
field’ (Farrell 1999, pp. 3-4).
World Trade in Telecommunications
Thus, telecommunications liberalisation policy is normally not limited to opening the 
markets inside a nation, but includes opening the doors to foreign enterprises as well. 
Given the importance of telecommunications, most governments are loath to let 
companies from other countries have a stake in their domestic markets -  that is unless 
their domestic companies can enter the markets in those other countries. This is where 
the WTO has stepped up, becoming the pre-eminent international body facilitating 
telecommunications liberalisation globally by coordinating agreements between 
countries. Perhaps among the most significant accomplishments o f the WTO was to 
finalise the 1996-1997 negotiations on the Basic Telecommunications Agreement 
between 69 nations. WTO Director-General at the time, Renato Ruggiero, commented 
after the deal was concluded that it could save customers around the world one-trillion 
dollars (US) over the next decade, which was equivalent to some four per cent o f global 
GDP at 1997 prices (WTO Telecom Talks Produce Landmark Agreement 1997, p. 1). 
The US, as the origin of one third of global telecommunications revenues, was by far 
the largest participant at the talks and world wide consensus could not have proceeded 
without it (Jerram et al. 1998, p. 11). A primary US concern had been that while it was
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willing to accept foreign companies operating in the American market, other 
governments would not make reciprocal pledges, which would have effectively 
handicapped American companies. In retaliation against foreign companies with 
protected monopolies in their domestic markets, the US had considered limiting the 
international services they could offer American customers (Jerram et al. 1998, pp. 11- 
12). However the final deal adopted broad regulations to ensure competition, covering 
markets representing 90 per cent o f total world telecommunications revenues (WTO 
Telecom Talks Produce Landmark Agreement 1997, p. 1). Though there were schedules 
and conditions specific for each country in adoption o f the agreement, in general it 
allowed companies from all signatory nations to offer services and invest in the markets 
and companies o f the other signatory nations.
Multinational dominance of telecommunications and market convergence
The end of the 1980s heralded a new era for telecommunications corporations as large- 
scale consolidations began to be an industry norm. Sylvia Chan-Olmsted and Mark 
Jamison, in their 2001 study Rivalry through Alliances: Competitive Strategy in the 
Global Telecommunications Market, explored this topic thoroughly and as such their 
work will be draw upon heavily in the following section to illuminate the role of 
multinational corporations in the increasing global telecommunications market. They 
describe (on p. 2) how the markets have been transitioning:
The marriages o f AT&T with TCI and Media One, MCI with WorldCom, and 
Vodafone with Mannesmann set the stage o f a rapidly changing global 
telecommunications market as players such as British Telecom (BT), AT&T and 
DoCoMo acknowledged their plans to build competitive advantages in the world 
market through combinations with other companies... we are also seeing 
mergers between major wireless players such as Vodafone and Airtouch, 
between old and new media companies such as Time Warner and America 
Online, and between old and new network companies such as US West and 
Qwest... the nature of competition today in the global telecommunications 
industry seems to centre around market activities that aim at gaining competitive 
advantages through strategic combinations o f resources and presence in multiple 
products and geographical areas.
Chan-Olmsted and Jamison note how four formerly separate industries are rapidly 
coming together as the new ‘multimedia information industry’: telephone, mass media 
(print, broadcast and cable), consumer electronics and computing. This new umbrella 
industry offers products that draw upon four primary commodities: customer devices
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(i.e. PCs, telephones, TVs, etc...), networks to move information around, network 
devices (i.e. email & voice-mail hosts and other services which hold and process 
information for customers), and software (i.e. digital information used by customers 
such as music, videos, databases, etc...) (Chan-Olmsted and Jamison 2001, p. 4).
The barriers between the different mediums o f transmission are also disappearing, 
whereby one medium can now play surrogate to another, creating price competition 
between them. While through most of the history o f voice telephony the service 
providers used fairly uniform technology with the differentiator between them being the 
charges for service over different distances (i.e. local, long-distance and overseas calls), 
modem technological advancements have mostly removed distance from being a 
function o f cost and now it is the different technologies that compete for a share of the 
market (Fransman 1998, p. 31). To illuminate this point, Martin Fransman notes that 
there are ‘at least seven distinct technologies that can be identified which are involved 
in the process o f local access. They are: optical fibre, copper/XDSL, co-axial cable TV, 
fixed radio access, mobile cellular and PCN, satellite, and powerline [using electrical 
cables]’ (Fransman 1998, p. 22). This can lead to situation where, even in markets 
which appear to be dominated by one player, there may in fact be a level of effective 
competition. Fransman cites the example of BT in the late 1990s, which appeared to 
have a market share o f around ninety per cent on local access in the UK, but in the 
following excerpt o f a letter sent in 1996 from BT to the then British regulator Oftel1, 
the company asserts that new technologies have blurred the boundaries o f how the local 
access market is defined, and therefore complicated competitive assessments o f the 
market:
When analysing the market for access from the point o f view o f the customer 
wishing to obtain access to the telecommunications networks in the UK, there 
are a number of products that can reasonably be regarded as substitutable. 
Analogue lines [based on copper cables], ISDN lines [integrated services digital 
network capable o f carrying voice, data, text and video], telephone lines offered 
by cable TV companies, fixed and mobile radio access and PCN [another mobile 
service] are all currently available alternatives. The cost o f access to the 
customer may vary depending upon the technology used, and the different 
means of access may be regarded as more or less substitutable, taking into 
account functionality, price and the speed o f delivery... the different 
technologies are likely to become more and more substitutable and the degree o f
1 Following mergers with other regulators, the former British regulator Oftel is now known as OFCOM.
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substitutability over time needs to be taken into account when determining 
whether a number o f different alternatives are in the same market, and whether 
that market can be described as competitive (BT cited in Fransman 1998, p. 22)
Chan-Olmsted and Jamison (2001, p. 5) illustrate the substitutability o f different types 
of telecommunications technology in noting how ‘credit card verification services’ and 
‘airline reservation services’ now use digital satellite technology instead o f telephone 
networks, and how VoIP and email are also becoming means of communication which 
increasingly substitute for the traditional phone call. As the differentiation between 
services erodes, fixed-line, mobile and Internet services become viewed more as 
variants of the same service and not wholly distinct, which has resulted in many 
companies offering discount packages including all three services for one price (Chan- 
Olmsted and Jamison 2001, p. 5).
Chan-Olmsted and Jamison’s assessment is supported by that o f Mitchell and 
Vogelsang (1997, pp. 20-22), who note that the impact o f technological advances on the 
American telecommunications market was to reduce barriers to entry, thus expanding 
the ‘range o f competition’ by increasing the number o f suppliers o f various 
telecommunications services:
The thrust o f the principal technological changes that have occurred since the 
divestiture of AT&T has been to reduce the compartmentalization o f formerly 
separate telecommunications markets. No single firm competes across the board 
in every market... rather, advances in technology along many fronts have 
brought competition from many different sources (Mitchell and Vogelsang 
1997, p. 21).
Such convergence in markets and products radically alters the role o f older 
telecommunications providers such as AT&T and BT, remark Chan-Olmsted and 
Jamison (p. 4), by changing the nature of competition from being based in a single 
geographical area and competing for voice services, to companies now having to 
compete on the basis o f their network coverage and the range and quality o f services 
they can provide over those networks. ‘Large multinational customers often want a 
single network to provide them with end-to-end telecommunications across multiple 
countries’, (Kramer & NiShuilleabhain 1997; Antonelli 1997; Jamison 1998, cited in 
Chan-Olmsted and Jamison 2001, pp. 14-15) the result being that to stay competitive, 
many telecommunications companies have either expanded their own network
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infrastructure into the foreign target markets o f their multinational customers, or bought 
and/or formed partnerships with network operators already existing in these countries. 
While building new infrastructure in foreign markets allows a company autonomy over 
its operations, it is time-consuming and also means assuming the risk that comes with 
effectively ‘starting from scratch’ -  i.e. heavy capital investment, fostering local 
customer confidence, building familiarity with the political and regulatory environment, 
etc. (Chan-Olmsted and Jamison 2001, pp. 10-11). In order to mitigate risk and facilitate 
quicker entry into other markets, many telecommunications companies form ‘strategic 
alliances’ with one another for mutual benefit and advantage over other rivals, ranging 
in degree from simple cooperation between their network systems to complete mergers 
and takeovers. Forming this kind of ‘seamless network’ for their customers in 
connecting any market on earth with any other given market allows a 
telecommunications company better quality control over its services and the ability to 
build larger economies of scale, increasing profitability and allowing the room to stay 
competitive through price reductions (Chan-Olmsted and Jamison 2001, p. 15).
These same sort of market forces likely helped shape the MTC-Vodafone joint venture 
into the Bahraini market as the Kingdom’s second mobile carrier in 2002. Vodafone had 
itself begun as a joint venture between the UK’s Racal Electronics and the US’s 
Millicom in 1983, when it was issued one of only two cellular licenses in the UK. 
Vodafone’s massive successes in the British market allowed it to expand outside the UK 
and by the mid-1990s the company was operating in Australia, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Malta, Scandinavia, Fiji, Germany, South Africa, and Uganda ( Vodafone Group Pic 
2006, p 1-2). Kuwait’s Mobile Telecommunications Company (MTC) was also formed 
in 1983, and grew steadily to be one of the leading mobile providers in the Middle East 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, today garnering a customer base o f close to 10 million. In the 
autumn of 2002 MTC and Vodafone formed a Partner Network Agreement, creating 
MTC Vodafone Kuwait, which soon after acquired a telecommunications provider in 
Jordan, then was issued a license to be the second mobile provider in the Kingdom of  
Bahrain ( Vodafone Group Pic 2006, p 1-2). As MTC-Vodafone grew its services in 
Bahrain, customers began to have access to the international services and roaming 
networks of the parent companies, and prices for mobile services decreased.
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The wisdom of the ‘strategic alliance’ approach for telecommunications providers to 
acquire ‘seamless’ end-to-end international coverage is called into question however by 
Peter Curwen and Jason Whalley in their book Telecommunications Strategy: Cases, 
Theory and Applications, where these authors note the failure of a number o f the major 
global alliances which were formed through the late 1990s and early 2000s:
For example, the Global One alliance, involving European and US partners 
recently collapsed amid acrimony, with the three partners going their separate 
ways. In addition, the Unisource alliance o f European telcos was broken up and 
its constituent parts sold off, simultaneously severing its transatlantic link with 
AT&T. Finally, the Concert alliance lost its US-based constituent MCI to a 
takeover by WorldCom, and, reformed as a joint venture between AT&T and 
BT, was itself later disbanded. Not surprisingly, financial market analysts have 
become very wary o f joint ventures essentially created to widen geographic 
spread where there are no substantive cross-shareholdings involved, and they are 
unlikely to play a significant role in the foreseeable future (Curwen & Whalley 
2004, p. 12).
Curwen and Whalley noted that while the ‘organic growth’ of a company is generally 
the preferred method o f expansion, this type o f corporate business strategy became 
regarded as antiquated during the late 1990s period of rapid change in the 
telecommunications industry. The almost blinding speed o f technological advancements 
in the industry also made over-reliance on in-house research and development for new 
products and services disadvantageous for a company’s competitive prospects, as by the 
time one company had realized a technological breakthrough through its own R&D 
division, industry competitors may well have already developed that technology and 
progressed on to the next level of innovation. In such an industry environment, Curwen 
and Whalley (2004, p. 13) asserted that the avenue most likely to lead 
telecommunications companies to a successful expansion with limited risks is, instead 
of forming alliances with other companies, to launch a takeover bid using the equity of 
the first company to buy out the target company, as Vodafone did in acquiring 
Mannesmann in 2000.
While this chapter has thus far focused mainly on the progress of telecommunications in 
the developed world, the movement towards telecommunications liberalisation and 
trans-national networks through mergers and alliances o f multinational companies has 
also manifested itself it the developing world. As Bahrain is itself a developing nation,
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it would now be useful to examine the progress o f telecommunications in the 
developing world.
Telecommunications in the developing world
While it is commonly asserted in the developed world that governments have 
undertaken the privatisation o f major service providers in an effort to boost efficiency 
and have cheaper and better services made available, in developing countries these 
ideals have often taken a backseat to the much more immediate need to fortify a 
nation’s ailing finances with solid foreign currency reserves (Ramamurti 1996, p. 39). 
As well, major privatizations are a way for developing economies to tell major investors 
around the world ‘we’re open for business’.
Ramamurti, in examining the experiences o f developing countries in Latin American 
with regards to privatisation and liberalisation o f major state-owned enterprises -  
specifically in the realms of telecommunications and transportation -  arrived to the 
conclusion that there were many commonalities between them. Among these was that, 
in the near-term after a SOE privatisation is complete, there is often a reinforcement o f  
regulatory authority -  at least in semblance -  as, when a state’s function is no longer 
confused between both owning and being the watchdog over a corporation, ‘regulatory 
reform have more credibility and teeth’ (Ramamurti 1996, p. 39). However, this does 
not necessarily imply that competition begins to flourish. While there is evidence to 
suggest that privatisation encouraged positive economic development (Wellenius et al. 
1992; Kikeri et al. 1992), many nations faced the conflicting interests o f both 
capitalising on the sale of their SOTE to balance government budgets and satisfying the 
demand for better customer services (Wallsten 2005, p. 5). These interests often 
conflicted because, to maximize government revenue from the sale, the buyer was 
offered an exclusivity period within which they could maintain a monopoly, 
substantially raising the sale price o f the SOTE; however, with a guaranteed monopoly, 
the new owner faced no competition and thus had little incentive to lower prices or 
make expensive infrastructure investments to improve services. This trade-off meant 
that improvements in services were often stalled (Wallsten 2005, p. 5). The less 
dependant a government is on filling its coffers quickly, the stronger its bargaining 
position in negotiating with potential purchasers, with the result tending to be that the 
new owner’s exclusivity period was relatively shorter and/or with greater limitations,
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thus tilling the ground more fertile for competition to sprout sooner rather than later 
(Ramamurti 1996, p. 39).
Over the long haul however, the regulatory regime negotiated when the former SOE’s 
ownership passed to the private sector begins to look more and more archaic and 
inapplicable as new technological advancements, fiscal realities and any number o f new 
circumstances come to affect the market environment.
Transaction costs associated with regulation will increase, relations between 
firms and governments will become strained and the risk o f regulatory capture 
will increase. Countries in which firms and governments enjoy high, mutual 
trust, and in which regulators have both the expertise and the discretion 
necessary to reasonably adapt rules to uncertainly will continue to gain from 
privatisation (Ramamurti 1996, p. 39).
Frequently however, Ramamurti found it to be the case that developing countries did 
not have these facilities necessary to make the most of privatisation. Despite this, and 
what the short-and-mid-term problems may be, privatisation does seem to make it more 
probable than not that somewhere on the horizon a country will arrive at some form of 
competitive market and leave behind its previously monopoly-dominated sector. If a 
nation’s coffers no longer fill directly from the profits of a company (i.e. because the 
state no longer owns said company) then at some point the government will likely 
develop the wherewithal to nudge the incumbent out o f the pampered security o f  
exclusivity and towards a path through the market gauntlet. The incumbent operator, 
firms eyeing up a possible run at market entry and other stakeholder all weigh with 
more credibility a state’s rhetoric vis-a-vis instituting a competitive playing field if  
privatisation has already taken place, rather than if  it has not (Ramamurti 1996, p. 39).
On paper at least, a good deal o f the transforms in the regulatory regime -  including 
imposing minimums for increased service access, performance goals and cost controls -  
that come about with privatisation could also have been implemented with the 
corporation under state ownership. The reality is, however, that the state’s ‘carrots’ and 
‘sticks’ to enforce its will ‘seem to have less credibility than similar promises and 
threats between the government and a private firm’ (Ramamurti 1996, p. 40).
The real significance o f privatising monopolistic firms... is to use the 
disciplinary forces o f competition and regulation to improve a firm’s
82
performance. That, in turn, is possible because privatization reduces the scope 
for opportunistic behavior by governments. Most o f the problems of the state- 
owned enterprise stem not from the enterprise but from the state; the discipline 
that privatisation imposes on the state is probably more important than the 
discipline it imposes on the firm and its managers (Ramamurti 1996, p. 40).
Looking at developing countries world-wide, the state-owned ‘natural monopoly’ model 
for telecommunications adopted by many was generally seen to failing by 1981, at 
which time Africa and Latin America averaged only 0.8 and 5.5 phones per hundred 
people respectively, while in the US that number was 83.7 (Saunders et. al., cited in 
Wallsten 2005, p. 3). As the Thatcher Government spurred the world wide flourish of 
public sector privatisations, developing nations also joined in, though their 
circumstances and motivations were slightly different. In regards to 
telecommunications, with few exceptions SOTEs were performing horribly: long delays 
in service and unreliable connections for customers, combined with the haemorrhaging 
effects of inefficient business practices and new infrastructure burdens on government 
finances, created internal demand for reforms, while at the same time international 
lending institutions made public sector reforms among the conditions for badly needed 
loans (Wallsten 2005, p. 3). As a result by 1999 over fifty per cent o f Asian and Latin 
American nations and one-third of African countries had divested o f their SOTEs 
(Megginson & Netter 2001, p. 5). However countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
Thailand and Vietnam showed little to no movement towards privatisation, while in 
China and India the SOTE was preserved, though allowing space for competition in 
fixed-line networks (Pennings et. al. 2005, p. 12).
With this in mind, it is informative to examine the experience o f Jamaica, which has 
followed a path involving both typical characteristics o f telecommunications 
privatisation and liberalisation in developing countries, as outlined above, as well as 
some rather unique routes to realizing successes from the country’s reform program.
The Jamaican case study
Jamaica’s deteriorating financial situation through the 1980s and into the early 1990s 
forced it to sell off the remaining shares in its partially privatised SOTE,
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Telecommunications o f Jamaica (TOJ)2, to cut expenditures and raise revenue. This 
represented a serious policy revision for the Jamaican state which, although it seemed 
committed to at least partial privatisation o f TOJ, had also stated publicly in 1988 that it 
had no intention of holding any less than 40 per cent o f the company; ‘it is widely held 
that... the need for foreign exchange to pass an IMF test led the government to sell the 
remaining blocs of shares’ (Telecommunications of Jamaica 1988)..In seeking to 
maximize the sale price of TOJ, the government gave the buyer, C&W, exclusive rights 
to operate the telecommunications network on the Island for 25 years, with the company 
able to renew its exclusivity at the end o f this period for a further 25 years (Lodge and 
Stirton 2002, pp. 9-10).
It should be noted, however, that when negotiations to privatise telecommunications in 
Jamaica were first initiated in 1985, the motivation was not solely fiscal concerns, as ‘it 
seems clear that the Seaga administration [1980-89] first began negotiations with C&W 
because o f its desire to obtain access to the technology, capital and expertise required to 
modernise the nation’s telecommunications infrastructure’, (Ramamurti 1996, p. 57). 
Impetus came from the fact that, after direct international dialing in and out o f Jamaica 
was established in 1977-78, the surge in demand surpassed the capacity o f  
JAMINTEL’s infrastructure to handle, while at the same time JTC was swamped by a 
wave of new demand to be connected to the phone network from businesses and homes 
(Ambrose et al. as cited in Lodge and Stirton 2002, p. 9).
Privatisation did seem to achieve some of the objectives the government sought, as 
capital infusion into the Jamaican telecommunications network swelled post­
privatisation: there was average o f US$16 million per year invested into domestic and 
long-distance infrastructure over the four years previous to privatisation, while the 
average for each of the four years post-privatisation jumped to US$72 million. A 
centrepiece o f this expansion was the digitalisation o f the network, with the TOJ 
chairman publicly claiming in 1992 that, “Jamaica is one of the few countries in the 
world to have a fully digital network’” (Telecommunications of Jamaica 1992, p. 5). As 
well, the expansion rate o f the Jamaican networked jumped dramatically: from and 
average o f 3,000 new lines added per year through the 1970s and 1980s, to 26,000 new
2 TOJ, a merger o f the former domestic carrier, Jamaica Telephone Company (JTC), and the long­
distance company, JAMINTEL, had been created in 1987 as part o f the agreement between Cable & 
Wireless and the government in preparation for privatisation
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lines in 1991, 36,000 lines in 1992 and 41,000 in 1993. As well, in monetary terms, the 
sale o f TOJ brought the government US$156 million, which, in examining the 
company’s capital assets and revenue forecast, was a relatively fair market price (Spiller 
& Sampson 1992, p. 41).
Cross-subsidisation o f domestic network expansion by international long-distance 
charges was a significant -  far from being solely a matter o f social responsibility for 
TOJ to provide underprivileged Jamaicans with basic phone service, that fact was it was 
extremely profitable to bring phone services to rural areas.
Jamaicans are one o f the world’s most footloose people; it is estimated that as 
many Jamaicans live overseas as in Jamaica, with over half concentrated in 
nearby North America. Subsidization allows expansion of the telephone network 
to the poorest Jamaicans in rural sections of the island, who are likely to have 
relatives overseas whose telephone calls lead to payments from international 
communications companies to the TOJ. These payments more than compensate 
for low domestic user charges. The TOJ could profit from each rural phone 
installed even if  the user never made a telephone call and monthly user charges 
were very low (Ramamurti 1996, p. 66).
Problems began to arise for C&W, however, in enforcing TOJ’s exclusivity clause, as 
the agreement was vague in regards to its application to things such as customer 
premises equipment (CPE), data transmissions, fibre-optic transmissions and certain 
value added services (Lodge and Stirton 2002, p. 10). Under pressure from C&W to 
close these loop-holes, a bill was introduced in 1993 granting TOJ exclusivity ‘...in all 
areas of telecommunications traffic in, out and through Jamaica’ (Lodge and Stirton 
2002, p. 10). However the resultant hostility this proposal provoked within Jamaica 
society and business community forced the government to effectively shelve the plan 
for some four years until after the next election in 1997, and even then it was never 
enacted.
Under pressure from Jamaica’s competition and consumer-protection regulator, the Fair 
Trading Commission (FTC), which was established in 1993, C&W agreed, in 1994 to 
allow ISP’s to interconnect with its networks. In 1998, the government issued five 
VS AT licenses to ISPs, a number o f which then began to offer VoIP long-distance call­
back services o f their own, effectively cutting into C&W’s exclusivity over long­
distance services; C&W launched legal battles to try and re-establish its long-distance 
dominance, but did not succeed:
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Continuing legal uncertainty, new actors, international constraints and 
commitments and technological change increasingly threatened C&W’s 
exclusive status and encouraged the operator to renegotiate arrangements with 
the government by the late 1990s (Lodge and Stirton 2002, p. 11).
The Jamaican path to telecommunications reforms is described by Lodge and Stirton 
(2002, p. 13) as a ‘surprising example’ in the developing world, where ‘...a  small state, 
dependent on external private investment for its telecommunications service, manages 
to overcome the resistance of the incumbent monopolist and to establish a programme 
of liberalisation, in a manner that broadly attracted support and strengthened the 
authority o f the regulator’. Stirton and Lodge attribute Jamaica’s relative success to a 
number o f favourable factors, including: the American FCC’s decision in 1997 to 
unilaterally cut by more than half the rates American telecom companies paid for 
termination of international calls, which dramatically reduced the profitability o f Cable 
& Wireless’ international division and hindered its ability to cross-subsidise its less 
profitable domestic operations in Jamaica; technological advancements which allowed 
domestic competitors to lighten their dependence on Cable & Wireless’ infrastructure 
networks; the establishment in 1993 of Jamaica’s FTC, which aggressively sought to 
enforce competition and consumer-protection, and Jamaica’s accession to the WTO’s 
Agreement o f Telecommunications -  all o f which weakened Cable & Wireless’ 
monopoly and encouraged the company to agree to accommodate the government’s 
Telecommunications Act o f 2000, a detailed piece o f legislation laying out the blue­
print for a three-phased, three-year plan to liberalise the Jamaican telecommunications 
market (Lodge and Stirton 2002, pp. 11-13).
Other examples from the developing world
Unlike Jamaica however, in other developing world cases, such as Mexico and Sri
Lanka, it became apparent that without strong regulation to ensure fair competition
following on from privatisation and liberalisation, the new owners of a privatised SOTE
would invariably leverage their dominant market position to benefit themselves and
hamper and exclude rivals. In Mexico the government began divesting o f Telmex in
1990 and opening the markets to competition in 1996. However Telmex created
problems for new companies trying to access its networks, allowing it to maintain a
dominant market position while consumer prices soared and services suffered. Even
after the WTO attempted to intervene through the national regulator, Telmex maintained
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market supremacy by minimizing competitor market share {Telecom deregulation and 
Post PTCL Privatisation n.d.). In Sri Lanka, Japan’s NTT bought a 38.5 per cent stake 
when the SOTE was divested in 1997, then raised line leasing rates for competitors by 
200 per cent, obstructed network infrastructure sharing and complicated 
interconnections -  all o f which hobbled rival market share and allow NTT to raise 
customers’ local telephone rates by 250 per cent {Telecom deregulation and Post PTCL 
Privatisation n.d.).
Ramamurti, in studying the experiences of Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela and Jamaica 
regarding the privatisation o f their SOTEs and attempts to liberalise the market, found 
the following to be the case:
In every country, the privatized firms seem to have adopted textbook tactics to 
make life difficult for companies wishing to offer new telecommunications 
services that were open to competition, such as cellular telephony and value 
added services. These providers had to connect their facilities with the 
monopolist’s network, but the terms and conditions had to be mutually 
negotiated. The privatized firms haggled over the number o f connection points, 
access charges, marginal investment required to facilitate interconnection, 
billing procedures and so on. Eventually, regulators were available to settle the 
issues, but meanwhile delays were to the monopolists’ advantage (Ramamurti 
1996, p. 32).
Taylor and Williams (1995, p. I l l )  described the opposing forces classically at play 
within a telecommunications sector under reform: policy-makers, in seeking 
development o f the industry, will support the growth of competition which increases 
business uncertainties for existing companies, while the strategic focus o f the 
companies is to minimize the uncertainties they face. ‘Almost inevitably, a regulatory 
policy that focuses on licenses, equal access and interconnection, will involve a 
response by firms, particularly the incumbents(s), in areas through which they might 
regain relative certainties’ (Taylor & Williams 1995, p. 111).
Comparing Singapore and Bahrain
Perhaps the most successful example o f telecommunications reform policies in the 
developing world has been Singapore. In the context o f this thesis Singapore is 
especially relevant given many of the characteristics and similarities the country shares 
with the Kingdom of Bahrain, among them being:
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Geographic size -  Singapore and Bahrain are both among the smaller 
nations in the world, at 692 sq km and 707 sq km respectively.
Strategic location -  Singapore is at the entrance to the Strait of Malacca, 
which has helped it become one of the most important shipping centres in 
Asia, while Bahrain is in the middle-south portion of the Arabian Gulf, 
which has historically placed it at the crossroads o f trade and shipping 
through the Middle East.
Future growth prospects -  economic survival for both countries depends on 
overcoming resource limitations and a small domestic market.
High per capita GDP -  while both countries have a high gross domestic 
product relative to their population, Singapore is ranked highly for its 
competitiveness and the freedom of its economy, whereas Bahrain’s 
competitiveness is lagging and the economy is relatively less free.
Labour force -  both countries are characterised by a small, comparatively 
well-disciplined indigenous labour force, a large pool of mostly unskilled 
foreign workers, and a demand for skilled local professionals which outstrips 
supply.
Foreign business incentives -  foreign companies are actively pursued to set 
up businesses locally, with both countries offering inducements including in 
a favourable tax climate (Bahrain has no taxes), free mobility o f capital, 
profits and current accounts, and in general neither country restricts or 
discourages foreign investment to protect local industry.
Centres for finance -  Singapore is an international financial and commercial 
centre, while Bahrain has historically been the banking and investment hub 
of the region.
Regional Competition -  Singapore has effectively been in direct competition 
with Hong Kong since the late 1980s in regard to which state can attract 
more multinational companies use them as a regional communications hub. 
This has motivated Singapore to aggressively pursue liberalisation o f its 
telecommunications market and other business-friendly initiatives in the 
interest of becoming more competitive. Bahrain is in a similar regional 
rivalry with other Arabian Gulf states which are attempting to attract 
multinational companies to establish regional centres within their borders,
adding incentive to Bahrain’s telecommunications liberalisation drive and 
other pro-business policies (Sanchez and Hwa 2003, p. 19).
The US ambassador to Bahrain, William Monroe, who previously served as the US 
ambassador to Singapore, stated that Bahrain, like Singapore, has the potential to 
‘eclipse its larger neighbours as a destination for international trade’, and noted that 
‘Singapore is a very, very successful economy and it’s a model for Bahrain’ {Gulf Daily 
News, April 4 2007, p. 1). In light o f the similarities between the two nations, an 
examination of the telecommunications liberalisation process undertaken in Singapore 
may yield helpful advice which can be applied to the situation o f Bahrain.
The Singapore model
The authoritative state in Singapore shapes economic and societal development, often 
through direct intervention, and thus telecommunications reforms and policies have 
been at the impetus o f the ruling regime. In the run-up to the 1980s, the state invested 
heavily in infrastructure to meet public and business demands for better services and 
shorter delays in getting a telephone connected to the network (Singh 1998, pp. 9-10). 
According to JP Singh in his 1998 Evaluating Telecommunication Privatisation and 
Liberalisation in India and the Far East (pp. 9-10):
The two groups at the micro level which matter to the state in terms o f  
telecommunications include the Singapore society and international business 
groups. The latter are often the only actors emphasized in examination o f  
Singapore’s telecommunications but it is important to remember that 
Singapore’s waiting list for telephones o f two years in 1972 (which included 
society at large) was brought down to less than two weeks in 1979. By 1980, 
Singapore had the highest teledensity in the developing world (while now its 
penetration rates are comparable to those of any in the developed world).
Telecommunications became an integral part o f the agenda to attract multinational 
businesses to relocate to Singapore during the 1980s. The 1986 National Information 
Technology Plan aimed at developing the country into an ‘information society’ and with 
forceful government policies Singapore had achieved 100 per cent Integrated Service 
Digital Networks (ISDN) before 1990, 50,000 mobile service subscribers by 1991, data 
networks for both public and private institutions and a number o f private networks 
operating in key sectors by at the dawning of the 1990s (Singh 1998, p. 9). In 1992, 
Singapore established a regulatory body for telecommunications which later evolved
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into what is now the Info-Communications Development Authority o f Singapore (IDA). 
The legislated mandate of the IDA outlines three main focal points o f regulator’s role: 
to encourage and assist the establishment and expansion of a world-class ICT market on 
the island; to issue licences and oversee the development o f market dynamics in the 
interests o f realizing a competitive telecommunications market in Singapore, and ‘to 
promote an information society in which ICT is readily available and accessible to the 
people’ (Budde 2008).
In 1993 Singapore began the initial privatisation of its SOTE, SingTel, with 11 per cent 
going up for sale (with private stake rising again to 25 per cent in 2002).
When SingTel was corporatised in 1992, it was licensed to provide telecom 
services in Singapore until 2007. In 1996, the government decided to embark on 
a policy o f liberalisation o f the telecommunications sector and the end of 
SingTel’s monopoly was brought back to 2002. SingTel was compensated for 
the change o f plan. Further liberalisation was unavoidable, especially since new 
and increasingly difficult to regulate technologies like the Internet had begun to 
encroach on the realm of basic service and render SingTel’s exclusive licences 
less and less meaningful. Not surprisingly, in preparation for competition, 
SingTel planned to invest $2.5 billion in local infrastructure over a three year 
period and planned on creating a number of strategic alliances to strengthen its 
position as an international player (Budde 2008).
In 2000 the government decided to begin sweeping liberalisation reforms o f its 
telecommunications market. Yeo Cheow Tong, Singapore’s Minister for 
Communications and Information Technology from 1999 -  2001, stated this agenda 
was adopted from necessity: in order for the city-state to achieve the status o f regional 
ICT hub, there needed to be a competitive market established to encourage an efficient, 
state-of-the-art telecommunications environment, and ‘The earlier introduction o f full 
market competition will strengthen our competitiveness and help position Singapore as 
the choice location in the region for key infocomm players’ (IDA Singapore 2000). 
Hailed as the “big bang” of the telecommunications industry in Singapore, operating 
licences were granted to 37 major telecommunications corporations and some 20 ISPs, 
effectively opening the market in all aspects o f service provision (Telecommunications 
Infrastructure Regulation and Liberalization n.d.). There was also the removal o f all 
restrictions regarding foreign ownership in the city-state’s telecommunications market, 
with StarHub becoming a market player in April 2000; in June o f that year Singapore
90
Cable Vision (SCV) announced it had finished installing a two-way Hybrid Fibre Coax 
(HFC) network, connecting the cable TV company to 99% of all homes in Singapore.
Also in 2000, the mobile sector saw a phenomenal surge o f one million new subscribers 
and as o f the beginning of 2003, Teledensity in Singapore had reached the third highest 
in Asia at near 80%, behind Hong Kong (83%) and Taiwan (106%). There were nine 
mobile subscriptions for every 10 Singaporeans by December 2004. In early 2005, in 
order to spur competition, the IDA said mobile phone companies would be able to 
differentiate their customers’ call charges depending on whether calls were completed 
within the company’s network or terminated in a competitor’s network, (though this 
plan was initially subject to a degree o f pricing limitations).
By 2006 teledensity passed 100% as it became common for people to have up to three 
different mobile phones for different uses. Between 2006 and 2007 mobile subscriptions 
surged again by just under one million. To promote competition further in the domestic 
market, at the end o f 2007 the IDA publicized plans to restructure Mobile Number 
Portability (MNP) to facilitate greater ease in customer migration. Previously, 
subscribers could switch service providers and keep their old numbers, but ‘in essence 
all they received was a call-forwarding service whereby calls to the old number were 
routed to the new one, meaning that some recipients could see an unrecognizable new 
number and choose to ignore the call’ (Budde 2008). Under the improved MNP regime 
however, consumers effectively own their number and can take it with them when they 
move to a new service provider.
As of February 2008, in a population of some 4.4 million Singaporeans, there were 
5,825,500 mobile subscribers -  equaling a mobile penetration rate o f 127% -  with 
annual market growth pegged at 20.8%. Of all mobile subscribers in February 2008, 
some 1,836,000 were consumers of 3G services, with the 3G market having swollen by 
150% in 2007. [As of February 2008, 98% of all homes also had fixed-line connection, 
with 20% having two or more fixed-line telephone numbers].
Beginning in 2005 the government in Singapore took a special interest in Broadband 
internet access and wiring the island into an ever-more technologically advanced 
communications web. The IDA handed out half a dozen new Wireless Broadband
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Access (WBA) spectrum licences in 2005, and in 2006 put forward a ‘request for 
concepts’ to begin preparations for setting up an island-wide web o f broadband 
infrastructure as part of the government’s grand plan for a Next Generation National 
Infocomm Infrastructure (Next Gen Nil). As well during the summer o f 2006, the 
government unveiled its super-strategy for ICT development over the next decade, 
called ‘Intelligent Nation 2015 (iN2015), which emphasized the role advanced 
telecommunications plays as ‘a strategic enabler for social and economic growth’ 
(Budde 2008). Though in the beginning o f 2006 the government said it would award 
some S$620 million (US$413 million) in tenders in the ICT sector, by year’s end it had 
actually awarded closer to S$850 million (US$567 million); while at the beginning of 
2007 Singapore announced some S$730 million (US$487 million) in tenders would be 
issued that year.
Currently in construction is Singapore’s Next Generation Network (NGN) which, 
coming online in 2012, is engineered to be a super-highway for data, able to transmit at 
a minimum of one gigabyte per second, and as o f the fall o f 2007, there were already 
5,000 publicly accessible wireless ‘hotspots’ around the island. In regards to broadband, 
as of February 2008 subscriptions had reach 3,501,100 (including wireless broadband 
users), meaning a penetration rate of 79.5 % (Budde 2008).
Given the above developments, the value o f the telecommunications sector to Singapore 
has jumped dramatically since liberalisation was undertaken. The ICT market on the 
island expanded 5% in 2002, with revenues of US$18.6 billion, or roughly 8% of 
national GDP; it is forecasted that the ICT sector in Singapore will make up 10% of 
national GDP by 2012. In 2006 the IDA recorded a whooping 20% growth in 
Singapore’s telecommunications market, hitting the S$45.4 billion (US$29.5 billion) 
mark in total value.
In the beginning however, there were doubts as to whether the liberalisation process 
would yield the results the authorities in Singapore were hoping for. The following 
excerpts of an article by Tony Sitathan that appeared in the Asia Times Online Oct 30, 
2003, under the headline ‘Singapore opens up its telecoms’ helps to illustrate the 
telecommunications strategy the Singapore Government was following and some o f the 
challenges it faced and, to some degree, still faces:
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‘Liberalization has pushed domestic players in Singapore to be more innovative 
and to look outwards’, said Lee Boon Yang, [the minister o f information, 
communications and the arts.] ‘We have no doubt that economically a vibrant 
and competitive telecommunications sector contributes to the competitiveness of  
the nation as a whole’. He added that competition has compelled incumbent 
telecommunication operators to become more efficient and to offer products and 
services that are more innovative and responsive to the end user... So far, 
however, liberalization exercise has not yielded immediate results. The 
infrastructure roll-out has been slow, with operators opting for the easier 
alternative of buying rather than building infrastructure from scratch. Given that 
condition, SingTel is expected to remain dominant in infrastructure... Michael 
Lim, an associate consultant with a foreign-based risk analysis company, said 
that IDA is currently studying the Telecom Competition Code and that change is 
expected soon. ‘From the beginning SingTel has a dominant position as an 
exclusive monopoly holder for its fixed line services’, Lim said. ‘This was due 
very much to its telecom infrastructure development in Singapore. Now however 
we are seeing its rivals calling for greater and inexpensive access to SingTel’s 
network. The bigger question is can the smaller rivals afford or want to build the 
nuts and bolts in the telecom infrastructure or choose instead to run their 
services over the existing network provided by SingTel’.
Budde (2008) noted, however that ‘deregulation o f the market was seen as a threat by 
SingTel and StarHub, which had invested billions into their telecom networks, because 
the new entrants were in a position to offer newer and cheaper infrastructure’. Thus, due 
to its decision to fast-track liberalisation, the Singapore Government also made 
significant compensation payments to these two companies.
In several aspects of the market, competition grew exceptionally quickly with 
liberalisation, with November 2003 a recognizable turning point. Prior to this the IDA 
had enforce restrictions on SingTel’s actions in the wholesale market for international 
and overseas calling, deeming that due to the company’s dominant market position, the 
regulator needed ensure interconnection and other services were provided in a timely 
manner and without price gouging. However, in November 2003 the IDA announced 
that SingTel had only 30 per cent market share of overseas customers -  with five other 
companies of note having succeeded in carving out market share for themselves. The 
IDA thus released SingTel from the regulator’s shackles, deeming that free market 
mechanisms were now active enough uphold healthy competition in the sector.
The cost o f long-distance calling has dropped noticeably as competition has risen, as 
much as 85 per cent relative to the days before liberalisation, [e.g. pre-liberalisation
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rates for calls to the US were in the rage o f US$0.95 per minute and over the course of 
liberalisation decreased to as little as US$0.09]. ‘Lower cost and the liberalisation of the 
telecom market also contributed towards the island’s development as a hub for data 
centers, content aggregators, digital media industries, Internet networking companies 
and e-commerce transactions’ (Budde 2008).
As the modernisation chase still continues to this day, Singapore is more and more 
confronted with dilemma of pursing the most advanced telecommunications networks in 
the world to maintain its status as the financial hub o f the region, yet given authoritative 
nature o f governance in Singapore, the government also seeks to control the information 
being conveyed over these networks to its citizens (Singh 1998, p. 10). There are also 
pressures for even more liberalisation efforts to stay competitive and attract large-scale 
infrastructure investments to continually improve services for the more than 650 
multinational companies that operate in Singapore, with these companies and the 
increased economic activity resulting from increased liberalisation being a means for 
the government to create jobs for its citizens (Sitathan 2003).
Lessons for Bahrain from the Singapore experience
Batelco was fully owned by the state until 1981 when the Bahrain Government divested 
of part o f its shares [see figure 3:1 below]. Like Singapore, Bahrain has come to view 
the telecommunications sector as a key element in carving out a competitive advantage 
for the Kingdom over regional rivals in attracting international banking and financial 
institutions, and as such has endeavoured to adopt a pro-active strategy regarding 
telecommunications development.
[Batelco, Bahrain’s monopoly fixed line service provider and one o f two providers for 
mobile service in the Kingdom, has shares held by the Bahrain government (75 per cent, 
after Cable & Wireless sold its remaining 20 per cent share to three different 
Government entities in 2006 for US$506 million), the Pension Fund Commission (21 
per cent) and other private Bahraini investors (four per cent). MTC-Vodafone (re­
branded ‘Zain’ in 2007), with 60 per cent o f its shares owned by Kuwait’s MTC and 40 
per cent by Bahraini investors, entered the mobile market in Bahrain at the end o f 2003 
when it launched its GSM and 3G services.
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Figure 3:1 Bahraini telecom market ownership structure (Dec 2006)
Operator Fixed Cellular
Batelco Batelco Zain
%
Government 75.0% 75.0% 0.0%
Public Sector 21.0% 21.0% 0.0%
Local Private Sector 4.0% 4.0% 40.0%
Foreign 0.0% 0.0% 60.0%
As will be discussed in more detail in later chapters, a liberalisation blue-print was 
drawn up in 2002 and by 2004 the telecommunications market was officially opened up 
for competition, though the results have been limited as Zain was the only competitor 
granted a licence by the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) to offer 
GSM services. As Singapore confronts the conflicting interests o f both expanding and 
enhancing its telecommunications services, while at the same time controlling the 
information those services convey to its population, the same dilemma is arising in 
Bahrain, though the difference may be that Bahrain’s concerns relate more to preserving 
cultural and value systems more than ensuring the authority of the state. This issue will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
In regards to job creation, as in Singapore, Bahrain is similarly interested in 
telecommunications facilitating new opportunities for its citizens, as the Gulf State is 
currently grappling with 14 per cent unemployment. The goals Bahrain has laid out as 
part o f its larger growth strategy include accelerating Bahrain’s economic growth to an 
average o f six per cent per year to double GDP within the next 12 years. To accomplish 
this Bahrain is seeking to privatise it electricity, water and healthcare projects, and make 
Bahrain a regional hub for healthcare, business and financial services and develop an 
international communication centre to facilitate e-commerce. The liberalising of 
telecommunications is seen as an essential component in accomplishing these 
objectives.
In the excerpts from Asia Times Online article above, Singapore’s Information Minister,
Lee Boon Yang, attributes the injection of competition into the marketplace as the spur
which drove ‘...incumbent telecommunication operators to become more efficient and
to offer products and services that are more innovative and responsive to the end user’.
This type o f dynamic telecommunications environment would add dramatically to the
competitive advantage which Bahrain seeks to build, and as such the Kingdom is
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attempting to develop a competitive telecommunications market. But as is also noted in 
the Asia Times Online article, the ‘ . .liberalization exercise o f Singapore has not yielded 
immediate results. The infrastructure roll-out has been slow, with operators opting for 
the easier alternative of buying rather than building infrastructure from scratch. Given 
that condition, SingTel is expected to remain dominant in infrastructure. This could well 
happen in Bahrain, where a second operator might opt to purchase from Batelco’s 
existing infrastructure monopoly rather than building their own, leaving Batelco the 
dominant player in infrastructure. In this regard Bahrain faces the same uncertainty 
emerging from Batelco’s dominant position as Singapore did with SingTel. Once the 
TRA opens up the market for fixed line services, can smaller rivals afford -  or be 
persuaded -  to invest in the ‘nuts and bolts’ o f new telecommunications infrastructure? 
Or, will they request to run their services over the existing Batelco network, which 
would necessitate Batelco offering them an affordable rate? Perhaps more importantly, 
with a population o f just 700,000, would any operator come forward to compete in 
Bahrain? These are issues that will require further examination later in this thesis.
However, having so far in this chapter looked at the progress o f telecommunications in 
the developed and developing world generally, with a greater focus on Singapore and 
Bahrain in the section just above, it is worthwhile now to review the 
telecommunications situation within Bahrain’s regional neighbours.
Telecommunications in the GCC
An exceptional characteristic o f the telecommunications sector across Arab countries in 
recent years has been the phenomenal growth in mobile use, with subscriber rates 
jumping an incredible seventy per cent through 2005 and the UAE and Bahrain 
attaining mobile penetration rates comparable to Europe’s (.Madar Research reports 70 
percent growth in Arab mobile phone subscription in 2005 2006). In the Gulf 
Cooperation Council3 (GCC) in particular this has been credited to the sweeping 
telecommunications liberalisation reforms which began taking hold six years ago to 
meet WTO benchmarks for accession -  Bahrain is currently furthest along in 
liberalisation efforts, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are showing progress, Oman 
currently has two mobile operators and Qatar is scheduled to liberalise its 
telecommunications in 2007 (GCC Investment Strategy and Sectors Outlook fo r 2007).
3 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) consists o f Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman.
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Figure 3:2 Telephone services penetration in GCC countries in 2005
Mobile penetration (%) Fixed-line penetration (%)
Bahrain 105 27
Kuwait 90 22
Oman 56 12
Qatar 93 28
Saudi Arabia 60 18
UAE 102 28
(Source: Global Research as cited in GCC Investment Strategy and Sectors Outlook fo r  2007)
Figure 3:3 Middle East Internet usage and population statistics
MIDDLE EAST Population (2007 Est.)
Usage, in 
Dec/2000
Internet 
Usage, 
Latest Data
%
Population
(Penetration)
(%) of 
M.E.
Use
Growth
(2000-
2007)
Bahrain 738,874 40,000 152,700 20.7 % 0.8 % 281.8  %
Iran 70,431,905 250,000 7,500,000 10.6 % 38.7 % 2,900.0  %
Iraq 27,162,627 12,500 36,000 0.1 % 0.2 % 188.0 %
Israel 7,237,384 1,270,000 3,700,000 51.1 % 19.1 % 1 9 1 .3 %
Jordan 5,375,307 127,300 629,500 11.7 % 3.2 % 394.5  %
Kuwait 2,730,603 150,000 700,000 25.6 % 3.6 % 366.7 %
Lebanon 4,556,561 300,000 700,000 1 5 .4 % 3.6 % 133.3 %
Oman 2,452,234 90,000 245,000 10.0 % 1 .3 % 172.2 %
Palestine (West 
Bk.) 3,070,228 35,000 243,000 7.9 % 1 .3 % 594.3 %
Qatar 824,355 30,000 219,000 26.6 % 1.1 % 630.0  %
Saudi Arabia 24,069,943 200,000 2,540,000 10.6 % 13.1 % 1,170.0 %
Svria 19,514,386 30,000 1,100,000 5.6 % 5.7 % 3,566 .7  %
United Arab 
Emirates 3,981,978 735,000 1,397,200 35.1 % 7.2 % 90.1 %
Yemen 21,306,342 15,000 220,000 1 .0 % 1.1 % 1,366.7  %
TOTAL Middle 
East 193,452,727 3,284,800 19,382,400 1 0 .0 %
100.0
% 490.1
(Source.www. internetworldstats. com)
Concurrent with the astonishing growth in mobile penetration rates in the GCC has been 
the absolute stagnation in fixed-line penetration rates, [as shown in figure 3:2 on the 
following page]. The Jordan-based Arab Advisors Group (2005) attributes the 
stagnation in fixed-line penetration directly to a drop in demand brought about by the 
advent of mobile services, noting that while there may be potential for fixed-line
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expansion in Saudi Arabia and Oman, which are currently below average in penetration 
rates, growth in other GCC States is ‘now stabilised at levels generally in line with 
population growth rates’.
The GCC population is roughly 34-million, with Saudi Arabia by far the largest at some 
24-million, and Bahrain and Qatar the smallest with less than 1-million each. In terms 
of wealth relative to their populations, Qatar ranks as one of the most prosperous states 
in the world with a US$29,111 per-capita income, followed by the UAE and Kuwait 
(Completion levels in Arab cellular markets & privatization levels in Arab cellular and 
fixed markets 2005). While the population base in GCC countries is not large relative to 
other world markets, the profitability, and thus the attraction for foreign 
telecommunications companies, is due to the high Average Revenue Per User (ARPU).
With booming economies due to skyrocketing oil prices and a small population, 
the GCC countries have the highest mobile spend per capita. The UAE and 
Qatar are neck to neck with the first having a mobile spend per capita o f US$557 
and the second with US$541. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman have a 
mobile spend per capita ranging between US$185 to US$492 (GCC Investment 
Strategy and Sectors Outlook for 2007).
Large profits in their home markets are also allowing some o f the GGC’s own 
telecommunications companies to pursue aggressive expansions into markets beyond 
their national borders. Emirates Telecommunications (Etisalat) in the UAE is probably 
the most significant in this regard: having obtain significant stakes in Pakistan 
Telecommunication and Atlantique Telecom in West Africa, Etisalat also has licences 
to operate mobile networks in Saudi Arabia and Egypt and ended 2006 with operations 
in 12 different countries and a subscriber base of some 10-million customers (al-Ateeqi 
and Stockmeier 2007).
In regard to Internet usage, the number o f people logging on to the Net in the GCC, and 
the wider Middle East in general, is increasing almost by the day. For many o f the more 
dictatorial regimes in the region the increasingly free-flowing nature o f information this 
entails is not always regarded as compatible with respect for the authority o f the state, as 
when the Saudi authorities announce in 1998 that they were deliberately jamming 
internet access for the public until a means was found to block ‘undesirable’ 
information from reaching their population (Dahan 2000). As Figure 3:3 above shows
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however, most countries throughout the region have experienced at least a several 
hundred per cent increase in Internet usage since 2000, and in some case there has been 
a several thousand per cent increase, an indication that trying to halt the relentless 
growth o f internet access is tantamount to fighting the tide and countries must instead 
find ways to adapt to it as a new reality.
The way forward
As stated above, the momentum for telecommunications liberalisation reforms in GCC 
countries was built behind the goal o f meeting the ffee-market ownership standards set 
by the WTO, though this is not the complete explanation. High oil prices for much of 
the 1970s and early 1980s led to rapid economic growth in GCC countries, facilitating 
massive state investments in infrastructure, industrial developments and public services, 
but the economies were also characterised by heavy state patronage and overwhelming 
reliance on a single commodity -  this led to an underdeveloped private sector and left 
government revenues severely exposed to price fluctuations in world oil markets 
(Lopez-Claros 2005, p. xii). As oil prices fell from the mid-1980s on into the 1990s, 
governments in the GCC found themselves in varying degrees o f fiscal crisis and 
ensuing political turmoil. While oil prices are now relatively high again and expected to 
maintain their present level for some time, much o f the current telecommunications 
liberalisation reforms in the GCC should be seen within the framework o f a larger 
agenda governments have to diversify their economies away from such massive 
dependence on oil -  a non-renewable resource subject to price fluctuations and, in 
Bahrain in particular, of increasingly finite supply.
Bahrain was among the first o f the GCC countries to recognize the implications o f its 
oil dependence and, as will be discussed further in the next chapter, initial attempts to 
diversify the economy began in the 1970. Thus, telecommunications liberalisation can 
be seen as both (1) a single sector under reform as part o f a larger general restructuring 
o f markets, and (2) as a way to facilitate the liberalisation reforms and competitiveness 
of other sectors. Augusto Lopez-Claros examines a wide range of literature on the topic 
in the 2005 Arab World Competitiveness Report and (citing Sulaf Zakharia, pp. xii-xiii) 
notes that Bahrain’s ‘assertive stance’ regarding the economy...
...employing a rigorous, fast-track approach to reform implementation, has
particular significance for the rest o f the region. Bahrain began by implementing
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a process o f political reform, through which it rapidly transformed itself from a 
sheikdom to a constitutional monarchy. Its approach to economic development 
has been equally assertive, and this small country has already implemented 
fundamental labour market reform, fully liberalised its telecommunications 
market in a record 18 months, realized a privatisation program which is still in 
full swing, and continued to open its market through multilateral and bilateral 
trade agreements...policies matter a great deal for economic outcomes, and 
Bahrain’s example is an encouraging message for the region.
Conclusion
Technological advancements in many ways helped break the conception of  
telecommunications as natural monopoly, which, outside the US, had almost universally 
been state-owned and operated. The potential for private participation and competition 
arrived with new technology that made telecommunications a cost-feasible and profit­
able industry; this, hand-in-hand with the rise o f privatisation and liberalisation 
ideology globally, led governments to divest o f their SOTEs and liberalise their 
telecommunications markets to let flourish the new technologies in their economies. 
Among the most crucial aspects determining the success of telecommunications reforms 
is their ability to secure interconnection between new market entrants and incumbent 
monopolists, and at fair prices. In cases where a coherent strategy and well implemented 
regulations for telecommunications liberalisation were applied, customers have 
benefited from expanded services and lower prices while the larger nation has benefited 
from the injection o f technological advancements, increasing overall economic and 
social growth. In cases where there was weak regulation and poor planning, incumbent 
corporations in newly liberalised markets moved to crush competition using their 
dominant position and further their own profit-margins at general expense. 
Liberalisation and technological advancement seem to reciprocally reinforce each other, 
both fundamentally altering the role o f telecommunications companies through 
converging markets and services. Notable in this regard is the fact that, in both 
Singapore and Jamaica, the emergence of new and difficult-to-regulate technologies 
made the exclusivity agreements held by their respective incumbent 
telecommunications operators increasingly obsolete, thus eroding their monopoly 
power. The telecommunications industry is now gaining a truly global status as 
multinational corporations compete and cooperate in multiple markets, products and 
services simultaneously.
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The successes o f Singapore, as a developing nation which through strong, coherent and 
insightful telecommunications policies has garnered tremendous benefits for its 
economy and future prospects, is an example which the Kingdom o f Bahrain should 
look to emulate as it seeks the modernising benefits of a dynamic telecommunications 
market to stake out competitive advantage in attracting foreign business and 
investments to the Kingdom. To better understand the context in which 
telecommunications is developing in Bahrain, it is necessary to examine the historical, 
political and economic background o f the Kingdom, and this is the subject matter o f the 
next chapter.
* *  *
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Chapter 4:
The economic, political and historical background of Bahrain
Introduction
A brief history o f  Bahrain
Located 20 miles off the east coast o f Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, a 36 island archipelago, 
lies near the centre of the Arabian Gulf. The three main islands of Bahrain -  the capital 
Manama, Sitra, and Muharraq -  are joined by causeways, and make up about ninety- 
five per cent o f the 707 square kilometer land area. The islands first became known as 
Bahrain in the early Islamic era, when the name was used for the entire region stretching 
from Basra, Iraq in the north to Oman in the south. It is one o f the most densely 
populated Middle Eastern countries, with eighty-nine per cent o f the population living 
in urban areas. Bahrain’s abundance o f fresh water, good fishing, and the lucrative pearl 
trade made it a valuable stopping point in the Gulf well before the discovery o f oil, with 
the majority o f the population earning a livelihood from pearls, fishing, agriculture and 
trade -  these first two were large employers of labour while trade, though it employed 
much fewer people, provided the major source o f revenue to the Kingdom.
About the year 640 A.D., the Prophet Mohammed sent a letter to the ruler o f Bahrain
inviting him to adopt Islam, leading many o f the island’s inhabitants to become Muslim
and after a series o f Islamic rulers, Bahrain came under Portuguese rule. It was a
staunchly Shiite Muslim community and during these years it appears to have been
well-governed and prosperous, being an important port on the trade routes between Iraq
and India. The Portuguese were in the Gulf for a little over a century, and by the early
1500’s, the Portuguese saw Bahrain as a key point from which to protect their trade
routes between India, Africa and Europe. The Portuguese were however unable to
protect the islands, being driven from Bahrain in 1602 by the Bahrainis themselves.
After the expulsion o f the Portuguese, the Bahrainis appealed to the Persians for
protection and so came under their control in 1603. This was followed by a long period
of turmoil, with Bahrain changing hands between the warring Persians and Arabs, until
it was finally conquered in 1783 by Sheikh Ahmed bin Mohammed al-Khalifa. Better
known as Ahmed bin Mohamed A1 Fateh, ‘the conqueror’, he was to usher in the
beginning o f a new and important era, though his rule was fraught with encroachments
and onslaughts from different forces: Persian, Masghatian (Sultanate o f Oman),
102
Ottoman Empire and finally the British; each attempted on several occasions to annex 
Bahrain to their dominion and during the eighteenth century Bahrain finally came under 
British rule and protection.
In 1820 Sheikh Ahmed’s sons Abdulla and Salman, then co-rulers o f Bahrain, signed 
the General Treaty with the British East India Company, beginning a connection to 
Great Britain that lasted until Bahrain’s independence in 1971. When Sheikh Salman 
died in 1825, a struggle for succession began. This internal strife continued with rival 
factions attempting to gain control o f the government and assassinations were rife for 
more than forty years. During this turbulent period the ‘Treaty o f Perpetual Peace and 
Friendship’ was signed with the British to end maritime aggression and build better 
trade relations. As a binding treaty o f protection, it was concluded in 1861 and further 
revised in 1892 and 1951. This treaty was similar to those entered into by the British 
Government with the other Arabian Gulf principalities. It specified that the ruler could 
not dispose o f any of his territory except to the United Kingdom and could not enter into 
relationships with any foreign government other than the United Kingdom without 
British consent. In return the British promised to protect Bahrain from all aggression by 
sea and to lend support in case of land attack. The treaty was seen by the rival internal 
factions as a means to secure their own power by enlisting British aid against the other 
factions in the continuing struggle for control o f the Bahraini Government. The struggle 
eventually reached a head in 1869 when the exasperated British simply removed and 
exiled the primary rivals and proclaimed the twenty-one year old Sheikh Isa bin Ali al- 
Khalifa the ruler of Bahrain. Sheikh Isa acted quickly and decisively to stabilize the 
government and, with the support of the British fleet, held off invasions by the Turks 
and the Persians, both o f whom claimed Bahrain as their own. Sheikh Isa guided his 
nation into the twentieth century, ruling until 1923 when his son, Sheikh Hamad, joined 
him as co-ruler.
The United Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire negotiated an agreement in 1913 
asserting the autonomy of Bahrain, though the island continued to be a British 
protectorate. Iran began to reassert its claim over Bahrain soon afterwards, and due to 
Sheikh Isa bin Ali al-Khalifa’s apparent willingness to acquiesce to Iran he was deposed 
by the English in 1923. The result was widespread condemnation throughout the 
population and further anxiety in London that control over Bahrain was slipping away.
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The veteran colonial officer Sir Charles Belgrave was then dispatched from England in 
1926 to quell the problem as an advisor to Bahrain’s Emir, though Belgrave’s heavy- 
handed subjugation o f Bahrainis engendered considerable animosity and lead to his 
ultimate expulsion in 1957 (Mojtahedzadeh 1995, p. 1-7).
Oil reserves, initially found on the island in 1902, only became an economic factor in 
the 1930s when major extraction and production facilities were built. Government 
revenues were heavily reliant upon the import and export duties and fees garnered from 
the growing merchant class and increased international trade passing through the 
Bahrain. By the midpoint of the century Bahrain’s economy was quickly gathering pace 
as nations around the Gulf began to reap the rewards o f the expanding oil industry. 
Cognisant o f Bahrain’s resource limitations, the government began efforts to diversify 
its economy as early as 1967, seeking to attract foreign private sector investment and 
pushing broad infrastructure, public service and education programs.
London relocated its regional naval headquarters to Bahrain from Aden, Yemen, in 
1967, but when the United Nations reported in 1970 that the inhabitants o f Bahrain 
desired independence, Britain withdrew from the Arabian Gulf area the next year and 
Bahrain became independent. In 1973 a constitution was adopted and an elected 
national assembly established, but in 1975 the Emir suspended the constitution and 
dissolved the national assembly, following claims by his prime minister that the 
National Assembly was impeding the work o f the government.
Bahrain and the other Gulf states of Oman, UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
formed the GCC in 1981 to expedite the free movement of capital, goods and labour 
throughout the region1. The GCC objectives are:
To effect coordination, integration and inter-connection between member states 
in all fields, strengthening ties between their people, formulating similar 
regulation in various fields such as economy, finance, trade, customs, tourism, 
legislation, administration, as well as fostering scientific and technical progress 
in industry, mining, agriculture, water and animal resources, establishing 
scientific research centers, setting up joint ventures, and encouraging co­
operation of the private sector (The EU and the GCC 2006, p. 1).
1 GCC states are also members o f the Arab League.
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In the late 1980s a causeway was built connecting Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. In the 
1980s and 1990s relations with Qatar were strained by a dispute over the Hawar Islands 
and the large natural-gas resources o f the Dome field, located in the shallow sea 
between both countries. When the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, attempts were made to 
improve relations with Iran. Persistent irritants to Iran were the poverty among 
Bahrain’s Shiite majority and the small Shiite representation in Bahrain’s cabinet. 
During the 1991 Gulf War, coalition forces were allowed extensive use of Bahraini 
territory. In 1993 a consultative council (Shura) was appointed to replace the long- 
dissolved national assembly, but during the mid-to-late 1990s unrest among Bahrain’s 
Shiites led to opposition protests and violence, with the restoration o f an elected 
parliament one o f their main demands. In 1996 more than 50 people were arrested for 
involvement in what was said to be an Iranian-backed coup attempt.
Sheikh Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa, who had ruled since 1961, died in 1999 and was 
succeeded by his son, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa. The new ruler moved gradually 
towards increased democracy for Bahrain and in 2000 called for the establishment of a 
national committee to write a new national charter. The charter, which established a 
constitutional monarchy, was approved in Feb., 2001; the same month a general 
amnesty for political prisoners and exiles was declared. Bahrain was proclaimed a 
Kingdom in 2002 and the Shura was dissolved prior to the assembly elections. Because 
King Hamad had established an appointed upper house in the national parliament, 
which had not been part o f the charter approved in 2001, a number o f groups including 
the largest Shiite associations, called for an electoral boycott which lead to a fifty-three 
per cent turnout in the October vote. However the election marked the first time women 
in an Arab Gulf monarchy could vote or run for national office.
The ruling family is Sunni, as are most o f the important merchant families, the officer 
corps in the army and senior civil servants. The Sunni elite have long mistrusted the 
Shiite community, but this situation improved in 1999 when King Hamad came into 
power and the government moved to allay these feelings, including lifting the ban on 
Shiites serving in the army and security forces, and amending the strict state security 
laws which had curbed many civil freedoms for almost 20 years. Another significant 
move was the formation o f the first human rights forum. The government hopes that
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such reforms will reduce tensions in the short term and that in the long term, political 
reform and greater economic prosperity will contribute to a more cohesive society.
Social and religious composition of Bahrain
The demographics o f the Bahraini-born population in the Kingdom are roughly two- 
thirds Shiite Muslim and one-third Sunni Muslim, with a marginal number o f other 
minority groups. Despite the size o f the Shiite population, they are still relatively 
marginalised in the social-economic and political spheres. The political reform 
programmes o f the government has removed many o f the underlying causes which 
sparked unrest in the 1990s, but persistent unemployment and a substantial population 
of foreign labourers continues to agitate tensions in the Shiite community as many 
Shiites regard the foreigners as occupying positions ordinary Bahrainis could fill (Dun 
& Bradstreet 2004, p. 6-7). General unemployment is around fifteen per cent, 
unemployment among youth is closer to twenty-five per cent, while some sixty per cent 
of the total labour-force is made up of expatriates, many of whom work in the Kingdom 
illegally.
Despite the fact that Bahrain is a small country, there are deep social divisions between 
Bahrainis and migrant workers, and between Sunni and Shiite. While an estimated 
fourty-five per cent o f the population are non-Bahraini (mainly other Arabs, Southeast 
Asian nationalities and Westerners), these migrant workers have few rights in Bahrain 
and despite their numbers have little to no influence over the government. They are 
silently contributing to the country’s growth and development and this scenario is likely 
to continue, whether or not the majority o f the local population is in agreement. Though 
the government has enacted a ‘Bahrainisation’ agenda to engender more employment 
among the indigenous population, it has been largely ineffective. Crown Prince Sheikh 
Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa has identified a major inadequacy o f the effort to be its 
lack o f emphasis on work-force relevant skills training and education, and has stated 
that the government is endeavouring to revamp its approach to Bahrainisation.
WTO membership, economic liberalisation and, o f particular interest to this thesis, 
telecommunications liberalisation are among the various economic stimulants the 
Bahrain Government is pursing to create jobs and improve living standards for its 
population, thus quelling potential for social unrest. US actions in the region, principally
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the Iraq war and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have provoked vehement anti-American 
sentiment in many parts of Arab society due to the US’ perceived hypocritical policies 
and selective application of principles. This includes Bahrain, which is the base for the 
US Navy’s 5th fleet, and thus the government must weigh its reliance on the US -  
mainly for territorial integrity and defense, though also in trade -  against the resentment 
in its population which this reliance rouses. With the onset of the recent Iraq war, anti- 
Americanism has been expressed with increasing openness, as religious leaders have 
called for an end to alcohol sales and other influences seen as US in origin and injurious 
to the lives of good Muslims.
An analogous comparison to the Shiites of Bahrain could be the Catholics of Northern 
Ireland, ruled by the United Kingdom. The Catholic minority of Northern Ireland are 
the underprivileged while the Protestants, the majority, own most of the businesses and 
thereby control the economy. The difference is that relative to the Catholic minority in 
Ireland, the Shiite majority in Bahrain is probably better entrenched economically. 
Among the Shiites there are many successful businessmen and their contribution to the 
economic growth is substantial. However in some ways the Shiite’s unorganized revolt 
against the Sunni rulers in the 1990s could be compared to continuous Irish Catholic 
protest activities. In Northern Ireland, the Catholic minority and the Protestant majority 
are deeply suspicious of the other (Sussman 2000, pp. 1-5), while the relationship 
between the minority Sunnis and majority Shiites is much the same.
The Shiite population does not have any major role in the Bahrain Government’s 
Cabinet, though their political ideology is to increase their population and thereby 
increase their political sway in the country. Moreover, the Shiites constantly demand 
government aid for the community by way of various concessions and subsidies that 
make their living easier. While the government continues to provide them with relief 
measures, it exerts a heavy burden on the government budgets. The Shiite community is 
also closely knit, and the wealthy segment of the community contributes five per cent of 
their income to a fund that is used for the welfare of the poor segment of the Shiite 
community.
The political system and its development
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The Kingdom of Bahrain is a constitutional hereditary monarchy under the rule o f the 
al-Khalifa family. The King is the chief executive and head o f state; the crown prince, 
Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, is the King’s eldest son. The prime minister is his 
uncle, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman A1 Khalifa, and the head of government. These posts 
are always filled by members of the al-Khalifa family. The judiciary system is relatively 
independent o f the government and is based on diverse legal sources, including Sunni 
and Shiite Islamic law. The cabinet is formally chosen by the prime minister but the 
King plays an important role in its make up, which balances various tribal and political 
factions. The present 19-member cabinet was appointed in early 2005. The cabinet 
consists of two women, Sunni and Shiite members and the rest are royal family 
members, who form the majority. The al-Khalifa family maintains control o f the key 
ministries, such as foreign affairs, finance, interior and defense.
The 2001 national charter, or constitution, established a bicameral parliamentary system 
(the National Assembly or al-majlis al-watani), with an elected Chamber of Deputies 
(majlis al-nawab), which can promote legislation, and an appointed Consultative 
Council (<majlis al-shura), which can promote and veto legislation. Both houses 
comprise o f 40 members. In the event o f a dispute between the two, all 80 meet, with 
the speaker o f the upper house having the deciding vote. This effectively gives power to 
the Consultative Council. The Chamber of Deputies elected Khalifa al-Dahrani, a Sunni 
Islamist, as its speaker, while a liberal Shiite, Abdel Hadi Marhoun, and a Sunni 
Islamist, Adel al-Muwda, were elected as first and second deputies. The appointed 
chamber has a Shiite, Faisal al-Musawi, as its chairman and contains six women and a 
Jewish member.
Although political parties are banned, a number o f political societies have gained legal 
status. These societies have been formed along religious lines, divided according to 
Sunni or Shiite belief, and ideological groups. Parliament is dominated by conservative 
Sunni Islamists, which tend to support the regime. However, parliament has already 
indicated that it will attempt block any reform that threatens the conservative values o f  
the country -  thus telecom liberalisation moves could meet with some resistance from 
the conservative Sunnis with a possible view that too much liberalisation might lead to 
erosion o f Islamic values. Nevertheless, the lower house has also proved willing to take 
a stance on alleged government corruption. Tensions between the executive and the
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lower house are unlikely to cause the breakdown of the political system however, given 
the power imbalance in favour of the executive, though tensions may fuel the 
dissatisfaction in society. The political societies that boycotted the election remain part 
of the political system, although they are becoming more isolated. These societies 
represent the majority o f the Shiite population, as well as unrepresented leftist trends. 
During 1999, soon after the demise of the Emir, King Hamad set up a Shura council (an 
advisory body having representatives from all walks o f life) as well as the Parliament. 
The Shiites opposed setting up o f two such bodies and wanted the 1973 charter to be 
followed, which had only one entity, namely the national assembly. As a sign o f their 
protest, they boycotted the parliamentary election.
General overview of Bahrain economy
Bahrain’s economic policy is characterised by prudent fiscal expenditure and improved 
budget balances along with an effective system of resource allocation for health, 
education and infrastructure projects. The Kingdom’s GDP grew steadily in recent 
years, increasing 13.5 per cent to BD4.140-billion (US$11.17-billion) in 2004 from 
BD3.647-billion (US$9.85-billion) in 2003 (refer to Figure 4:1, ‘Summary o f Main 
Economic Indicators’ on following page). This helped pushed the Kingdom’s per-capita 
income to US$20,800 in 2005 (Bahrain per capita income hits highest level 2006) -  
though Bahraini ‘middle class’ incomes are between US$6360-7968 annually and 
account for forty per cent o f the population (All past is prologue 2006 p. 35). The non­
oil sector showed a high rate of growth, a sign that the diversification drive is bringing 
results, as the Kingdom’s FDI increased by an astronomical 2,100 per cent between 
2003 and 2006, from US$137 million to US$2.93 billion (Foreign Direct Investments 
on the Middle East 2006 p. 1). The government has focused its efforts on the entry o f  
new private firms, particularly in information and communications technology, 
education and training services, tourism, financial services, business services, healthcare 
services and related industries -  all o f which would benefit substantially from a more 
competitive and liberalised telecommunications environment in the Kingdom. 
Recognition o f Bahrain’s efforts came when it was named the ‘freest economy in the 
Middle East’ in the 2006 Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage 
Foundation/Wall Street Journal, with the Kingdom ranking the 25th freest o f all world 
economies (About EDB 2006, p. 1).
Figure 4:1
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i Summary of Main Economic Indicators
0
.2003 2004 200S-QI 2005-Q2 j
Population and Em ploym ent ______ _ ,_ J
Total Population 689.418 707,160
Total Employment 
D om estic  O utput
249.493 285.390 292550 303,134
GDP at Current Prices (BD Millions) 3j646.9 4.1405
GDP per Capita (BD) 5,289.9 5JB55.2
Crude Oil Production
(US Barrels Thousands) 87,481 76.337 17,001 16,971
Public Finance and Domestic Public Debt
........................
■ ' '' ' ■ - ' '  ^ j
Revenues (BD Millions) 1,1455 1,300.4
Expend cures (BD Millions) IJ080.4 1,104.6
SurphisiDefidt (BD Millions) 13.6 60.0
Domestic Public Debt (BD Millions) 5 915 5 8 5 5 589.0 609.6
As % of GDP 16.2 14.1 14.2 14.7
[Prices , , ., ,  ^ ’ ]
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1020
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 9 2 7 86.9 1
[External S ector " T j  1 2
Trade Balance (BD Millions) 366.4 388.8
Current Account Balance (BD Millions) 7 5 5 156.1
As % of GDP 21 3.8
Overall Balance of Payments (BD Millions) 16.4 59.4
As % of GDP 0.4 1.4
[Money and Blinking . .........
M2 Growth (X) M 4.1 5.6 4.4
Consolidated Balance Sheet o f the
Barking System (USD Billions) 100.9 118.9 119.2 1221
Total Deposits as % of GDP 8 8 5 87.1 B6.6 90.7
Total Domestic Credit as X o f GDP 49.3 53.9 55.9 57.3
[Bahrain Stock  Exchange
Bahrain Stock Exchange Index (Points) 2,346.3 3J054.2 - *
Bahrain All Share Index (Pdnts) 1,336.8 1.773.7 2078.1 2 147 .9
Dow Jones Bahrain Index (Pdnts) 110.7 149.41 174.19 180.11
Stock Market Capitalisation (BD Billons) 3.6 5.1 6.0 6.3
(Source: Bahrain Monetary Agency, Economic Indicators June 2005)
The Economic Development Board
The Crown Prince, an outspoken proponent o f privatization, took over the chairmanship
of the Economic Development Board (EDB), a ‘one-stop-shop’ for potential investors,
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and in 2005 the EDB was entrusted with the task o f giving shape to the King’s vision of 
labour, economic, and education reform in the pursuit o f opening up the economy. The 
EDB is a public agency with the general responsibility for formulating and overseeing 
the economic development strategy o f Bahrain, aiming to create an attractive 
environment for investment -  which includes establishing a state-of-the-art 
telecommunications network. The EDB markets Bahrain internationally, and offers 
investor-facilitation services, acting as the first point of contact and examining 
objectives of investors, providing them with information regarding the relevant 
procedures for setting up business, and helping them form a network o f contacts in 
Bahrain. The EDB is also re-orienting how the success of the Kingdom’s economic 
policies are measured, moving away from an emphasis on dollar increases in foreign 
direct investment and towards a focus on job creation numbers and changes in average 
wages, reflecting an ethos that economic development in Bahrain should benefit a wide 
cross-section of the population (Innovation: The Cost o f Entry 2006, p. 46). Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Essa al-Khalifa, Chief Executive o f the EDB, stated that:
' i {
The key focus is productivity. In comparison with its neighbours, Bahrain has 
very little resources, so we cannot rely on resource exploitation to increase our 
relative wealth, nor can we compete on cost. When we looked around for role 
models, we found various countries that started development from similar 
position. The main similarities were with countries like Singapore and Ireland. 
The key to their development was increasing productivity. We want to make 
Bahrain a highly productive economy, and thereby increase the relative wealth 
of Bahrain {Innovation: The Cost o f  Entry 2006, p. 46).
Open economy
Despite a relatively strong economic base, government revenues remain highly 
dependent on oil, though the financial system is doing well with the banking system in 
Bahrain being a source o f macroeconomic stability with very little contingent liability to 
the government. On the back o f a consistent track record in macroeconomic stabilisation 
and structural reforms, the Kingdom has been regularly upgraded by international rating 
agencies. In 2003, Bahrain's long-term foreign currency ratings were raised well above 
investment grade. Regular rating upgrades have boded well for access to the 
international capital markets.
A number of factors have contributed to the openness of the Bahrain economy, 
including that the Kingdom was among the founding members o f the WTO in 1995 -
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though as a developing country, Bahrain was granted ‘...a period o f adjustment and 
exceptions under the GATT before being completely integrated into the WTO’, (Scarce 
transparency in public services n.d.). In 2003 the US and Bahrain signed the Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), followed by a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
in 2004, allowing for the free flow o f commerce between the two countries. Among the 
attributes o f Bahrain’s economy are, as noted by the US State Department (Investment 
Climate Statement -  Bahrain 2005, p. 1-12): the favorable foreign ownership laws; the 
general lack o f government ‘red tape’ and the ability for investors to repatriate all of 
their profits and capital; foreign currency is easily obtainable and there are no exchange 
controls; the Bahraini Dinar, which is currently pegged to the US dollar, and unlikely to 
suffer major devaluation; money transfers and conversions are not limited in any way 
by legislation and there is no ‘parallel exchange rate or black market’. The US State 
Department describes the Kingdom’s fiscal approach as:
Consistent with the Government o f Bahrain’s liberal approach to foreign 
investment, government policies facilitate the free flow o f financial resources. 
Foreigners and Bahrainis alike have ready access to credit on market terms. 
Generally, credit terms are variable but often are limited to 10 years for loans 
under $50 million. For major infrastructure investments, banks will often offer 
to assume a part of the risk, and Bahrain's onshore and offshore banks have 
shown extensive cooperation in syndicating loans for larger risks. Generally, 
Bahrain’s banks are described as eager for solid investment opportunities. A 
sound system provides yet another comfort factor for potential investors. The 
banking activities undergo examination and supervision by the Bahrain 
Monetary Agency (BMA), which has a solid international reputation (Doing 
Business in Bahrain: A Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies 2005, p. 
87).
Though Bahrain is a relatively a small market for many of the mammoth corporations o f
developed countries, it offers the facilities that enable organizations to use it for their
regional operations that extend even to the Asian Subcontinent -  in this context the
importance of telecommunications liberalisation and its impact on the economy again
become apparent. Robust government spending, prompted by exceptionally strong oil
revenue, is stimulating private consumption and helps to bolster business confidence -
in 2006 government expenditure was forecast to rise by US$4.1-billion, or 10.8 per
cent, over 2005 (Bahrain: Political developments to dominate 2006, p. 2). The 2007-08
budget estimates an increase in government spending of 19.5 per cent over the previous
budget, meaning an extra US$4.9-billion in both budget years, with the emphasis being
placed on social development to calm tensions in the Bahraini population: education
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spending will rise to fifteen per cent of the total budget, from thirteen per cent in the 
previous budget, and spending on new housing development will rise by forty per cent, 
with ‘recurring expenditure’ rising by twenty-five per cent (Bahrain: Political 
developments to dominate 2006 p. 2).
Energy and industry
Oil and gas amounted to 11.5 per cent o f economic activity in 2005, dropping nearly 
two per cent from 2004, though including refining and processing, the percentage rises 
to twenty, and oil and gas make up 25.8 per cent o f GDP, up more than two per cent on 
2004 (More Promising Future 2006, p. 109). Relative to other GCC countries, 
Bahrain’s oil production is relatively small compared to its oil refining industry. The 
state-owned Bahrain Petroleum Company (Bapco) processes all the oil produced in 
Bahrain at its 250,000 barrel-a-day refinery, as well as large amount o f crude it 
purchases from Saudi Arabia. Bapco is also involved in drilling, production and 
distribution of petroleum products and natural gas, and its asset include a 14 million- 
barrel storage facility, marketing terminal and marine terminal (More Promising Future 
2006, p. 109)
Crude oil has been pumping from on-shore reserves in the Kingdom at a relatively 
constant 37,000 bpd since the 1970s, with only minimal decreases. Though precise 
measurements of the Kingdom’s remaining reserves are not made public, general 
estimates place the number around 90-billion cubic metres, which is roughly 20 years 
supply at current rates of extraction. Sustaining some level o f nation reserves in crucial 
for Bahrain as they can be used as collateral in major financing deals, as happened with 
the recent BD 1.01-billion (US$2.68-billion) project to expand to the Kingdom’s 
refining capacity (More Promising Future 2006, pp. 109-113).
The Government o f Bahrain has also been involved in a major joint venture with Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait since 1985 called the Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company 
(GPIC), producing ammonia and methanol for export (Feed me, See more 2006, p. 135). 
Another major collective project with Saudi Arabi and German based Breton 
Investments -  though seventy-seven per cent Bahraini owned -  is Aluminum Bahrain 
(Alba), which operates the largest aluminum smelter in the world and was set to have an 
output of some 830,000 tons by the end o f 2006 (Helter Smelter 2006, p. 132). Two
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related companies are the Bahrain Aluminum Extrusion Company and Gulf Aluminum 
Rolling Mill, while other major industrial players in Bahrain are the Arab Iron and Steel 
Company, with an iron ore palletizing plant that outputs 4-million tons per year, and the 
Arab Ship Repair Yard.
The development of tertiary sectors in the Bahraini economy
Banking and financial services
A highlight of the diversification successes in Bahrain has been the banking and 
financial sectors. The BMA, founded in 1973, has been the major player in developing 
the industry in the Kingdom, having helped attract the more than 360 banks and other 
financial institutions currently operating in Bahrain (Global Economic Research - 
Bahrain, Economic and Strategic Outlook 2004, p.25). Total assets held by banks in 
Bahrain are estimated at ‘nearly ten times the size o f Bahrain’s economy’ and the 
industry accounts for at least twenty-five per cent o f national income and is the leading 
private employer o f Bahrainis (Leading from the front 2006, p. 59). A measure o f the 
success in the banking sector can be seen in the gains between the third quarter o f 2006 
over the third quarter o f 2005: the unified budget o f commercial banks in Bahrain 
increased 28.4 per cent to BD7.6-billion (US$20.1-billion); offshore banks saw their 
unified budget increase 24.6 per cent to reach BD 138.1-billion (US$366-billion), while 
investment banks unified budget topped BD410.4-billion (US$1.09-trillion), an increase 
of 50.7 per cent over 2005’s third quarter (Bahrain’s banking sector in progress 2006, 
pp. 1-2). Bahrain is also home to 34 o f the world’s 78 Islamic investment funds, with 
the Central Bank o f Bahrain (CBB) planning the establishment o f the International 
Islamic Financial Market, which would include the membership o f Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Brunei, Malaysia, Pakistan and Indonesia (Bahrain’s Banking sector in progress 2006,
p. 1-2).
The financial sector is one o f the successes o f the Bahrainisation programme, with 
Bahraini nationals counting for nearly ninety per cent o f all employees, both male and 
female, in full commercial banks and in excess o f seventy-five per cent o f all employees 
in international banks (Global Economic Research - Bahrain, Economic and Strategic 
Outlook 2004, p. 2). These banking and financial communities also contribute indirectly 
to the national economy in terms o f expansion of both trade and services, especially in 
the form of real estate, transportation, telecommunications, tourism and the creation of
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job opportunities outside the financial sector, and a competitive telecommunications 
industry is necessary to facilitate Bahrain’s continued successes in the banking and 
financial sectors.
Insurance
The insurance market in Bahrain is one of the largest in the region and is growing 
steadily. Divided into a well-developed onshore market and a vast offshore market, the 
insurance sector in 2004 was comprised o f some 100 operating companies and 60 
associated firms, with gross written premiums of BD452-million (US$1.2-billion) in 
that year (Time to get Serious 2006, p. 103). According to BMA figures (sited in 
Bahrain insurance sector posts healthy growth in 2005 2006, p .l) gross premiums 
generated in the domestic market for 2005 amounted to BD94.9-million (US$251- 
million), an increase of 5.4 per cent over the 2004 figure of BD90.1-million (US$238.4- 
million). In 2005 the domestic market was comprised o f 19 insurance companies 
carrying out direct insurance business in Bahrain -  11 locally incorporated firms having 
roughly seventy-five per cent o f the market share and eight branches o f foreign firms 
(Bahrain insurance sector posts healthy growth in 2005 2006, p. 1). The offshore 
market, comprised of more than 70 companies, collected more than BD301-million 
(US$800-million) in premiums in 2004 -  including the Arab Insurance Group, one of  
the biggest regional reinsurance companies which alone underwrote BD49-million 
(US$130-million) in premiums in 2004 (Time to get Serious 2006, p. 103).
According to Mr. Abdul Rahman A1 Baker, executive director of financial institutions 
supervision at the Central Bank o f Bahrain (Bahrain insurance sector posts healthy 
growth in 2005 2006, p. 1):
The climate for insurance services continues to improve in Bahrain and the 
region. Robust economic growth coupled with renewed government investment 
in large infrastructure projects and strong private sector investment in real estate 
and other economic sectors are contributing to the expansion o f the insurance 
sector. In addition, increasing public awareness and acceptance about the need 
for insurance is also contributing to the growing demand for insurance products, 
both conventional and Islamic.
Although not as successful as the banking in sector in regards to Bahrainisation, some 
sixty-three per cent o f the insurance industry workforce are Bahraini nationals, with the
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total number o f employees being 1003 people in 2005, a nine per cent increase over 
2004 {Bahrain insurance sector posts healthy growth in 2005 2006, p. 1).
Tourism and the Formula 1
Bahrain’s Formula 1 track hosted its first Grand Prix championship in 2004 and is 
anticipated to dramatically increase tourism in the Kingdom, complementing the 
expansion of the financial sector and raising Bahrain’s profile as an international travel 
destination. The 5.4 km, $ 150-million track is also hoped to foster the growth o f motor 
sports generally, as the track can be used for any auto or motorcycle racing events, as 
well as vehicle testing. Also included on the grounds are facilities for hosting any 
number o f other events, from conferences to concerts. Fawaz bin Mohammed al- 
Khalifa, chairman o f the Bahrain International Circuit, notes that ‘Formula 1 is number 
three in popularity in the world sports calendar, following the Summer Olympics and 
the World Cup finals in football’, {Grand Prix o f  Bahrain, Bahrain International 
Circuit 2005, p. 2).
Tourist numbers in Bahrain range from 3.5-million to 4-million tourists per year, with 
tourist attractions including the 18-hole PGA Golf Course, scuba diving and snorkeling 
locations, and ancient forts and museums. The land-link to Saudi Arabia across the King 
Fahad Causeway has also helped facilitate the tourism from other GCC states. In recent 
years the Kingdom has set out to establish itself as a major tourist and leisure lifestyle 
destination. The target market for the numerous luxury residential complexes springing 
up around the island is expatriates who, looking to base themselves in the region, are 
attracted to Bahrain because of its liberal economics, cultural tolerance and extremely 
safe environment. Many affluent EU and GCC citizens have bought plots on man-made 
luxury-living resort islands, and Bahrain has eased restrictions to allow GCC expatriates 
to permanently relocate. As an example, Durrat al-Bahrain, a US$1.2-billion luxury 
residential facility, sold all o f its villas on the first day o f sale, and is now going about 
creating another seven islands with 1,600 more plots, as well as another 18-hole golf 
course and a marina with a 350 yacht capacity {Boomtown 2005, p. 132).
Economic and fiscal policies
Similar to other members o f the GCC, Bahrain’s economic performance is closely 
related to the volume of oil revenues contributing to both the economy and the revenues
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of the government. Although the importance o f oil revenues to the economy has been in 
decline since the 1970s, government revenue tends to rise and fall with fluctuations in 
the global price o f oil, which has been relatively high since 2000. The revenues from oil 
accrue to the government, which then injects them into the economy through its 
expenditure programmes. Along with the considerable degree o f state-ownership in 
Bahrain, the state is also the largest employer and key economic investor.
Fiscal Policy
The Bahraini Dinar is freely convertible and has been pegged against the U.S. dollar 
since 1980 at one dollar equals 0.377 BD, while the BMA first offered government 
bond in 1977, followed by treasury bills in 1986. The government restricts itself in 
borrowing from foreign lenders, having so far been able to use domestic banks to fund 
its entire public debt, which stood at US$1.5 8-billion in 2004 (Dun & Bradstreet 2004, 
p. 19). Although the Government o f Bahrain has a controlling interest in many of the 
Kingdom’s major industrial establishments, its overall approach to economic policy can 
best be described as laissez faire.
In principle, there is no tax or duty on imports o f raw materials or semi-manufactured 
goods for manufacture, on imports required for development projects, on transshipments 
or on goods for re-export. Except for certain basic foodstuffs and petroleum products, 
private companies set the prices of goods and undertake the importation and distribution 
of foreign commodities and manufactured products. Because most manufactured 
products sold in Bahrain are imported, prices depend on competition, the source o f  
supply, shipping costs, and agent markups. Agency commission has been abolished and, 
as a result, local merchants have been unable to maintain excessive margins, forcing 
more competitive pricing. The government makes major purchasing decisions (above 
US$27,000) through the tendering process. For major projects, the ministry concerned 
extends invitations to select pre-qualified firms. Smaller contracts are sometimes 
handled by departments within ministries, and are not necessarily subject to 
prequalification.
Bahrain is essentially tax-free. There is no individual income tax, nor does the country 
have any Value-Added Tax, property tax, production tax, or withholding tax. The only 
exception would be for companies engaged in petroleum extraction and refining.
117
Bahrain collects customs duties and a few indirect and excise taxes, which include a tax 
on gasoline, a ten per cent levy on rents paid by residential tenants, a 12.5 per cent tax 
on office rents, and a fifteen per cent tax on hotel room rates. Firms with fifty-plus 
employees must pay a training levy at a rate of three per cent o f the payroll for 
expatriate employees and one per cent for Bahrainis. The government charges a fee for 
the issuance of expatriate work permits, an attempt by the Government o f Bahrain to 
encourage employment o f Bahraini citizens.
Private consumption and government spending
Private sector consumption to a great extent relies on government expenditure policies. 
The government is the main employer in the economy, but even in the private sector, 
many companies rely on government contracts for the bulk o f their business. Therefore, 
confidence in the private sector is dependent on government spending patterns. 
Traditionally, private consumption has followed the trend o f oil revenues, however this 
direct link was broken in the late 1990s when the government used increased oil 
revenues to reduce indebtedness and rebuild foreign exchange reserves. Since 2001 the 
government has reversed its economic policy and is again using expenditure to boost the 
economy, resulting in an increase in private consumption by 4.9 per cent in 2001, six 
per cent in 2004 and 5.9 per cent in 2005 (.Need for Growth 2005, p. 29). As noted by 
the 2005 study by the OBG entitled Need for Growth:
Disposable income is high and increases in income are recycled into 
consumption owing to the low tax environment: the only taxes that most 
Bahrainis encounter are the indirect tax on petrol sales and the ten per cent 
municipal tax on rents. The government is unlikely to introduce new personal 
taxes in the short to medium term or to increase existing taxes.
Figure 4:2
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The government, which is the main investor in the economy, is actively promoting a 
number of large-scale projects that it hopes will promote both economic growth and 
economic diversification including the US$660-million al-Hidd super port project; an 
expansion o f the airport at a cost o f US$300-million; a US$2.35-billion expansion of  
the aluminium smelter; the US$1.3-billion Bahrain Financial Harbour project and 
US$600-million expansion o f the oil refinery at Sitra island. These projects should have 
a positive effect on investment by private companies, which are expected to upgrade 
facilities to take advantage of new economic opportunities. However, the impact o f  
these improvements will not be felt in the short term. In addition, the size o f the projects 
means that international, rather than local, construction companies will be the principal 
beneficiaries.
The government’s proficiency in recycling oil revenues has a major impact on real GDP 
growth and largely determines the rate o f economic growth. Thus, government 
consumption is the most important factor affecting the increase o f real GDP. 
Government consumption accounts for around twenty per cent o f GDP -  high public 
sector wages and the provision o f a generous welfare system prevent the government 
from reducing recurrent expenditure in the short term -  and coupled with capital 
expenditure, the share would increase to around thirty per cent of GDP.
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Besides oil-related revenue, which has increased substantially with the rise in oil prices 
in recent years, the other major sources of government finances are other publicly 
owned industries (listed above), and financial assistance from governments such as 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia which often contribute to major infrastructure developments 
in Bahrain. In writing up the budget, the government normally estimates conservatively 
on oil prices and aims for a six per cent deficit, which, contingent on further 
government spending, often results in a smaller deficit (Dun & Bradstreet 2004, p. 23). 
Bahrain has also been running a net trade surplus since 1993, which contributes some 
2.3 points to real GDP growth, with the Kingdom ‘expected to continue to run a trade 
surplus in the medium term’, (Dun & Bradstreet 2004, p. 23).
Inflation
With an average annual inflation of 0.5 per cent in the period 1994 to 2003, Bahrain has 
maintained a low inflationary environment for the past two decades. Two factors that 
have played major roles in maintaining low inflation are the government’s monetary 
policy and its dominant economic position. This has helped Bahrain to move on with its 
economic liberalisation efforts. However, Bahrain has to import most o f its needs and is 
therefore vulnerable to inflationary pressures from key markets. The government’s 
policy o f maintaining a fixed exchange rate against the US dollar, affects cost of 
imports from other countries.
It can be seen from figure 4:3 (below) that years 1998 to 2000 were deflationary, with 
positive low inflation returning in 2001. Strong domestic demand took inflation to 2.1 
per cent in 2005, and while the low inflationary environment is expect to hold in the 
near term, it was expected to rise again to 2.7 per cent in 2006 riding continued strong 
domestic demand (.Bahrain Inflation Rate 2006, p. 1). In the medium term, the removal 
of subsidies and price liberalisation necessitated by membership in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and economic liberalisation is likely to threaten the low rates o f  
inflation experienced in recent years.
Figure 4:3
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Economic outlook
The EDB’s economic strategy envisions doubling 2005’s GDP by 2015, with GDP 
growth of six to nine per cent each year from 2005-2015, concurrent with a five per cent 
growth in employment for each of those years -  no small feat, to be sure. Given its 
resources and those of the other GCC nations, Bahrain has not benefited as substantially 
from recent high oil prices as many of its neighbours, and while Bahrain is liberalising 
its economy quickly and investing heavily in new infrastructure to attract FDI and new 
businesses to the Kingdom, many of its neighbours are pursing much the same path, 
only with much greater financial resources. As a 2006 McKinsey Consultants report 
entitled Reforming Bahrain’s Labour Market: The Case for Change notes, ‘Dubai is 
making great strides in many of the sectors that Bahrain could once think o f as its own, 
including transport, trade, logistics and even finance’.
The government’s 2002 ‘privatisation decree’ allowed for the divesting o f ‘tourist and 
communications sectors, transport, electricity and water, the ports and airport service, 
the oil and gas sector, and the postal service’, {AU past is prologue 2006, p. 33,) all in 
the interest of stimulating growth, investments and jobs, though full privatisation has so 
far only occurred in public transportation and a few other services. The McKinsey 
Consultants report also stated rather ominously that Bahrain will have 100,000 new
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jobseekers over the next ten years, effectively doubling the number o f workers in the 
Kingdom, and that major growth in the private sector is required for there to be 
employment for all the new work-force entrants, as the public sector is near capacity:
The Bahrain public sector will not be able to absorb the large number o f job 
seekers in the future because Bahrainisation within the public sector already 
exceeds ninety-four per cent as per 2002 statistics. As a percentage of total 
labour force, Bahrain has twenty-five per cent in the public sector, which is 
higher than Canada (twenty per cent), US (fifteen per cent), Germany (fifteen 
per cent), UK (fifteen per cent), Japan (six per cent), and Korea (four per cent) 
{Reforming Bahrain’s Labour Market: The Case fo r Change 2004, p. 4).
The government places strong emphasis on its Bahrainisation programme as a solution 
to the challenges posed by a growing labour force. The programme obliges companies 
that employ more than ten people to increase the proportion of Bahraini employees by 
five per cent a year, until at least fifty per cent o f the staff is Bahraini. The dependence 
on expatriate labour will continue as long as the Bahraini education system fails to 
deliver adequately skilled workers and Bahrainis remain reluctant to take on low skilled 
jobs {Reforming Bahrain’s Labour Market: The Case for Change 2004, p. 6). 
Bahrainisation also pushes up wage costs, reducing profits and deterring potential 
investment. In addition, the World Bank has criticized the programme. It argues that, 
rather than setting quotas, such as in the banking sector, policies should be based on 
training and education to ensure local skills are available to meet the requirements o f the 
market.
Human development
With a well-developed oil economy, Bahrain has experienced a sizable influx o f foreign 
workers, with the economy also contributing to a high degree o f social and cultural 
development. For example, the people o f Bahrain enjoy the benefits of sophisticated 
social programs, including a free health care system and education. Bahrain has 
traditionally boasted an advanced educational system which, setup in 1919, also opened 
its doors to educate women two years later. Schooling and related costs are entirely paid 
for by the government, and primary and secondary school attendance rates are high. 
Bahrain also encourages institutions of higher learning, drawing on expatriate talent and 
the increasing pool o f Bahrainis returning from abroad with advanced degrees. 
Additionally, Bahrain University has been established for standard undergraduate and 
graduate study, and the College o f Health Sciences -  operating under the direction o f
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the Ministry o f Health -  trains physicians, nurses, pharmacists and paramedics. The 
national literacy rate for the total population is 89.1 per cent with the rate o f functional 
literacy for males at 91.9 per cent and eighty-five per cent for females. On the United 
Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI), which rates nations 
based on their relative life expectancy, education and standard o f living, Bahrain ranked 
high at 39 in the world, with the only Arab country to place higher being Kuwait, at 
33rd.
Investment overview
Bahrain’s role as a regional finance center developed because o f its international 
standards facilities, strong regulatory environment and low taxes. International investors 
want the security that an effective regulatory framework creates and Bahrain’s 
commercial law and dispute resolution mechanisms are effective and efficient, while the 
GCC’s Commercial Arbitration Centre is also a recognized legal body for finance 
issues. In addition, Bahrain is the most open economy in the region and has a long 
history of interaction with more developed financial markets, corruption is mild 
compared to the Kingdom’s neighbours and property rights are well established and 
adhered to, though ‘bureaucratic inefficiencies do arise and investors can find 
inconsistencies in the interpretation and application o f pertinent regulations’ (Dun & 
Bradstreet 2004, p. 48).
The government is keen to encourage foreign investment to finance economic 
diversification and, in turn, achieve sustainable economic growth. The commercial 
company law introduced in January 2002 has increased the scope for foreign ownership 
so that non-Bahrainis are also now able to own land in restricted areas and a new 
foreign investment law is in the process o f being promulgated. However, a long history 
of vested interests and concentration of wealth and power inhibit full liberalisation (Dun 
& Bradstreet 2004, p. 48). Efforts to maximise the employment o f Bahrainis may also 
obstruct the progress o f investment projects. In addition, the small size o f the Bahraini 
economy limits the scope for investment projects, while the financial sector is served by 
a large number o f small institutions, which cannot compete on the global stage (Dun & 
Bradstreet 2004, p. 48). A reform strategy prepared by the EDB o f Bahrain includes 
plans to speed up the privatisation process, improve flexibility in the labour market,
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reduce bureaucratic bottlenecks and increase the capital o f the Bahrain Development 
Bank (BDB) six fold.
The EDB prepared these ambitious economic reform plans in conjunction with 
consulting firm McKinsey. According to the EDB website, McKinsey’s Middle East 
managing director says Bahrain could increase its GDP to US$26.5-billion -  more than 
double 2004 estimate -  by 2015. Other ten-year targets include upping per capita 
income to BD12,000 (US$31,800) from an estimated BD5,108 (US$13,585) in 2004, 
and creating 150,000 new jobs. Yet although the reform strategy has the backing o f the 
crown prince, resistance from other political and bureaucratic interests may well slow 
its implementation and cause some o f the plans to be dropped altogether. Proposals 
published by the EDB and McKinsey include establishing an independent, 
professionally managed company to oversee the privatisation of the state’s minority 
stakes in many companies. The report also suggests fast-tracking high priority 
investment projects, and changing the requirements for investments to be approved so 
that companies would automatically gain approval unless their sector was blacklisted, 
rather than having to wait to be added to a white list. However, there could be political 
resistance as not all members of the ruling family share the Crown Prince’s enthusiasm 
for market methods and some members o f the elite may wish to protect their own 
economic interests, including their patronage networks (Dun & Bradstreet 2004, p. 8).
Foreign investment has been primarily encouraged in sectors that are export-oriented 
and do not compete directly with local producers. Regulations allow 100 per cent 
foreign ownership o f new industrial ventures or service companies with their regional 
headquarters located in Bahrain. The government also allows the establishment o f  
representative offices or branches of foreign companies without local sponsors. Foreign 
firms receive the same investment incentives available to Bahraini companies, including 
personal and corporate tax exemption, no restriction on capital and profit repatriation, 
and duty-free access to GCC member states for products manufactured in Bahrain. 
Manufacturing investments receive incentives such as electricity rebates, 100 per cent 
rebate o f customs duties for the first five years for all industries, export credit facilities, 
and tariff protection -  subject to the approval o f the National Committee and Tariff 
Protection (Gulf Daily News, 17 Nov. 2005). As Sheikh Mohammed bin Essa al- 
Khalifa, CEO of the EDB noted:
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Our greatest challenge is creating awareness and packaging our offer correctly. 
Bahrain has a very good value proposition, but not enough people know about 
it...having identified which economic clusters Bahrain can compete in 
effectively, we target investors and companies with bespoken value 
propositions’ (Innovation: the cost o f entry 2006, p. 47).
Infrastructure to support the present economy
The Bahrain Government has substantially stepped up its efforts to develop 
infrastructure as a step towards diversifying its economic base, as is noted by a report 
from Global Investment House, Global Economic Research -  Bahrain, Economic and 
Strategic Outlook (2004, p. 12), and shown in Figure 4:4 (below). The entire GCC 
region is witnessing a real estate and construction boom and Bahrain is part o f this, with 
several billion dollars worth of projects in progress or on the horizon. There are also 
plans being developed to upgrade the Bahrain’s entire road network and construct a 
causeway connecting the Kingdom to Qatar, as well as building four new towns with
250,000 new homes (Bahrain boosts infrastructure spending 2004, p. 1).
Figure 4:4, Identified projects in Bahrain over US$ 500 million -  2004
(Estimated Cost in US$ millions)
Project EstimatedCost Purpose
Alba Fifth Potline 1,700 Additional 300,000 tones per year capacity
Bapco Petrochemical Plan 1,500 Naptha based cracker
Bahrain Financial Harbour 1,300 Commercial Development
Durrat A1 Bahrain 1,200 Tourism Island Resort
Amwaj Islands 1,000 Tourism Island Resort
Khalifa bin Salman Container Port 1,000 Construction of new port
Bapco LSDP Unit 685 40,000 b/d LSDP unit
Al-Areen Desert Resort 600 Tourism Spa resort and hotels
Al-Ezzal Power Plant 600 Power plant w/ capacity of 370/470 MW 2006
Lulu Tourism Resort 530 Tourism Artificial island
Desalination Plant 500 Ministry of Water 60 million gallons/day
Equestrian Centre and Resort 500 Tourism racetrack and golf course
Key:Alba- Aluminium Bahrain (Aluminium Extrusion Company); Bapco -  Bahrain Petroleum Company 
(Down stream petroleum processing company); Durrat A1 Bahrain -  Luxury residential villas; Amwaj- 
Ownership villas.
(Source: Ministries o f  Finance; Economic Development Board; MEED)
Bahrain Financial Harbour (BFH)
The US$1.3-billion Bahrain Financial Harbour is expected to be the flagship o f the 
Kingdom’s future economy, built with the goal o f elevating Bahrain to the world
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financial stage on par with New York, London, Hong Kong and Tokyo. Just over half 
completed in 2006, and expected to be finished in 2009, the BFH is slated to be a 
‘centre for financial excellence’ -  i.e. key infrastructure for the finance industry, 
directly providing employment for 2,500 people. Covering an area o f approximately
58,000 sq.m., the BFH includes the 50 storey Dual Towers, the Harbour House and the 
Financial Mall.
Power sector
Bahrain has been witnessing occasional power shortages in summer and plans to 
overhaul and upgrade its power infrastructure as part of its strategy to provide the 
optimal environment for attracting foreign investment (A model success 2006, p. 118). 
To achieve this objective, the government has awarded a contract to foreign firms to 
draw up a master plan of Bahrain’s power and water requirements from 2006-20. In 
early 2006 a US$378-million deal was announced to sell the Kingdom’s al-Hidd water 
and power generation plant to an international consortium consisting o f companies from 
the UK, Belgium and Japan. The companies have agreed to expand and develop the 
plant which currently provides 1000 MWs of power and 113-million litres o f 
desalinated water (A model success 2006, p. 119). In 2004 the government also award a 
contract to foreign companies to build the al-Ezzel 1000 MW power plant, which should 
completed by later in 2007. AMEinfo, the online publication covering Middle East 
finance and economy, in a March 7, 2004 article Bahrain Boosts Infrastructure 
Spending, characterises Bahrain’s infrastructure developments in the following way:
The challenge ahead is the ability o f the government to fund its various 
infrastructure projects. Funding such a huge investment is likely to translate into 
increased indebtedness, putting some pressure on Bahrain's creditworthiness and 
at the same time successful implementation o f these schemes would help the 
economy grow at a faster rate in the long-term. The success o f the above growth 
plans will be largely dependant upon the effectiveness o f communication 
network which would facilitate e-business, wireless network, and other state of  
the art telecommunications facilities -  all o f which is best facilitated by a fully 
liberalised telecom sector.
Telecommunications
Among the most profound occurrences in the Bahraini economy in recent years has 
been the liberalisation of the telecommunication sector. Government’s aims in 
liberalising the telecommunications industry in Bahrain fall into four broad categories:
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(1) stimulating economic activity generally, (2) creating a free market environment for 
telecommunications to attract private investment in the industry, (3) turning Bahrain 
into the communication hub o f the region to boost Bahrain’s attractiveness as an 
international centre for business and investment, and (4) offering premium quality 
telecommunications at the most competitive price while ensuring subscriber’s needs are 
met (No Regrets, No Turning Back 2006, p. 170). Technically Bahrain’s 
telecommunications went from a monopoly service to a liberalised market in two years 
under the watch of the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA), though 
positive results in the mobile sector have not been matched thus far in fixed-line service 
or Internet access. A 2006 study by the Oxford Business Groups notes that Bahrain’s 
market for internet service provision is small yet ‘fiercely competitive’ and that while 
licenses have been granted for many new operators to enter the market, most have not. 
As an example the study notes that while seventeen licenses have been granted for new 
ISPs, only four are so far operational, and what may transpire in Bahrain could mimic 
what occurred in Saudi Arabia with ‘a rush of mergers and acquisitions that will lead to 
a smaller number o f stronger companies. Saudi Arabia had forty ISPs but this has now 
been trimmed down to twelve strong players’ (Dial tones at the ready 2006, p. 168).
The government wants Bahrain to establish itself as a leading participant o f the 
emerging global economy. In order to get there, Bahrain must create an ‘information 
society’ in the Kingdom with a competitive advantage over regional rivals, and 
electronic access to government services will become increasingly important to citizens. 
The government had planned to have the majority o f public services available online by 
the end of 2005, though to date the state o f government e-services would best be 
described as ‘in progress’. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia (ESCWA) noted that the Kingdom has adequate telecommunications 
services for its present needs, though major upgrades in service and infrastructure will 
be necessary for Bahrain to become the ‘information society’ it seeks to be (Profile o f  
the Information society in the Kingdom o f Bahrain 2003, p. 20).
E-government
The Bahrain e-govemment strategy is made up of five key projects: a National Dataset 
project, a Security Strategy Implementation project, a Hardware and Software upgrade 
Project, a Government Data Network Project as well as an Applications Transformation
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Project. Alongside these, a National Smart Card and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
project will result in a single card for citizens and expatriates which will give access to 
government services and support an ‘e-purse’ payment mechanism. Batelco has signed 
an agreement with Bahrain’s Central Informatics Organization, which manages 
information technology for the government for providing communications technology 
for the e-govemment project. The proposed system will integrate Bahrain’s back end 
systems, including national databases, immigration registration systems, customer 
relations management systems and other services. For these systems to function 
properly, it is imperative that these projects have access to an advanced 
telecommunications infrastructure.
Privatisation and liberalisation
Zakaria Hijres, the former CEO of the EDB, was o f the opinion that the vehicle of 
sustainable economic development ought to be the private sector, and that the role o f  
government in Bahrain ought to be that of a ‘facilitator and regulator, rather than service 
provider and investor’, (Treading the Board 2005, p. 55). At the same time Mr. Hijres 
also advocated a cautious approach be taken to privatisation so as not to exacerbate the 
unemployment woes o f the Kingdom. Overstaffing in government organizations 
suggests that there would be significant redundancies after privatisation. Additionally, 
with an increasing number of people no longer dependent on the government for 
employment, there is concern within the ruling family that loyalty to the state and the 
ruling family may erode. This would damage the paternalistic social contract on which 
the state is based, under which the ruling family provides an appropriate standard o f  
living in return for the right to govern {Developing Representation 2005, p. 13). The 
move towards a limited form of democracy is a signal that this long-established contract 
is being eroded, and theoretically allows the government to implement economic 
policies that in the short term could upset the social contract. Due to these factors, the 
privatisation process adopted by Bahrain must ensure that job opportunities created 
instead o f resulting in more unemployment, while at the same time the potential risk for 
increased unemployment appears to be one o f the prime reasons for the government’s 
reluctance to engage in large-scale privatisation. Privatization of public transportation is 
case in point. The public transport was contracted out to a private company to run with 
no sale of assets or transfer of shares from public to private. This way, employee 
retrenchment was avoided, thus not adding to the current unemployment levels.
128
In terms o f supply, the degree o f privatisation and liberalisation are important. From the 
demand side, well-organized large user groups are clear winners from restructuring 
leading to economic growth. Liberalisation leads to healthy competition and demise o f  
monopoly operators. An understanding of the socio-political set up and the level of 
economic growth is needed to appreciate the how the societal preferences are given 
attention to by the country’s ruling authorities. The liberalisation moves should result in 
improved economy in order to enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms in world 
markets, promote economic growth and achieve sustainable development for Bahrain. 
However the process o f liberalisation in Bahrain, and o f specific interest to this thesis 
telecommunications liberalisation, takes place within the context o f an Islamic nation 
with deep social and cultural divides, and a ruling family interested in growing the 
economy while both ensuring its own authority and preserving traditional values -  in 
this regard to these factors and examination o f the business viability o f 
telecommunications liberalisation in Bahrain is warranted, and is thus the subject o f the 
next chapter.
* * *
Chapter 5:
Liberalisation in an Islamic cultural context, regulation of information 
______________________ and business viability_____________________
Introduction
An understanding o f the relationship between Islam and market capitalism is necessary 
to understand the general context in which liberalisation is carried out in the Muslim 
world, and an examination of the cultural and socio-political mechanisms unique to the 
Kingdom that relate to the liberalisation process will also be enlightening, and this 
chapter will endeavor to examine these. Included in this discussion will be the measures 
in place to ensure national security and compatibility between telecommunications 
liberalisation with other economic and social objectives, and given this, what role is the 
telecommunications regulatory authority playing to shape the liberalised environment.
Islam and free market capitalism
Bahrain being an Islamic Kingdom, it is meaningful to understand the relationship 
between Islam and free market capitalism because liberalisation accelerates free market 
capitalism. Is Islam fundamentally opposed to market capitalism? Despite modern-day 
misconceptions of Islam, the answer is quite the opposite. The Prophet Mohammed had 
actually been a merchant tradesman up until the age of forty when the angel Gabriel 
came to him and he began his religious journey. Even during the later half of 
Mohammed’s life it was common for him to comment or act in ways supportive o f free 
markets, as when he professed that price controls were forbidden -  ‘prices were in 
God’s hands and he wished to meet God without having to answer for some injustice 
that he might commit in this respect’ (Bartlett 2001). Many o f God’s revelations to 
Mohammed, as recorded in the Holy Qur’an, also seem to support the idea o f fiscal 
responsibility and open commerce, such as in ‘O you who believe! Squander not your 
wealth among yourselves in vanity, except it be a trade by mutual consent... And whoso 
does that through aggression and injustice, We shall cast him into Fire’ (An-Nisaa’ 
4:29). This has given rise to the view among many academics and researchers that 
Islam’s religious base is ‘fundamentally pro-capitalist’ (Bartlett 2001).
However with the first of the roughly 500 years o f Christian Crusades and invasions 
into Muslim countries that began in 1095, there also began a shift towards introversion
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and religious fundamentalism which led to a steady decline in the scientific and 
economic accomplishments that had until then characterised the Islamic world. In some 
ways the effects are still evident today in the opposition some segments o f Islamic 
society express towards Western cultural practices. However, this type o f resistance to 
capitalism should be seen as ‘...less based on Islam's affinity for socialism, than on its 
fear o f modernity’ (Bartlett 2001).
Islam, oil and the private sector
The discovery and exploitation o f oil and gas resources have spurred the most profound 
changes in the social and economic makeup o f the Muslim World since the European 
Crusades, with more than sixty-five per cent o f the world’s know oil reserves and more 
than half o f its natural gas being located within Muslim countries -  with the largest part 
of that being located in the GCC countries and Iran (BP Amoco Statistical Review of  
World Energy 2000 as cited in Karim 2001, pp. 1-2). In his 2001 paper Oil, Islam and 
International Petroleum Industry Legal, Economic, Political and Cultural Issues,
tViMuhammad Karim examined how the oil boom through the later half of the 20 century 
resulted in massive demographic shifts in Arabian Gulf countries as new economic 
opportunities drew rural populations into the cities and increased prosperity lead to the 
population of the region doubling between 1970 and 1992 -  in Saudi Arabia the 
population tripled over the same time frame. This rapid population growth also led to 
the new demographic reality where today some seventy-eight per cent of the population 
in GCC countries is less than thirty-four years old. As Karim notes, this situation poses 
substantial challenges for the ruling regimes in the region:
The exceptionally high number o f youth means that the government has to spend 
much more in education and then the graduates are to be absorbed in the job 
market. Less than fifty per cent o f Saudis graduating from Universities every 
year are able to find jobs... In an area where local participation in job market is 
among the lowest in the world, it is bound to increase discontent among the 
masses (Karim 2001, p. 4).
Karim argues it is the contrast between the vast amount of oil wealth controlled by the
ruling regimes in the region and the ‘unfulfilled expectations o f the masses’ to gain
benefit from this wealth that results in the general population becoming ‘...more
conscious and critical of prevailing authoritarianism, unpopular and corrupt leaders, and
lack o f socio-economic justice and equality...’ (Karim 2001, p. 3). The ensuing
‘ideological void’ is then filled by Islam in light o f it teachings regarding social and
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economic equality and fairness -  the very thing denied to most people in the region -  
‘thus the mosque became the centre o f this new movement in the lack o f any democratic 
and representative institutions’ (Karim 2001, p. 4).
The current geo-political makeup and power structures o f the GCC region, and the 
Middle East more broadly, owe their foundations to the arrangements created post WWI 
and WWII as the former colonial powers of France and Britain relinquished their 
control, while the US has wielded heavily influence in the region since. Political 
stability in such a resources rich and strategically significant region was seen as a 
paramount concern and thus monarchies were installed to govern and given substantial 
backing by Western interests, thus resulting in the current pro-Westem leanings o f the 
governing regimes in GCC states (Karim 2001, p. 5). The oppressive and sometimes 
brutal measures employed by some Middle Eastern regimes to quash political dissent 
and unrest have met with little to no criticism from Western governments whose 
interests, for all intents and purposes, lay in propping up the ruling regimes to ensure the 
security o f the oil supply upon which their Western economies depend.
Thus in a broad sense oil is seen as a negative influence on the society and a tool 
by virtue of which the unpopular and repressive regimes are holding on to 
power... The presence o f American forces in the Middle East region since the 
Gulf war is being regarded as a western move to militarily protect its oil interests 
and hence is a source o f much opposition to the regimes in Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait. Thus in a popular Islamic culture, oil is viewed as a negative and 
corrupting force which has invited western penetration and hegemony (Karim 
2001, p. 5).
The vast oil wealth has also changed the relationship between governments in the region 
and their private sectors. Beginning with Iran in 1953, governments around the Middle 
East began nationalising their oil industries by creating powerful SOEs that poured huge 
amounts o f wealth directing into government coffers, which at the same time lead to the 
marginalisation of the economic importance o f the private sector (Karim 2001, p. 6). As 
national treasuries expanded, the state became the biggest player in the economy, 
leading the private sector to become dependant upon public sector spending for its 
growth and survival and effectively hobbling prospects for progressive private sector 
development.
Bahrain and cultural change
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While Bahrain as a Muslim country is not opposed to economic development along 
capitalist lines, few citizens o f the state, let alone the ruling Royal Family, would wish 
to see the country depart from its religious faith or adopt fully Western secular 
lifestyles. The growth o f telecommunications that is necessary to establish the 
infrastructure for developing a successful modem economy, if  unregulated, would 
inevitably expose the Kingdom to the risk of cultural change towards a more globalised, 
or as some would fear more Americanised culture. Braithwaite and Drahos raise salient 
issues regarding nations’ ability to maintain their ‘cultural sovereignty’ in face o f the 
ever-more freely flowing content the global expansion o f telecommunications networks 
entails:
The US is the world’s major supplier of cultural information. While theorists of 
culture elevate difference, an extraordinary number of people are at any given 
moment glued to episodes of Baywatch and The XFiles, to mention only two US 
cultural flagships. US cultural models are seen and imitated in many places. The 
success o f US culture abroad means that US concerns about culture are not, 
unlike those o f other countries, preservationist concerns... Developing countries 
have long complained hat the emerging communications order will erode their 
sovereignty. Some Western states, notably France, have articulated a similar fear 
(Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, p. 357).
However, Bahrain has always been a relatively tolerant and liberal society in 
comparison to its regional neighbours (A1 Najjar 2002, p. 25). As King Hamad 
remarked in November 2003, ‘Bahrain must develop an open society which can cope 
with a world of rapid change. Human security, the rights o f women and children and the 
right to freedom of expression are among the issues which government bodies must 
continually follow up’ (Bahrain Economic Issues 2003, p. 2).
The role of women in Bahrain emphasises the progress the Kingdom has made in 
regards to social equality and openness, where, as stated in Chapter 4, women in 
Bahrain were the first in GCC to be able to both vote and run for office in the 2002 
election. While none garnered enough ballots to win a seat, King Hamad attempted to 
alleviate this by appointing six women to the Shura Council -  also where Bahrain’s 
Jewish and Christian minorities’ leaders sit. Dr. Nada Haffadh became the first female 
cabinet minister in 2004 when she was appointed to the Ministry o f Health portfolio, 
and Haya bint Rashid al-Khalifa became the first Arab woman president o f the UN
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General Assembly in 2006 when Bahrain was elected to head the world body {First 
Arab Women President o f UN General Assembly Shaikha Haya o f  Bahrain 2006).
Social stability and the increasing need fo r economic growth
The course towards a more open environment in Bahrain, both socially and 
economically, is imperative, as show by Laurence Louer in his 2004 paper ‘Bahrain’s 
Fragile Political Reforms’ for the Arab Reform Bulletin at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. Louer notes that while King Hamad’s reforms since taking the 
throne in 1999 have improved political freedoms dramatically in Bahrain, ‘...in a 
country where 70 percent o f the population is Shiite but the key political positions 
remain controlled by Sunnis, especially by the royal family, the reforms have done little 
to address Bahrain’s underlying socio-political problems’. Louer notes the initial 
optimism following the 2001 constitutional plebiscite disappeared when King Hamad 
appointed the Consultative Council to restrain the power o f the elected chamber, and as 
this led to the Shiite election boycott and a subsequent massive overrepresentation of 
Sunnis in the new parliament, ‘rather than diminishing the sectarian character of 
Bahraini politics and easing the gap between Shiite demographic and political power, 
the elections have exacerbated them’. However sectarian representation moved slightly 
more towards resembling the demographic makeup o f the wider population in the most 
recent election on November 25th, 2006, where only a partial boycott by Shiite groups 
lead to the election o f 16 Shiites to the 40-seat lower house o f parliament {Bahrain 
Parliamentary Election 2006).
The elections have also exposed rifts inside the Shiite community, where many o f the 
older leaders have pragmatically recognized that some form o f cooperation with the 
ruling family is the only viable political option for progress, while the younger 
generation is showing more militancy, ideologically demanding full political and 
economic rights and representation while regarding ‘cooperation as capitulation’ (Louer 
2004).
Caught between the contradictory demands o f their militants and the regime, the 
Shiite movement’s leaders have chosen to stand openly by the former while 
discreetly assuring the latter of their readiness to compromise. In adopting this 
balancing act, they have sought to prevent a more radical leadership from 
emerging (Louer 2004).
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Adding to the tension, Louer notes that while the growth in the population is generally 
outstripping the number of jobs available in the economy, the situation is exacerbated in 
the Shiite community which make up the underclass. In this respect attracting foreign 
investment to stimulate job growth in the economy is less of a choice and more of a 
necessity to maintain social stability, and hence the importance o f a successful 
telecommunications liberalisation process in helping to foster that economic and 
employment growth in Bahrain.
Regulation of the news media in Bahrain
In Chapter 3 it was discussed how advancements in telecommunications technology 
have brought about a convergence in the industries o f ‘telephone, mass media (print, 
broadcast and cable), consumer electronics and computing’, resulting in the evolvement 
of a type of unified ‘multimedia information industry’, with many of the means for the 
communication and transmission of information now increasingly substitutable for each 
other (Chan-Olmsted and Jamison 2001, pp. 4-5). What is often o f interest to 
government authorities is not simply the means of transferring information, but also the 
actual information which is being conveyed and telecommunications liberalisation is 
likely to bring about much more readily available resources for sending and receiving 
information. In this regard, it is important to review the state o f media regulation in 
Bahrain, as the regulations governing the press and the means the press uses to ‘get the 
story out there’ will undoubtedly have consequences for the telecommunications 
industry, especially with regards to the Internet.
Legal framework
The 2002 Constitution has three articles specifically relate to media and freedom of 
speech {Internet Filtering in Bahrain 2005, p. 15):
Article 23
Freedom of opinion and scientific research is guaranteed. Everyone has the right 
to express his opinion and publish it by word of mouth, in writing or otherwise 
under the rules and conditions laid down by law, provided that the fundamental 
beliefs o f Islamic doctrine are not infringed, the unity o f the people is not 
prejudiced, and discord or sectarianism is not aroused.
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Article 24
With due regard for the provisions o f the preceding Article, the freedom of the 
press, printing and publishing is guaranteed under the rules and conditions laid 
down by law.
Article 26
The freedom of postal, telegraphic, telephonic and electronic communications is 
safeguarded and its confidentiality is guaranteed. Communications shall not be 
censored or their confidentiality breached except in exigencies specified by law 
and in accordance with procedures and under guarantees prescribed by law.
The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting controls licensing for media outlets, with 
newspaper licenses requiring the endorsement of both the Minister o f Information and 
the larger cabinet. The Press, Print and Publications Law No. 47 o f 2002 requires 
minimum capital investments in order for a publication to begin operations, with daily 
newspapers needing BD1-million (US$2.65-million) paid-up capital, BD250,000 
(US$662,000) for non-dailies, and BD50,000 (US$132,000) for ‘specialty’ newspapers 
{Internet Filtering In Bahrain 2005, p. 4).
In regard to telecommunications more generally, the 2002 Telecommunications Law 
stipulates fines and/or jail sentence for an individual who ‘uses telecommunications 
equipment or the telecommunications network intending to send any message in the 
knowledge that the contents o f the message are false, misleading, offensive to public 
policy or morals, endanger the safety o f third parties or prejudice the efficiency of any 
service’, (Legislative Decree No. 48 Promulgating the Telecommunications Law 2002). 
Telecommunications companies themselves must ‘provide all technical resources, 
including telecommunications equipment, systems and programs relating to the 
telecommunications network... to allow security organs to have access to the network 
for fulfilling the requirements of national security’, {Internet Filtering in Bahrain 2005).
Soon after the 2002 elections, government enacted law allowing authorities to fine 
media organizations, jail persons associated with them and even close them down 
completely if  found to have infringed on state security, promoted immoral behaviour, 
‘slighted the Islamic faith, the unity o f the people, the person o f the king, or created
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divisions or religious differences’, {Assessment o f  Shiites in Bahrain 2004). A reporter 
convicted o f ‘blaspheming the king, denigrating the state religion, propagating national 
disunity and sectarianism, or calling to overthrow the political regime, could be jailed 
for a minimum of six months’ {Internet Filtering in Bahrain 2005).
In short, the news services in Bahrain are the subject of concerted government scrutiny. 
As the Prime Minister emphatically stated in July, 2003, ‘Freedom must be within the 
boundaries o f protecting the country’s interests’ {Internet Filtering in Bahrain 2005). 
The authorities in Bahrain also monitor television broadcasts and a number o f foreign 
media agencies have been censured, such as the Doha-based Al-Jazeera which has had 
reporters banned from Bahrain, though the state does allow many international 
networks, such as the BBC, CNN, FOX, and other major Arab-Language networks to 
show their programming without censorship.
Internet regulation
The Ministry o f Information and Broadcasting requires all ISPs and websites to be 
registered with the ministry before becoming active on the internet, though relative to 
the Internet censoring in most nations, Bahrain’s practices are fairly reserved. Even in 
countries widely revered for their freedom of speech and expression, such as Canada 
and Germany, there is a well established precedent that material deemed excessively 
offensive be blocked. The organisation Internet Censorship Explorer, in a March 28, 
2005 article entitled Free speech or hate speech cites a Canadian Press story where ‘six 
sites that fomented hatred against Jews or advocated terrorism or suicide-bombing have 
been pulled by the host in Kelowna, B.C... The Criminal Code o f Canada contains 
sections pertaining to hate propoganda as does the Canada Human Rights Act.’ The 
European Digital Rights (EDR) group, in a March 10, 2005 article Search engines 
voluntarily block harmful content in Germany states the following:
All the major search engines in Germany have voluntarily agreed to filter out 
harmful content for their German audience. Google, Lycos Europe, MSN 
Germany, AOL Germany, Yahoo, T-Online and t-info have founded a self- 
regulatory organisation that will voluntarily block a list of URLs considered to 
be harmful for the youth. The list is provided by a governmental media 
classification organisation, ‘Bundespriifstelle fur jugendgefahrdende Medien’ 
(BPJM)...The BPJM gives the following definition of harmful content: ‘Objects 
are considered harmful or dangerous to minors if  they tend to endanger their 
process o f developing a socially responsible and self-reliant personality. In
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general, this applies to objects that contain indecent, extremely violent, crime- 
inducing, anti-Semitic or otherwise racist material’.
The EDR article then notes that the search engines will not make public the sites which 
are being blocked, making access to the information they contained severely restricted 
for the German population. This would indicate that in Germany, as in Bahrain, there 
exists an apparent conflict between what is available on the internet, and what a 
country’s government would feel is prudent for its citizens to be able to access. This 
would seem to show that irrespective of the political background, countries do need 
certain regulatory measures to protect the societal and cultural values o f the country.
The Open Net Initiative (ONI) in its study Internet filtering in Bahrain in 2004-2005 
tested some 6,000 website and found only eight were inaccessible -  three were 
pornographic and the rest were o f a political and religious nature, though slight 
alterations to the URL in the web browser usually allowed for similar, if  not identical 
material to be viewed. This led the ONI to conclude that ‘the level o f blocking is 
extremely low, indicating that the effort is likely symbolic in nature and does not 
present a serious challenge for its citizens in finding internet content’ (Internet filtering 
in Bahrain in 2004-2005 2005, p. 3).
This is not to say the Bahraini authorities do not have the ability to impose harsher 
censorship measures. Existing legislation would allow for far stricter controls, and 
because there is a single primary in ISP and IXP, executing a more authoritarian grip on 
information flows would be relatively easy. The sporadic arrest and interrogation of 
Bahraini bloggers or website editors in the last several years also shows that 
government is not above flexing its authority over web content. Thus it would seem that 
though government is willing to be relatively laissez-faire in regards to the free-flow of  
information on internet, there are limits, and the Bahraini government has developed 
both the legal and technical mechanisms necessary to enforce these limits to protect the 
sovereignty and national identity o f the country. Maintaining this upkeep o f societal 
values in a liberalised telecommunications environment is, and will continue to be, of  
significant importance. While the liberalisation process launched by the government 
picks up momentum, it is contingent upon the government to ensure that the social 
stability, as well as the Islamic character and culture o f the Kingdom are continually 
upheld, as is required by the Constitution.
138
Given the above stated involvement o f government in regulating information, a brief 
overview o f the telecommunications regulators ability to act independently is now 
warranted, as well as an examination of subsequent business viability.
The telecommunications regulator and business viability
The TRA enacted its Final Access Regulation in May 2005, outlining ‘when and how 
licensees, such as new internet service providers, can use the telecoms network and 
facilities of other operators to provide services to consumers and at what cost’ 
(Telecommunications Regulatory Authority responds to the need to resolve access 
issues as soon as possible by issuing a Draft Regulation on Access 2005). The gist o f  
the regulation is to require an operator with dominance over market access to make it 
known publicly and within a reasonable time limit the costs and conditions under which 
other service providers could use its networks to enter the market. The TRA then has the 
authority to judge whether the costs and conditions are reasonable, and if  not, to 
mandate that they be changed (Telecommunications Regulatory Authority responds to 
the need to resolve access issues as soon as possible by issuing a Draft Regulation on 
Access 2005). One might expect that as Batelco currently holds a monopoly over fixed- 
line service and a ‘virtual monopoly’ over Internet provision, it might meet the criteria 
of having dominance over the market, however, the TRA has so far not been 
forthcoming with such a designation.
This has led to delays in the entry o f new players into the market, stymied competition 
and stagnated developments in services and pricing, all the while massive growth in 
tertiary sectors o f the economy in Bahrain, as noted in the last chapter, is increasingly 
demanding that these sorts of development in the telecommunications sector happen. 
Bahrain is enticing new financial institutions to set up their regional bases in the 
Kingdom and existing ones to enlarge, among the attractions being its convenient 
location, its renown for well structured and effective institutions, the investor friendly 
policies and relatively inexpensive operating environment (IMF Country Report 2006, 
p. 25). In its 2006 Country Report on Bahrain, the IMF notes (p. 25) ‘...other financial 
centers have tried to catch up. Such a process is inevitable. It need not be a threat, 
provided that Bahrain continues to offer an environment attractive to institutions that 
have an interest in operating and being seen to operate in a well-regulated and
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supervised jurisdiction’. Part o f this ‘continued attraction’ is a telecommunications 
environment o f exceptional quality and efficiency, which likely requires the TRA’s 
effectiveness to rise considerably, and this will be examined in detail in further chapters.
Conclusion
In this Chapter it has been shown there is no intrinsic conflict between Islam and 
capitalism. The potential for cultural conflict arises with the idea that American values 
and culture will infiltrate on the coat tails o f liberalisation and destroy the Islamic 
foundations o f the Kingdom of Bahrain. However, the internal forces pushing for the 
liberalisation o f telecommunications and the economy generally are considerable: there 
are fewer and fewer jobs available to the growing population and this problem is 
disproportionately severe in the Shiite community, who encompass some seventy per 
cent of the population and already harbour a deep sense o f disenfranchisement against 
the Sunni elite. For the future social and political stability o f the Kingdom, the economy 
must be liberalised to let the private sector develop and with it jobs for all Bahrainis. 
The economy is already expanding rapidly in the tertiary sector, and this sector is also 
demanding the liberalisation o f telecommunications to allow further growth and to 
maintain the competitive advantage of the Bahraini marketplace. Regionally countries 
are becoming more competitive and trying to pull ahead o f each other, and Bahrain 
cannot afford to let the monopolistic practices o f Batelco weigh down the Kingdom’s 
future economic prospects. A liberalised telecommunications environment, with an 
active and effective regulator to ensure competition, will fertilize economic growth 
through improved services, pricing and innovation -  but what about values o f the 
Kingdom? Is Bahrain not in danger of Americanization and losing its cherished Islamic 
character in this rush to grow?
As has been shown in this chapter, the government has the ways and means, through 
legislation and technical capacity, to protect that which is held as sacred and prohibit 
that which is offensive. This allows the government to strike a balance between 
allowing room for the new technologies to penetrate deeper into the social and business 
spheres, while at the same time ensuring the identity of Bahrain is not lost. As has been 
noted in this and the previous chapter, Bahrain is already a relatively open society and 
has been historically. Telecommunications liberalisation can, if  approached properly, 
help herald the evolutionary progression o f the Bahraini economy and society, and
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while government is allowing leeway for these new developments to be explored, such 
as with the internet, it retains the ability intervene if  ever aspects o f progress stray into 
the undesirable waters. A more thorough examination of the telecommunications 
situation in Bahrain, its regulation and the views o f policy makers and industry players 
in the liberalisation process is now warranted, though first the methods used to compile 
this information must be scrutinized, and this will be done in the next chapter.
* * *
Chapter 6: 
Methodology
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the various methodologies used in this study to collect data and 
information related to the telecommunications liberalisation process in Bahrain and to 
justify the predominantly positivistic approach taken within this thesis. Generally 
speaking, this author has acquired subjective material from interviews and surveys 
regarding telecommunications in Bahrain and its wider socio-economic externalities, 
then triangulated this material to produce an effective argument that is able to be 
justified through a number of reinforcing sources of evidence. It can, however, be 
argued that the issues outlined in the preceding objectives do not necessarily have 
definite and unchallengeable solutions. For example, the advantages o f liberalisation 
over monopolisation by Batelco for the Bahraini economy or society will clearly differ 
depending on the values and needs of who is asked for their opinion. A change creating 
more efficient and cheaper Internet services for a particular consumer may represent a 
serious competitive threat to an employee o f the previously nationalised business. 
Similarly, opening up the telecommunication services of Bahrain to foreign suppliers 
can promise some consumers greater access to Western culture while to others it may 
represent a dangerous slide away from the traditional Muslim practices which 
characterise the national identity o f the state. Within this context the study will have to 
look at success of privatisation generally and liberalisation specifically, from several the 
stakeholders’ point o f view -  such as the government, consumers, employees, and 
operators.
Thus the epistemological basis o f the study cannot be an entirely rational one that
maintains there is a single observable and verifiable answer to the questions posed by
the study. Nevertheless, this does not mean there are no plausible answers to the
questions raised in this study, nor that the ideas put forward reflect wholly the
personalised and specific perspective of the author, as the following sections explain. A
completely phenomenological perspective is not likely to produce a particularly
heuristic basis for the study. In an ideal world the methodology could be based on a
critical realist framework as suggested by Bhaskar (cited in Dobson 1999, p. 268) which
holds that while rational answers may exist to social problems, uncovering these
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solutions is not always, or even normally, possible. At best, the author identifies the 
correspondences between a set o f values and observed events relating to a problem 
which then may suggest the likelihood that a certain assertion is closer to the 
unobservable truth than any of the other apparent options.
It is meaningful to note Goldthorpe’s contention (cited in Mahoney 2003, p. 14) that 
‘some process existing in time and space, even if  not perhaps directly observable, that 
actually generates the causal effect o f X  on Y and, in so doing, produces the statistical 
relationship that is empirically in evidence’. Due to practical limitations, it is not 
possible to account for each and every mechanism of liberalisation, but observable 
results such as increased economic activity, or greater rates o f Internet access, ought to 
imply that there is a correspondence between liberalisation and the subsequent changes, 
amounting to empirical documentation. To look closer at the affective link between 
telecommunications liberalisation reform and the ensuing results Bennett defines 
‘...causal mechanisms as ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological 
processes through which agents with causal capacities operate in specific context to 
transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities’ (cited in Mahoney 2003, p. 14).
In light o f these problems it is worthwhile at this point to outline a number o f subjective 
approaches and review the extent to which they can be applied to the objectives of this 
thesis.
Subjective approaches to qualitative data analysis
Ethnographic approach
Case study data analysis has been used for analyzing the qualitative data collected by 
way o f interviews, with Bahrain’s liberalisation process being the case study in this 
context and an ethnographic approach being taken to the research. According to Robson 
(2002, p. 487), ‘the ethnographic approach is typically exploratory. It is a method of 
recovery, well suited to the study of the unfamiliar, the new and the different’. Here the 
word ‘ethnography’ is appropriate in relation to any qualitative study aimed at 
producing an account which is extensive and thorough, and the word ‘qualitative’ is 
used to differentiate the study from ‘quantitative’, or statistically oriented investigation 
(Hoey n.d.). According to Hoey, quantitative and qualitative approaches frequently 
complement each other but are in essence distinct. As well, Hoey notes that interviews
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are a means to gamer ‘targeted’ data though the use o f unambiguous but open-ended 
questions, though there are many types o f interviews and everyone has their own 
ethnographic approach. The concept is to grant the interviewee latitude in answering 
and not to restrict them to a template type o f response -  as Hoey remarks ‘In most 
cases, an ethnographic interview looks and feels little different than a casual 
conversation’. As such, the ethnographic approach is appropriate for the purposes o f  
this thesis, and has been adopted into the qualitative analysis o f the case study. Other 
source materials relevant to telecommunications liberalisation, such as articles, media 
reports, governmental and NGO studies have also been used as a basis for the analysis.
Phenomenological approach
Phenomenological research focuses on the subjective experience o f the phenomenon 
studied. At the heart of phenomenological research is the attempt to understand a 
particular phenomenon -  in the case of this research, telecommunications liberalisation 
is the phenomenon. It also has an influence on the general development o f qualitative 
methodology, provides the philosophical basis for interpretive research strategies and is 
also linked hermeneutics, which is ‘the art or science of interpretation’ (Hall 2002).
All social science research involves interpretations and insights gained from 
hermeneutics that are relevant to many aspects of the research process. Hermeneutics is 
now applied more widely to conversations, interactions between people in different 
settings, and even fashion (Robson 2002, pp. 196-197). In regards to this thesis, 
interpretation of the information gleaned from the interviews is o f primary concern, and 
thus hermeneutic approaches were applied. Hermeneutic enquiry adopts a dialogue 
nature. Initial understandings o f liberalisation are refined by interpretation o f the 
interview findings. This then raises further questions, calling for a return to the text and 
revision of the interpretation. For example, the parliamentarians commented in 
interviews that despite the entry of the second telecom operator (MTC-Vodafone), 
effective monopoly still exists in the telecommunications scenario. The author o f this 
thesis then returned to the experiences of other countries and did an objective review to 
conclude that a duopoly scenario -  stated in Chapter 8 -  need not necessarily be an 
undesirable situation.
Limits of the subjective approaches
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The subjective approach is not without its weaknesses. Robson’s, in his 2002 work 
entitled Real World Research (2002, pp. 170-173) notes that the primary failing comes 
in ‘.. .not considering alternative explanations or understandings o f the phenomena you 
are studying’. For instance, there were a number o f instances noted by the author of this 
thesis in the course o f his research where telecommunications liberalisation was not 
always necessary for a nation’s economy to thrive. As well, Robson notes how the 
veracity o f the study can fall victim to ‘reactivity, respondent biases and researcher 
biases’ -  in regards to this thesis, special attention has been given to minimize the 
impact of bias upon the study. As Robson explains, ‘respondent bias’ can cover the 
spectrum from misleading and/or incomplete answers on one end, to an interviewee 
offering exactly the answers he or she feels the interviewer wants to hear on the other. 
‘Researcher bias’ involves the prejudices and assumptions the interviewer or researcher 
carries with them already, which could affect the direction o f the study, including what 
sources are designated to be consulted, who is asked to be interviewed, the information 
asked of them, and which answers and results are emphasized (Robson 2002, p. 172).
‘Phenomenological approaches to qualitative research stress the importance of 
reflexivity, i.e. an awareness o f the ways in which the researcher as an individual with a 
particular social identity and background has an impact on the research process’ 
(Robson 2002, p. 172). To mitigate these threats to the validity, in the course o f this 
thesis study the author has implemented a number o f the recommendations Robson 
(2002, p. 173) cites from Ahem (1999, pp. 408-10), to achieve ‘reflexive bracketing,’ 
i.e. ‘using reflexivity to identify areas o f potential bias’. For example, this author has 
ensured that he has ‘reflected’ on how the interview results were analyzed, how much 
each source was quoted relative to the other sources in this thesis and why.
Validity
Information that is gathered, if  it is to be of use, must be a quantification o f whatever it 
is that it claims to be a quantification of, and here is where the notion o f validity comes 
into play: how far does the information gathered go in reflecting accurately what is 
actually taking place in the world and society. In this regard it is telling to look at how 
the number of unemployed has been determined over the course o f the last couple 
decades (Livesy n.d., p. 4). While the numbers gathered by the census or other means 
are most likely reliable, what has changed is the boundaries of which social
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circumstances are a representative o f meaning ‘unemployed’; the definition o f the term 
has been revised over and again by economists and bureaucrats to the point that when 
one speaks o f the “unemployment rate” in 1985, and one speaks o f the “unemployment 
rate” in 2005, these are effectively two different things, and one cannot validly compare 
‘apples with oranges’. As well, because statisticians do not actually add up every single 
person who is both pursuing employment and unable to find any in their calculations of 
‘unemployment’, it is doubtful that the numbers they produce are a valid reflection of 
reality (Livesey n.d., p. 4).
The notions o f reliability and validity are very much interwoven in sociological study:
If data is reliable but not valid, then it may have limited use. We can make 
general statements about the world, but such statements may not actually apply 
to any one social group (such as the ‘unemployed’). If data is valid, but not 
reliable, we may not be able to use it to make general statements about the world 
(for example, we may be able to understand something about one group o f  
unemployed people that doesn't necessarily apply to all unemployed people) 
(Livesey n.d., p. 4).
Thus, when one examines that information that was gleaned from either primary or 
secondary sources, one should endeavour to ascertain the extent to which the data 
adheres to the structures of both being valid and reliable.
Triangulation
There is a diverse assortment of means available to researchers for the purposes o f 
information collection for a study, and each has inherent in it various strengths and 
weaknesses; thus, it is prudent when a study is undertaken to utilize several avenues o f 
data collection. In this way the process o f collecting information for the study can be 
organized such that the strengths of one form of data collection compensate for where 
another form of data collection is lacking, and vice-versa (Livesey n.d., p. 5). Using 
different methods gives a ‘fuller’ or ‘more complete’ perspective o f the subject o f the 
study, allowing for observations that may not have been possible without the diversity 
of methods. Not only that, however, one can use the results o f one method o f data 
collection to check against the results o f another method of data collection. If through 
different means, similar result were arrive at, then one can be more confident that the 
results one has achieved are in fact accurate. However, if  through different means of 
data inquiry, different results were arrived at pertaining to the same object o f study, then
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this would suggest to the researcher that he or she must ‘go back to the drawing board’ 
so-to-speak, and re-examine the results, research methods and so forth to determine the 
source of the discrepancy. This is called ‘triangulation’, a term derived from the 
surveyors’ technique of double-checking they have measured the correct distance 
between two points by measuring off a third point, an equal distance away from one of  
the original points and at an angle o f 60 degrees -  if  the remaining side o f what should 
then form an equilateral triangle is the same length as the other two sides and at an 
angle o f 60 degrees with both, then the original measurement has been confirmed; if, 
however, this is not the case, then the surveyors know they must re-examine their 
measurements (Livesey n.d., p. 5). ‘Methodological triangulation’ follows a similar 
concept o f checking one methodology against another for corresponding results.
In this thesis the following approaches are used to analyze the data collection through 
interviews to double check the accuracy of the data collected.
Table 6:1 Approaches to data analysis
Approach Helps in
Ethnographic Qualitative analysis
Phenomenological Understand a phenomenon
Hermeneutics To interpret the findings
The positivistic characteristics o f this author’s method are expressed in the effort made 
to ensure the validity o f results by tapping a variety o f sources o f information, thus 
strengthening the study’s foundation, which Denzin would define as ‘data triangulation’ 
(Denzin 1988, pp. 174-175). To attain this and minimize the influence o f bias inherent 
in any of the sources used, this author has utilized resources of a mixture o f different 
natures -  such as a diverse selection o f written researches and relevant studies and 
person-to-person interviews with a wide range of concerned individuals. The mitigation 
of bias is essential for the credibility o f the results. Though studying the relevant 
literature and theories may lead one to forecast results, interviewee answers and 
qualitative data can help determine to what degree these predicted results are actually 
realized.
Conceptual framework and justification
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This work is a comparative analysis that uses theory and historical data to reach a better 
understanding of the liberalisation processes in the Kingdom of Bahrain. The research 
looks for possible causal connections that might offer theoretical insights that could be 
generalised to similar cases. In this research a previously proposed theory or statement 
is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results o f the study. This
work uses the concept of the two tier approach for analysis proposed by Krairit (2001, 
p. 350). The first tier of analysis examines the adopted process with regards to 
international similarities, and the second tier is the comparison or variation of the 
adopted regulations against the implementation o f the process in Bahrain. The first tier 
discusses international developments in telecommunications liberalisation and its 
effects as experienced by various developed and developing countries. These 
experiences act as a benchmark against which the Kingdom of Bahrain can assess the 
economic and social impact o f its own liberalisation process. For instance, WTO 
membership and FTA agreements expect implementation of certain liberalisation 
measures. The second tier discusses the various problems related to implementation of  
the liberalisation policies in Bahrain, such as the TRA’s independence to formulate and 
implement regulations being somewhat limited due to the presence o f bureaucratic 
power which controls the entity. This has a direct impact on the extent to which it can 
enforce liberalisation regulations. The organisational structure o f TRA permits political 
interference, which in turn weakens the effectiveness o f the liberalisation.
The documentary data, while offering excellent detail, facts and analysis on the 
liberalisation process in Bahrain, cannot be used to accurately predict future trends. 
Thus, the documentary analysis results are reflected against the social and economic 
impact o f telecommunications liberalisation to take a critical look at the development o f  
the Bahraini telecommunications industry since its privatisation in 1980s.
Data collection procedures
This section describes how the data was collected for documentary research, interviews, 
and statistical data. The principal sources of data are; documentary evidence and 
interviews with policymakers, industry players and international organizations 
concerned with telecommunications. In the absence of adequate data on the 
liberalisation of monopolistic practices in the Gulf States, it was necessary to seek the
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views o f individuals representative o f the customers, government policy makers, the 
regulatory body and the media. Thus, the bulk of the information that was required to 
make this analysis meaningful has come from three main sources -  documentary 
research, interviews, and field survey respectively.
Documentary research
Information on the political and economic history o f Bahrain and its basic regulatory 
framework for telecommunications services was gathered and then processed and 
analyzed. A summary o f the historical and documentary data for Bahrain was then used 
to prepare questions for the interview process. The data included statistical facts on all 
the three services -  namely fixed telephone, cellular mobile telephone and Internet 
services -  which were incorporated into the interview preparation. Next, the researcher 
gathered data on telecommunications regulations in Bahrain by referring to on-line data 
as well as locally available sources. Historical information and statistical data were 
gathered for the preliminary investigation conducted before the interview process, with 
the initial research data for this report being gathered mid 2003.
Primary sources used for the research include official communications, journals, 
newspaper articles, reports, commentaries etc., on privatisation and liberalisation in 
general and telecommunications privatisation and liberalisation specifically. Secondary 
sources included materials written some time after the privatisation and liberalisation 
process involving commentaries on the situation that has developed and events which 
have unfolded -  for example, in media reports. Statistical sources used were census 
reports, numeric statements that support the privatisation and liberalisation case or 
otherwise. The material used includes published articles on privatisation and 
liberalisation -  worldwide and in the Arab region -  Middle East market overviews and 
analysis related to telecommunications, text books, and internet search results. A major 
portion o f the articles were sourced form the Internet. Documentary research was 
carried out both before and after the interview process, and as new data and publications 
on telecommunications deregulations and liberalisation were constantly published, this 
researcher incorporated them throughout the analysis process.
Interviews
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A research interview involves the researcher asking questions with the hope o f receiving 
heuristic answers from the people who are being interviewed. It is of course, very 
widely used in social research and there are many different methods that can be used 
depending upon the subject and the epistemological standpoint o f the interviewer. 
Robson (2002, pp. 270-272) discusses three types o f interviews -  structured, semi­
structured and unstructured interviews: ‘Data collection is not just a process of 
collection; it is also a process o f creation -  o f using information in unique ways related 
to the purposes o f the study’ (Birley & Moreland 1998, p. 40). Accordingly, the author 
paid attention to the following while developing the data collection technique:
• The method must produce data that is relevant to the research questions on 
privatisation and liberalisation, and be able to provide answers or 
illumination on the topic.
• The technique must be convenient and relatively easy to use in the 
circumstances.
• Specific focus will be given to the issues o f validity and reliability o f the 
research techniques used.
As Denzin (2000, p. 663) quotes Schwandt:
It has become increasingly common in qualitative studies to view the interview 
as a form of discourse between two or more speakers or as a linguistic event in 
the meanings o f questions and responses is contextually grounded and jointly 
constructed by interviewer and respondent.
Considering the fact that the research is on privatisation and liberalisation, and also that 
the interviewees are knowledgeable (particularly the senior staff), it is imperative that 
the interviewees be given an opportunity to express their views and share their 
experiences in an informal environment rather than try to solicit information with all 
closed ended questions. It is equally important to gain the trust o f the interviewees so 
that they would openly express their views -  establishing a rapport with the 
interviewees is important because the goal o f unstructured interviewing is to gain 
understanding.
Magnusson (2005, p. 11) cites Patton in noting how the informal, unstructured
conversational interview allows for a great deal o f latitude in exploring any given
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avenue to examine the subject at hand, though this is not normally the most speedy 
process and is mainly appropriate when there is a fair allotment o f time with which to 
carry out the interview. The unstructured interview ‘...is used in an attempt to 
understand the complex behavior of members of society without imposing any a priori 
categorisation that may limit the field o f inquiry’ (Fontana & Frey, cited in Kerlin 1997, 
p. 10). In instances where the time allotment is not so generous and the interviewer 
wishes to question a number o f different subjects regarding a particular topic, the 
unstructured interview would likely be unsuitable for the interviewer’s needs and 
instead a ‘semi-structured’ format should be pursued.
Robson (2002, p. 278) uses the analogy of a ‘shopping list’ to describe the semi­
structured interview, in regard to the fact that the interviewer has a number of specific 
areas that he or she wants to examine, but also has a good deal o f leeway in regards to 
what order the questions will be asked, how to approach each area o f interest and how 
long to spend discussing each. Both the informal and semi-structured interview methods 
could be considered ‘qualitative research interviews’ (King cited in Robson 2002, p 
271). The benefit o f the semi-structured approach is to lend the interview a type of 
framework and direction that does not drastically restrict the interviewee’s options in 
responding to the questions.
For the purposes o f this thesis the semi-structured method has been adopted. Interests 
regarding, and influences shaping, the telecommunications reform process in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain involve a wide variety o f persons and organisations, each with 
their particular perspective on what issues are o f significance. It would thus be 
appropriate that each interviewee be allowed a fair degree of leeway to convey their 
point o f view on the different aspects o f liberalisation and privatisation process.
The third interviewing approach identified in much o f the literature concerns asking 
respondents a set of closed question. Such a technique is appropriate for surveys where 
responses are likely to be on simple issues on which respondent and interviewer are 
likely to be in common accord as to their meaning and where there are limited resources 
in time to conduct a lengthy interview. In respect to the interviews conducted with 
senior officials, as listed below, this technique would have secured very limited results 
and not allowed a much richer expression o f ideas and values from the respondent.
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However, data has been drawn from other studies on consumer attitudes to 
telecommunications provision in Bahrain that have been cited as evidence within this 
thesis.
Planning interviews
Robson (2002, p. 273) notes that time allotment is an important aspect o f the interview 
process, as interviews o f less than thirty minutes may not be long enough to gamer 
pertinent information, yet interviews longer than an hour are likely to put a strain on the 
interviewees’ schedule o f other commitments. Colin’s notes that the interviewer’s 
‘closure skills’ come into play and proper preparation key, with a schedule for all 
interviews drawn up and all arrangements confirmed as part o f the interview planning.
Respondent selection
A list o f potential interview candidates was drawn up, which included ministers and 
senior executives from the government, members of parliament as well as the private 
sector who had direct involvement in the privatisation and liberalisation process. Tables 
6:1, 6:2, 6:3 and 6:4 list, respectively, the cabinet members, parliamentarians, 
representatives o f government bodies and industry stake holders selected for the 
interviews, with the methodology of conducting the interview altered to suit the calibre 
of each interviewee.
Table 6:2 Cabinet members selected for interview
Name Organisation Designation Date o f  
interview
Sheikh Khalid bin Abdullah al 
Khalifah
Ministry o f PM 
Court
Minister Dec. 2004
Mr. Ali Saleh al-Saleh Ministry of 
Municipalities & 
Agriculture
Minister Feb. 2005
Dr. Mohammed A. Ghaffar Ministry of 
Information
Minister May 2005
Mr. Mohammed al-Mutawa P.M. Court Advisor and 
former Minister
Jan. 2005
Mr. Nabi al-Shoalah Ministry of State Former Minister Feb. 2005
Table 6:3 Parliamentarians selected for interview
(To find, from their view points, the effects o f  privatisation on economic growth, the 
outcomes o f telecommunications market liberalisation and their role in this regard.)
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Name Organisation Designation Date o f  
interview
HE Khalifah al-Dhahrani The Parliament Chairman Feb. 2005
Mr. Jassim A. Aal 
Mr. Othman Sharif 
Mr. Jassim al-Mawali
The Parliament MPs -  members 
of Finance 
Committee
Feb. 2005
Table 6:4 Representatives of government bodies selected for interview
(Concerning the policies and function o f  the TRA in telecommunications market 
liberalisation and ensuring competition in the face ofBatelco’s market dominance.)
Name Organisation Designation Date o f  
interview
Mr. Salman Seyadi Legal affairs Head Aug. 2005
M. F. al-Ada P.M Court Advisor Aug. 2005
Table 6:5 Industry stake holders selected for interview
(To understands how the TRA regard’s it own role and it self-evaluation so far, how the 
regulations protect the new entrants and how the two mobile operators evaluate the 
TRA)
Name Organisation Designation Date o f  
interview
Dr. Marwan al Ahmadi MTC-Vodafone CEO Dec. 2005
Saleh Tarradah Batelco GM info, 
systems
June 2005
Formulations o f questions
The questions were formulated based on both the theories behind privatisation and 
liberalisation and their actual experience. The questions for the ministers were different 
from those o f the other interviewees, in that their questions were oriented more towards 
policy matters, linkages o f privatisation and liberalisation to employment, trade 
balances and visions for the future of the Kingdom, etc. The questions put to ministers 
were open-ended and asked within a semi-structured interview method aimed at finding 
answers to the policy matters related to privatisation in general and telecommunications 
privatisation and liberalisation in particular. The questions were aimed at seeking their 
views on privatisation as a tool for economic growth, the aim of liberalising the 
telecommunications market and its impact socially and economically and their strategy 
or vision for Bahrain.
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The list below is the basic template o f questions with which this author approached each 
interview. However, the actual questions each interviewee was asked were adapted to 
take into account specifics of their position, authority and area o f expertise. As well, this 
list o f questions is only a basic template in that during the progression of each 
interview, this author allowed leeway regarding the topics into which the conversation 
flowed. This author then adapted the questions that were asked dependant on what 
topics were discussed, often spontaneously. Therefore, the list below should not be 
regarded as the full and complete list o f questions each interviewee was asked, but 
instead be seen as the guidelines and general parameters that were used in the interview 
process.
Template o f questions for policy makers and industry stakeholders:
• What are the goals o f privatisation and liberalisation, both generally and 
with regards to telecommunications specifically?
• What is the government’s role in telecommunications privatisation and 
liberalisation?
• What is the TRA’s role in telecommunications privatisation and 
liberalisation?
• What is the private sector’s role in telecommunications privatisation and 
liberalisation?
• How do you perceive you own role in the telecommunications privatisation 
and liberalisation process?
• How do you perceive the results o f the telecommunications privatisation and 
liberalisation process thus far?
• In what aspects could the process o f telecommunications reform be 
improved?
Recording interview data
When collecting information it is essential to take a full account o f the interviewees 
responses, and while Patton (2002, p. 380) notes that audio recordings o f interviews 
should be made, there are a number of factors which should be considered in making 
such a determination. On the positive side, recording an interview allows the 
interviewer to give their full attention to the interviewees answers while also allowing
154
the interviewer more opportunity to ‘think on his feet’, meaning he is more able to re­
formulate questions to fit meaningfully with the dynamic that develops as the interview 
progresses and not be encumbered with having to take the time to write all the responses 
into notes. One problem is however, along with needing the interviewee’s permission 
for the interview to be audio-recorded, the knowledge that the interview is being 
recorded can often lead the interviewee to give more stilted and reserved answers to 
questions, as opposed to what he or she actually thinks. Patton (2002, p. 380) notes that 
using a tape recording also does not remove the usefulness o f taking notes, as writing 
down responses can often help the interviewer ‘retain focus’, as well as notes acting as a 
back-up in case there are unforeseen difficulties with the recording equipment.
This author has used the note taking method for obtaining data during the interviews 
due to the sensitivity o f interviewee’s political positions and to maintain a friendly 
atmosphere during the sessions. The notes o f the interviews, made on index cards, 
showed the name and designation o f the interviewees. These cards were then grouped 
into the sequence o f the hierarchy o f their job titles, which are then used in the analysis 
and writing up o f the interview findings in Chapter 8.
Analysis of qualitative data
There are generally two approaches to analysing interviews: (1) to analyse data on a 
case by case basis, effectively writing a case study for each person interviewed; (2) use 
a cross-case analysis, grouping together answers from different people to common 
questions or analysing different perspectives on important issues. The latter method is 
used in this thesis. For the purpose of analysis, the researcher grouped the interview 
data collected into four segments based on the interviewee segment; these were: 
ministers, parliamentarians, senior government servants, and stakeholders.
The interviewees’ views on the following aspects o f telecommunications liberalisation 
were solicited and analyzed. Questions were asked regarding their views on the 
privatisation and liberalisation moves initiated by Bahrain and about the involvement o f  
the private sector in the country’s economic development program. They were also 
asked to comment on the role of an adequate regulatory framework to ensure 
transparency and competition among different players, which also touches upon the role 
of the government in the country’s liberalisation programme. Other questions related to
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telecommunications included its potential to provide more job opportunities and ease 
the fiscal burden on the government. Interviewees were also asked whether in their view 
an oligopoly could come into practice. The analysis o f the findings o f the interview, 
carried out based on this segmentation, can be termed as qualitative analysis. One 
characterisation o f ‘qualitative data’ is that it is an ‘attractive nuisance’ (Miles 1979, p. 
590-601):
Attractive because words are by far the most common form of qualitative data 
and are a speciality o f humans and their organizations. Narratives, accounts and 
other collections o f words are variously described as ‘rich’, ‘full’ and ‘real’ and 
contrasted with the thin abstractions of number.. .[though it is a nuisance in that] 
naive researchers may be injured by unforeseen problems with qualitative data. 
This can occur during data collection stage.. .but the main difficulty is in their 
analysis (Robson 2002, pp. 455-456).
If the author had a substantial amount o f qualitative data then some kind o f software 
package would have had to be used to deal with it. However, in the case o f this thesis, 
the data collected is not so substantial that it calls for a word processing package 
utilisation. The opinions expressed in the four segments stated above can be 
conceptualized with relative ease and retained by the reader to arrive at comprehensive 
conclusions.
Survey of consumers
Field survey is one of the preferred approaches to obtain detailed information regarding 
the effects of liberalising the telecommunications industry in a country. If the resources 
were available this study would have incorporated its own extensive consumer survey 
regarding telecommunications in Bahrain. Though this was not possible, it was possible 
to incorporate data that had been obtained from published sources. Two field surveys 
were used: one, to measure the economic effect o f the liberalisation process on the 
telecommunications market; the other, to assess consumer behaviour and levels o f  
satisfaction with the various telecommunication services and products. Detailed results 
are analyzed in chapter 8.
The first survey was carried out in 2003 by the Bahrain Centre for Studies and Research
(BCSR) -  a Government entity for research work -  to measure the impact o f
telecommunications liberalisation by seeking the views o f various segments o f society.
The outcome o f this comprehensive survey was published by the BCSR in June 2004
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and statistical data for this study was collected from this source. The total sample, 
consisting of more than 550 surveys, was tested to ensure proper statistical distribution 
across the age, social status and economic rank parameters. After the raw data were 
collected, they were processed using statistical software and put into descriptive 
summaries. The second survey incorporated in the research o f this thesis was conducted 
by the Nielsen Company in 2007, under commission from the TRA, as a market 
research study aimed at obtaining detailed knowledge o f the behaviour of the different 
customer groups in Bahrain -  i.e. residential users and corporate/business users -  with 
the results being published in July 2007. The sample size o f the residential module was 
1052 people, which included respondents from all across the Kingdom’s socio­
economic class spectrum -  as will be detailed in Chapter 8. The sample size of the 
business survey was 159 interviews, which this author deemed to be rather small. Thus, 
while the results o f the business survey will be discussed in Chapter 8, this is done in 
the context of the points of interest these results raise, rather than regarding them as a 
comprehensive representation of the general response of the business community to the 
telecommunications climate in Bahrain.
These surveys were used as additional information resources for this study. Given that 
these were detailed studies this author has not sought to replicate similar surveys and 
instead gave more time for in-depth interviews. The reasons behind choosing these 
surveys were their comprehensiveness, the wide range o f consumers they covered, the 
fair distribution between the two major companies (Batelco and Zain), and their 
relevance to the thesis topic -  i.e. the surveys helped to evaluate and measure the impact 
of liberalising the mobile phone market from the customer’s point o f view. The 
information content of these surveys was found to be quite useful for the purposes of  
this study, enabling this author to determine a number o f the affects o f liberalising the 
telecommunications market, as well as the behaviours and attitudes of consumers in this 
market.
Conclusion
The research aim is to analyze the economic and social advantages and disadvantages o f  
liberalisation in the provision of telecommunications in the Kingdom of Bahrain. This 
chapter has presented the three methods used for the study namely, documentary 
research, interviews, and field surveys, and the conceptual framework within which the
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data collection and analysis was carried out. It has shown that the hypothesis is based on 
the problems presented in Chapter 1. In addition, the relevance o f data collection and 
analysis to the hypothesis was explained, which highlights that the hypothesis and 
research plan are consistent with the goal o f the thesis. While in secondary data bias was 
not significantly evident as diversified and authenticated literature was reviewed, 
primary data evidenced bias was likely present as correspondents were familiar only 
with the national and controlled telecommunications scenario in Bahrain. However 
careful design of the research plan by the researcher is an attempt to minimise or, to the 
furthest extent possible, eliminate bias.
* * *
Chapter 7:
Liberalisation policy and its application in the Bahrain 
telecommunications scenario
Introduction
The prevailing philosophy in telecommunications sectors around the world has 
expounded liberalisation and competition since the UK and US pushed their national 
service providers, BT and AT&T respectively, into the private sphere in the 1980s. 
Among the challenges for governments has been how to sow a field fertile for 
competition and infrastructure investments in their networks. Standing in their way have 
been the telecommunications monopolies which staunchly defend their market control 
and power. Success in breaking the grip of the monopolies has come in varying degrees, 
depending on the country, and liberalisation can be seen as a movement in progress and 
yet to be fully realized -  as will become apparent regarding the example o f Bahrain. The 
following chapter will be an examination o f the policies and regulatory mechanisms 
enacted by the government o f Bahrain in pursuit o f telecommunication liberalisation, 
the current scenario regarding telecommunications service provision and the challenges 
the Kingdom faces in realizing its ambitions for a competitive telecommunications 
market.
The Telecommunications Law
The liberalisation process in Bahrain officially began when the Telecommunications 
Law was enacted on the 20th of January 2002, granting a licence for another mobile 
service provider to compete with Batelco’s mobile service, offering a number of  
licences for ISPs and value-added services, and laying the foundations for the BIX. The 
stated intention o f the law was to break Batelco’s monopoly and inject competition 
across a full spectrum of services in the telecommunications market. The law also 
created the TRA as an independent regulator for competition, licensing and protection 
of consumer rights, separating telecommunications regulation from the Ministry of 
Transportation, which is the source of governments’ telecommunications policies.
While it was not stated explicitly, provisions within the Telecommunications Law 
which removed barriers to foreign ownership and investment were included to ensure 
Bahrain met the WTO benchmarks laid out in the Basic Telecommunications
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Agreement -  as mentioned in Chapter 3 -  regarding privatisation and competition in its 
telecommunications market (Shusterman et al. n.d., p. 3). The FTA between Bahrain 
and the US signed in September 2004, while liberalising trade generally, also calls for 
an open telecommunications and e-commerce market between the two countries to 
allow companies to invest freely. To ensure the Kingdom had a coherent strategy in 
place to accomplish its telecommunications liberalisation goals, the 
Telecommunications Law also called for the enactment o f the National 
Telecommunications Plan to act as a blueprint for the future.
The National Telecommunications Plan
The Ministry o f Transportation issued the 2003 National Telecommunications Plan 
exactly a year after the Telecommunications Law had been promulgated, with the stated 
aims o f breaking Batelco’s monopoly to liberalise the market and separating the roles o f 
policy maker and market regulator between the Ministry o f Transportation and the TRA 
respectively.
Government policy is that it shall perform no role, take any action with regard to 
Batelco that would prejudice the desired separation of Government’s duties of  
policy oversight for the telecommunications sector, and, its rights and 
obligations as a shareholder in Batelco. To these ends, whilst Government 
retains a shareholding in Batelco, it shall be represented on the Board of Batelco 
only by its Investment Management arm (The National Telecom Plan 2003, p.6).
While the plan’s stated aim is to improve telecommunications services in Bahrain to 
foster the development o f an ‘e-society’, turning the Kingdom into the ‘information 
hub’ of the region and encouraging high-tech investment, there is reason to doubt the 
plan’s ability to fulfil these ambitions. For instance, the general manager o f IT services 
at Batelco, Saleh Tarradah, stated that the national plan was an implementation plan 
with target dates and it did not incorporate any visionary aspects as to how the future 
telecommunications industry in the country is supposed to look, nor its impact on other 
sectors in the economy (interview 23rd October 2005). As will be discussed in Chapter 
8, Mr. Tarradah’s criticism of the plan is shared by a number of the individuals 
interviewed for this study, and this absence o f a vision for telecommunications 
liberalisation could negatively impact not only on the success rate of the liberalisation 
moves, but the growth of the other segments of the economy for which
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telecommunication forms the basic infrastructure for its expansion, such as banking and 
IT.
Both the Telecommunications Law and Plan ensure, on paper at least, that the Kingdom 
leads other GCC countries in terms o f telecommunications liberalisation. However there 
have been inexplicable delays in implementing a variety o f aspects o f the liberalisation 
agenda. Though competitors are now able to establish their own cable networks for 
fixed-line and internet services for Bahraini customers, none has yet, and 
recommendations to sell off Batelco’s fixed-line division were never implemented, 
despite expressed interest from international investors for this and other aspects of 
Batelco’s business. Technically, post-July 2004 there were no restrictions on companies 
obtaining a licence to offer any telecommunications service, apart from mobile services 
where competition was limited to one other company, yet Batelco still maintains 
dominance over almost all aspects of telecommunications provision except for the 
mobile sector and long-distance calling.
The Second National Telecommunications Plan
In February 2008 the Government of Bahrain announced the Second National 
Telecommunications Plan; based on a review o f the results derived from the enactment 
of the 2002 Telecommunications Law and the first National Telecommunications Plan, 
this second national plan laid out a three-year prescription o f how the 
telecommunications sector in the Kingdom is to develop. ‘In particular it is an objective 
of the Plan to further assist the telecommunications sector to become a major force in 
the development o f the national economy’ (Second National Telecommunications Plan 
2008, section 1).
Among the admissions o f the government in the new plan is that ‘the growth o f  
competition is underway but has not yet reached full development’ (Second National 
Telecommunications Plan 2008, section 4). The Plan notes that both the continued 
expansion o f current telecommunications market players and the entry o f new ones are 
necessary to further the Kingdom’s objectives for general economic expansion, and thus 
the TRA must see to it that barriers to entry continue to be removed in order to foster an 
open market -  one in which competition spurs greater access to services at lower prices.
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TRA must also continue to work towards elimination of opportunities and 
incentives for anti-competitive behaviour. TRA must continue to take measures 
to promote competition and ensure that wholesale products, including 
infrastructure sharing, are appropriately priced and regulated so as to encourage 
their proper and adequate provision... The Government requires TRA to support 
industry in the use of any technology in the provision of facilities allowing both 
service and infrastructure competition (Second National Telecommunications 
Plan 2008, section 4).
In recognizing the areas where competition has not developed, the government requires 
that the TRA to protect consumers from price gouging, while noting that wherever 
possible ‘barriers that prevent customers from realising their right to choose’ should be 
taken down. Interestingly, the government explicitly states it is against allowing Batelco 
to cross-subsidize costs between its different segments (i.e. fixed-line, mobile, long­
distance, etc.) and that the TRA is required to enforce price regulations which reflect the 
actual cost o f the service.
Where traditionally integrated services (e.g., telephone line rental and call 
services delivered over that line) separate, these services should be adequately 
priced in accordance with the costs o f these different services. The Government 
therefore supports implementation o f regulatory measures and policies that 
maximise long-term consumer benefit, even where there may be some 
unavoidable short term costs. Therefore, the Government requires TRA to 
ensure that there is a full rebalancing o f tariffs of fixed telephony (Second 
National Telecommunications Plan 2008, section 4).
While noting the likely price-hikes may harm low-income subscribers, the Government 
said this will be handled under general social welfare policy, and not be a consideration 
for telecommunications policy, which should be focused on generating a competitive 
market. Economic efficiency is held to be best pursued through market mechanisms, 
and to this end the TRA ‘shall use both actual competition, and mechanisms that seek to 
replicate competitive outcomes, in designing the regulatory regime for 
telecommunications’ (Second National Telecommunications Plan 2008, section 4).
Among the most significant aspects of the new plan, however is the Government’s
commitment to divulge itself of most, if  not all o f its shares in Batelco within three
years. The Government states that this separation o f its interests from Batelco’s will
allow the company to focus its decision-making on market motivations, as opposed to
Government issues, an put the Government in a position to treat the company as it
would any other market player. ‘Government ownership in Batelco is, and will continue
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to be, managed by a body clearly separated from policy and regulatory decisions and 
entrusted only with the financial management o f its investments’ (Second National 
Telecommunications Plan 2008, section 4).
A more detailed consideration o f the current telecommunications landscape, including 
the various services and scenarios playing out in the fixed-line, mobile and Internet 
sectors would allow for a better understanding regarding the extent o f competition in the 
telecommunications market and the future potential to promote competition.
Telecommunications services scenarios
General overview
Figure 7:1 Market share in Bahraini telecommunications, by sector -  2006
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(Source: TRA, Telecommunications Sector Liberalisation’ presentation to BBBF 2007)
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As has been mentioned several times in the thesis thus far, Batelco remains the 
dominant player in the domestic telecommunications market despite the government’s 
efforts to try and foster more competition in a liberalised market. As illustrated in 
Figure 7:1 above, only in the mobile sector has there been any notable reduction in 
Batelco’s monopolistic power in telecommunications markets inside Bahrain. For long­
distance and overseas calling however, there has been significant progress in 
diminishing Batelco’s dominance, with the success o f companies employing long­
distance call-back cards and VoIP technology to cut Batelco’s market share to less than 
half (40 per cent).
It should be noted that Batelco’s continued dominance in fixed-line and broadband 
services in the Kingdom is unlikely to be the result of a lack o f licences for other 
companies to offer services in these areas. As illustrated in Figure 7:2 below, there are 
seven companies the TRA licensed to be allowed to provide fixed-line service and 14 
that have been issued licenses to be Internet service providers. However, in less than 
half o f these cases have the companies actually attempted to offer their services (and 
thus an alternative to Batelco) to Bahraini customers; even those that have, as o f year’s 
end 2006, have had a minuscule impact upon Batelco’s market share (which, as shown 
in Figure 7:1, still stands at 96 per cent in both fixed-line and broadband segments).
Figure 7:2 Service licences issues and services offered -  2006
|R e ta il  S e r v ic e s '
Licensee
|y^=jciarrcntlyj}freriiv£»erviceT
F ixed  A ccess F ixed  Calls M obile ISP In te r  S erv ice VAS P ag ing  NFWS
T o ta l
O ffer in g  S e r v ic e s
2C onnect  
N eutel T elecom  
ANIS 
B atelco
B u sin ess  C om m unication  Networks
E tisalcom  YV.L.L
F a k h r o
Kalaam T elecom  
Light Speed
M ena Broadband serv ices WLL 
MTC - Vodafone Bahrain  
N orth Star 
Orbit
Sw iftel International 
TeleGulf 
V iacloud WLL
(Source: TRA, ‘Telecommunications Sector Liberalisation’ presentation to BBBF 2007)
164
Despite the relative lack o f competition in most areas o f Bahrain’s telecommunications 
market however, a very salient trend in the sector is its propensity for increasing 
revenue returns. Between 2003 and 2006, revenue from all segments o f the market 
combined increased 74 per cent, from some BD152.5 million (US$412 million) in 2003 
to some BD265.6 million (US$717 million) by year’s end 2006 [please see Figure 7:3 
below]
Figure 7:3 Growth of telecommunications market revenue 2003-06
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(Source: TRA, 'Telecommunications Sector Liberalisation ’presentation to BBBF 2007) 
Fixed-line services
As o f year’s end 2006 there were seven companies licensed to provide fixed-line 
services in the Kingdom of Bahrain: 2Connect, Neutel Telecom, Batelco, Etisalcom 
W.L.L., Kalaam Telecom, Light Speed, and Mena Broadband Services W.L.L.. Of 
these, only Neutel Telecom and Batelco have actually engaged the opportunity to offer 
services actively in the market. Batelco, the former SOTE monopolist, commands 
almost complete market dominance (96 per cent market share), while Neutel Telecom, 
now in operation for close to two years, has scratched out a four per cent share o f the 
market.
In cross-referencing (triangulating) between various sources o f data, this author has 
come to the realize that there are conflicting accounts of the actual number o f fixed-
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lines in the Kingdom, as well as incompatible reports regarding trends in the fixed-line 
market.
On the one hand, there is the perspective that Bahrain’s fixed-lined subscriber base 
appears to be shrinking, with Business Monitor International (BMI) -  in its Bahrain 
Telecommunications Report Q2 2005 (p. 9) -  forecasting a drop from 25.5 per cent 
penetration in 2005 to 20 per cent by 2010, [likely entailing Batelco’s continued 
monopolistic dominance in the sector]. The TRA Development Review Panel Report 
(TRA-DRPR) of 2005 concurred with this assessment, and noted that Batelco’s 
effective fixed line monopoly necessitates that adequate regulatory controls be in place 
to ‘counter-weight’ this market supremacy -  ‘Regulation should retreat as the tide of  
competition advances; But at the moment competition is only prospective’ (Cave et al. 
2005, p. 8). Batelco has stated, in a company financial report by published April 2007 
by the National Bank o f Kuwuit (NBK) (p. 19), that it considers the fixed-line segment 
‘a loss-making business since it is obliged to provide the service for 10 times less than 
the cost, due to social responsibility pressure’. In the same paper the company reported 
that, as o f year’s end 2006, revenue from the fixed-line sector had dropped to BD41 
million (US$110.7 million), a decrease o f 13 per cent over the same period in 2005. 
[Figure 7:4, below, illustrates this conception of the Kingdom’s fixed-line market].
Figure 7:4 Scenario “A” for fixed-line trends (2001-2008)
2001 2002 2003 2004o 20051 2006f 2007f 2008f
Main Telephone Lines in Service (’000) 174 175 186 188 187 181 .175 165
Main Telephone Lines/100 Inhabitants 25.2 24:6 25.5 25.1 24.3 22.9 21.6 19.9
W ith the country’s fixed-line subscriber base 
flatlining. B M I believes that 2004 saw only a 
marginal increase in the Kingdom ’s subscriber 
base. (At the time o f  writing, no data were 
available for the year-end.) In the medium tenu, 
numbers will fall slightly as users migrate to 
alternative technologies, with the penetration rate 
falling from its current level o f  25.5%  to around 
20% by the end o f  the decade.
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The other conception o f the Kingdom’s fixed-line segment is that the number of  
subscribers is actually on the increase. The TRA put forward findings in a November 
2007 presentation to the Bahrain British Business Forum [BBBF] that, between the 
years 2002 and the first quarter o f 2007, the subscriber base in the Kingdom had grown 
from some 175,000 to some 204,000 [as shown in Figure 7:5 below], which equates to a 
growth o f roughly 16 per cent over the course o f five years. This is hardly stellar 
expansion, especially when compared to the much more rapid growth o f other segments 
of the telecommunications industry, or the phenomenal growth o f the Bahraini economy 
generally over the same period, but it nonetheless does point to a slowly and steadily 
expanding market -  contrary to the assessments of BMI and the TRA-DRPR of 2005.
Figure 7:5 Scenario “B” for fixed-line trends (2002-2007 Ql)
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(Source: TRA, 'Telecommunications Sector Liberalisation ’presentation to BBBF 2007)
Thus far is has been possible to settle conclusively neither the reason for this 
discrepancy nor ascertain with complete certainty what is the actual trend in the fixed- 
line segment in Bahrain, as this author has not had access to the raw data used in 
preparing the above statistics, nor been briefed on the method through which the raw 
data was processed. Thus this author has weighed and considered several possibilities 
for these inconsistent findings regarding the state and trends o f Bahrain’s fixed-line 
subscriber base. It is possible that part o f the reason for the discrepancy could be due to
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the fact that the assessments of BMI1 and the TRA-DRPR are based on data from years 
up to, and including, 2004, and fixed-line estimates for the years post-2004 are 
forecasts, not based on data gathered in the field from actually counting the number o f  
fixed-line subscribers. The TRA’s presentation o f findings in 2007 is based on data 
from years up to, and including, 2006 as well as the first quarter o f 2007.
Both the data sets in question point to small but gradual rise in the number of fixed-lines 
in Bahrain until 2004 (though the exact number o f lines differs slightly between data 
sets). In the years post-2004, the BMI and the TRA-DRPR forecasted steady decreases 
in the number o f fixed lines, while the TRA’s presentation o f findings in 2007 reported 
that there was instead an increase in fixed-line subscriptions for the years 2005, 2006 
and the first quarter o f 2007. Perhaps the most straightforward way to regard this 
situation would be to deem that, in making their forecasts -  i.e. claims regarding 
circumstances that had not yet come to pass -  BMI and the TRA-DRPR were simply 
wrong, and that this was exposed by the TRA’s presentation of findings in 2007, which 
reported what actually did  come to pass.
However, consistent with this author’s methodological approach to this study described 
in Chapter 6, to assess threats to the validity o f this data concerning fixed-line 
subscriptions in Bahrain, Ahern’s recommendation concerning reflexive bracketing was 
applied, meaning this author used reflexivity to identify potential areas where bias may 
have factored into the results. Through this process the author determined that a 
potential for bias existed in the TRA’s presentation o f findings in 2007, as, given that 
the TRA was created in 2002 as the regulator o f telecommunications in Bahrain but had 
yet to show it had progressed significantly in affecting positive results in the fixed-line 
sector, it is possible there existed a degree of pressure to show some positive results 
(such as expansion o f services rates). Though officially ‘independent’, the TRA does 
still receive its budget from the Government o f Bahrain’s coffers, thus it is conceivable 
that employees o f the TRA would begin to worry that members o f the Government 
would begin to question the TRA’s budget allocations, given that, for more than four 
years, there had been scarce little positive results in the fixed-line segment.
1 BMI lists the ITU as the source o f the information upon which it based its findings.
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By contrast, BMI -  whose data came from the ITU -  and the TRA-DRPR would be 
under considerably less pressure to have their results tainted one way or the other by 
bias in the interest o f securing revenue, as neither is heavily dependant on, nor beholden 
to, the Government o f Bahrain or any other stakeholders in the Bahraini 
telecommunications scenario on a long-term basis: BMI, as the name ‘Business Monitor 
International’ would suggest, is a private corporation that publishes information 
concerning various sectors o f the economy and finance in a wide number o f countries, 
while the TRA-DRPR was a project involving several industry experts being contracted 
on a fixed, short-term basis to analyse the telecommunications market in Bahrain. If 
anything, it would be in the self-interest of both BMI and the writers o f the TRA-DRPR 
to report as accurately as possible the status o f the telecommunications market in 
Bahrain, as their reputations, and thus future income based off contracts arrived at 
because o f their good reputations, is on the line.
In the interest o f minimizing the possibility o f the impact o f bias upon this study, this 
author undertook a triangulation of the results the different parties came to regarding 
fixed-line subscription rates -  i.e. sought out another point o f reference to gage these 
results by. It was found that Batelco’s own market analysis, published in the 2007 
financial report NBK (mentioned earlier in this chapter), had arrived at similar results as 
the TRA’s presentation o f findings in 2007, stating that:
The number o f fixed-line subscribers reached 190,345 at the end o f July 2006, 
which translates into a penetration rate o f 25 per cent and a CAGR o f 3 per cent 
from 2002 to 2005. This modest growth is expected to continue, especially since 
telecom users seem to prefer mobile services over fixed-line services throughout 
the world. However, increased competition coupled with an increased demand 
for data services and the implementation of a Next-Generation Network (NGN) 
could boost future growth rates (NBK 2007, p. 11).
Thus, while this author has thus made due note that further investigation may be needed
in order to ensure the veracity o f the status o f fixed-line subscribers in the Kingdom,
this author has decided to proceed with the rest o f the thesis and data analysis under the
assumption that there has in fact been small though steady growth in the number o f
fixed-lines in Bahrain. Aside from the reasons mentioned above involving the
triangulation of results, there are also other factors: (1) though the possibility for bias
has been noted above with the TRA, the regulator and Batelco are closer to, and much
more involved in, the telecommunications industry in the Kingdom than were BMI or
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the TRA-DRPR, thus it is reasonable to assume that the former group’s observations of 
the sector -  which are also more recent -  would have a higher likelihood of being 
accurate than the later group’s. (2) As noted in Chapter 4, the economy in the Kingdom 
has been experiencing a surge in the last half decade or so, creating thousands o f new 
business and residential construction projects in and around all o f the island’s urban 
centres, with most, if  not all o f these new projects, likely to have some form of 
connection to the fixed-line network. Though admittedly no more than anecdotal 
evidence, it is difficult for this author to fathom how there would be a drop in fixed-line 
connections -  such would necessitate a major decrease in pre-existing fixed-line 
connections, and while there has been somewhat o f a drop noticed in residential fixed- 
line use, as will be discussed more next chapter, it does not appear to be on the scale 
necessary to outweigh the new fixed-line connections coming on stream and cause an 
overall decrease in fixed-line usage.
Mobile services
Currently there are only two companies to be licensed to provide mobile services in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain: Zain (formerly called ‘MTC-Vodafone’ until September 2007) 
and Batelco. Both are active in the market, with Zain holding 30 per cent market share 
and Batelco the remaining 70 per cent.
Figure 7:6 Mobile subscriptions in Bahrain 2002-06
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MTC-Vodafone became the only competitor to Batelco in the mobile sector when it 
began operations at the end of 2003, launching both 2G and 3G services and a US$120-
170
million network infrastructure plan. The company initially aimed to capture up to 30 per 
cent market share within the first three years, and as of year’s end 2006 had 
accomplished this goal. MTC-Vodafone doubled its subscriber base between December 
2004 and December 2005, from 105,000 to 202,000, while EBIDTA over the same 
period went from a negative US$58-million to US$42-million and MTC-Vodafone 
began expansion of its network capacity to be able to carry some 400,000 customers 
(Dial Tones at the ready 2006, pp. 166-167). While Bahrain is a small market for Zain, it 
is profitable and also represents a strategic ‘piece of the puzzle’ in becoming a major 
regional player in mobile telecommunications, as the company is also operating in 
Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, totalling just over three million customers regionally 
(MTC announces 2004 consolidated earnings 2005). Future prospects for Zain in 
Bahrain look promising, as 83 per cent o f their new subscribers in 2005 remarked that 
they prefer the new mobile service provider over Batelco, and there was a significant 
movement in high-end customers away from Batelco to Zain (Bahrain 
Telecommunications Company Report 2006 p. 28-31).
Between 2005 and 2006 the number o f mobile subscriptions in the Kingdom surpassed 
the number o f people living in the Kingdom, which, by year’s end 2006, led to a 
penetration rate o f 108 per cent, with 11 per cent of mobile users having at least two 
mobile numbers. One factor contributing to this is that Batelco does not allow for 
number transfers, thus while many people wanted to try out the new services offered by 
MTC-Vodafone, they also did not want to lose their old phone numbers and so bought 
the second subscription as well as keeping the first -  another factor may be overly 
generous reporting o f statistics by the mobile carriers, as well as the counting o f lapsed 
subscriptions2. [The TRA announced in June 2008 that it intends to implement a 
Number Portability platform before 2011.] There was speculation o f a third mobile 
operator being granted a licence, though a 2005 TRA Development Review Panel 
Report notes that market factors ought to determine whether there is space for another 
operator in the current duopoly scenario, as profitability, pricing and limited customer 
base could be significant hurdles to any new entrant (Cave et al. 2005, p. 8).
For Batelco’s part, the company officially doubts a third mobile operator will enter the 
market: ‘the weight we assign this scenario is minimal, as we do not believe that such a
2 It should be noted that in 2005 some 25 nations worldwide recorded mobile penetration rates exceeding 
100 per cent (Measuring the Information Society 2006, p. 31)
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highly penetrated and small market will be attractive to a third operator, which would 
have to try to compete with two strong established operators’, at the same time Batelco 
admits a third mobile operator would create even stiffer competition and impact ARPU 
levels (NBK 2007, p. 4 & p. 7).
After much public speculation regarding the possibility o f a third mobile operator 
entering the market, as well as several years of the TRA issuing periodic press releases 
stating that the regulator was examining the subject, in July 2008 the TRA issued a 
press release headlined TRA Appoints a Consultancy Firm to Design and Manage a 
Competitive Process for the Award o f the Third Mobile Operator Licence’ (TRA 
2008a). The TRA stated that the American company Telecommunications Management 
Group Inc. had been awarded the contract to ‘design and manage’ the process by which 
the third mobile operator was selected and given access to the Bahraini market. The 
press release stated that the aim was to have the third mobile operator selected by year’s 
end 2008. In September there was the first round of tenders, with the second round o f  
tenders being called in October. The final round o f tenders is scheduled to be held in 
December 2008.
Given the years o f speculation concerning the possibility of the TRA allowing a third 
mobile carrier to enter the market, it is prudent to be cautious about the outcome o f the 
process currently underway. However, as this is the farthest the TRA has yet ventured 
down the path of having three operators in the mobile market, it is reasonable to assume 
that the concept may be gaining enough momentum to make it a reality in within the 
foreseeable future. The impact o f a third mobile operator would likely be to spur the two 
existing operators to expand and upgrade services while pushing prices down further. 
This would also force Batelco and MTC-Vodafone to innovate to generate new revenue 
or operate with greater efficiency in order to maintain profit margins.
Internet services
As o f year’s end 2006 there were 14 companies licensed as internet service providers in 
the Kingdom of Bahrain: 2Connect, Neutel Telecom, ANIS, Batelco, Business 
Communication Networks, Etisalcom W.L.L., Kalaam Telecom, Light Speed, Mena 
Broadband Services W.L.L., Zain, North Star, Orbit, TeleGulf and Viacloud W.L.L.. Of 
these, six were actually offering services to customers in the Bahraini market: Neutel
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Telecom, Batelco, Kalaam Telecom, Light Speed, Zain and Orbit. The market is, 
however, overwhelming lopsided in Batelco’s favour, with the incumbent 
telecommunications monopolist enjoying 96 per cent o f the broadband market share, 
while the remaining four percent is divided among the other six companies.
In 2003 -  at the beginning of the liberalisation process when Batelco was still the only 
ISP in the market -  there were some 49,000 Internet service subscriptions, growing just 
2.7 per cent to some 50,600 by year’s end 2004, though a large number of existing 
customers switched from dial-up to broadband service. As show in Figure 7:7, 
beginning in the third quarter o f 2006 the number o f internet subscriptions, especially 
broadband, has begun to increase more rapidly, reaching almost 80,000 by the end of 
2007. Though total penetration o f ADSL Internet services all across the region is 
limited, the growth rates of broadband access became comparable to those in the 
developing world in 2006. This the same year Batelco unveiled plans to have ADSL 
access available to every home in the Kingdom by 2008 {Middle Eastern - 
Convergence, Broadband and Internet Market 2006, p 3).
Figure h i  Total internet subscribers in Bahrain, 2004-2007
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Figure 7:9 Bahraini households with internet connection -  2007
; g | Have Internet
B  Do not have Internet
53%
(Source: TRA 2007 Annual Report, pp. 20 & 22)
An assessment o f the Internet situation in the Kingdom included in the TRA 
Development Review Panel’s 2005 report noted that broadband advancement was a 
likely payoff of the liberalisation of the sector, though at the time it noted ‘.. .roll-out of 
broadband appears to be caught in a vicious circle of low initial demand deriving from 
high prices, leading to low levels o f supply and hence high costs’ (Cave et al. 2005, p. 
10-11). Progress in regard to broadband, WiFi and other e-services has gradually been 
gaining momentum, but as o f yet Bahrain’s ‘high-Tec revolution’ can still be considered 
in its initial stages.
‘Broadband Bahrain'
In February 2005 Batelco announced the US$55.6-million ‘Broadband Bahrain’
campaign, laying out a three-to-five year plan for expanding and investing in new
internet infrastructure ‘which will ensure faster access and cheaper prices; the continued
roll-out o f WiFi; placement o f MPLS networks for businesses and organizations; and a
raft o f additional products, services and advances’ (Broadband Bahrain 2005). The
WiFi plans include installing wireless routers in public places around the country to
offer internet access using a pre-paid system and offering businesses a post-paid WiFi
service, while Broadband Bahrain also entails a general expansion and upgrading o f
fixed-line and mobile network infrastructure. For each o f the three-to-five years o f the
plan, Batelco’s stated intention is to add some 20,000 new Internet customers
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(Broadband Bahrain 2005). However Internet costs remain relatively high and the 
Broadband Bahrain programme was likely to have been spurred in large part by 
widespread complaints over the narrow scope and inflexibility o f services, such as poor 
VoIP service, deficient virtual services for big businesses and financial institutions, and 
degrading accessibility to international networks due to the shrinking capacity o f  
Batelco’s infrastructure {The Pressure Increases on Batelco 2006, p. 15). In fact 
Batelco’s own customer surveys indicated that almost half o f their Internet customers 
believed they were overcharged for a service that was too slow {Batelco’s Broadband 
vision 2006). Batelco then announced in May 2006 that it was removing the option of 
unlimited downloading, instead issuing a cap of 15GB monthly and charging customers 
a premium for any downloading above this limit.
BIX (Bahrain Internet Exchange) and ISPs
The Bahrain Internet Exchange (BIX), established under the Telecommunications Law, 
is to be a not-for-profit mechanism that promotes competition, efficiency and consumer 
price savings, and while scheduled to come on-line in early 2005, as o f the publication 
of this thesis, it is still not operational. Sheikh Hamad bin Hamad al-Khalifa, BIX 
Chairman, describes it as ‘...basically routers and switches. It’s simple infrastructure 
that is very expandable. The idea is to start switching traffic between local companies, 
and as the demand grows...the exchange can grow too’ {Licensed and Ready 2005 p 
150).
The concept is to have all ISPs in the Kingdom connected to the BIX to facilitate faster 
and cheaper Internet traffic. Currently, if  one person or organisation in Bahrain sends 
information over the internet to another party in Bahrain, that internet traffic leaves the 
Kingdom to run through a third party server in an outside country, then is routed back to 
the receiver in Bahrain. Once the BIX is operational it will act as a hub, where 
information sent from any ISP in the Kingdom will run through the BIX to any other 
ISP in the Kingdom without having to go through an outside server. This will speed 
connection times and offer savings to the ISPs in that they will not have to buy as much 
international bandwidth -  though as it stands currently there is not an overly large 
volume of intra-Bahrain traffic {Licensed and Ready 2005, p. 150).
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Government anticipates the BIX will facilitate the growth of e-commerce, allow ISPs to 
‘develop complementary services such as applications development and hosting, 
thereby feeding the growth of the IT sector more generally, creating jobs and building 
human capital in the Kingdom’ {Licensed and Ready 2005, pp. 150-151). Batelco will 
also be obligated to allow the BIX access to the company’s networks, both local and 
international, with other ISPs then able to purchase access to these networks from the 
BIX. In this way the BIX should facilitate new competitors’ entry into the market as 
currently potential new entrants face the prohibitive prospect o f having to buy 
bandwidth wholesale from Batelco. As well, once the BIX is up and running, it is 
anticipated that the subsequent drop in usage fees will substantially boost business 
demand for Internet access, which will itself spur greater competition in the market 
{Licensed and Ready 2005, p. 151). Batelco’s response to the establishment o f the BIX 
can be captured in the words o f Hani Radhi, Batelco’s wholesale and carrier relations 
senior manager in 2005:
In signing the agreement with BIX, we are demonstrating our commitment to 
respond to our obligations to facilitate competition in a timely and constructive 
manner. We anticipate that our efforts and co-operation with BIX will directly 
lead to a host o f benefits for the people of Bahrain. Lower prices, better quality 
of service, greater awareness of the benefits o f the Internet and a host o f new 
products would all help boost the telecom market {Gulf Daily News, 27 April 
2005, p. 16).
Nonetheless, detractors may see such a comment as the voice o f reluctant conciliation 
from a monopoly player that is in reality still doing everything within its power to delay 
liberalisation reforms which would result in the loss o f its market dominance.
The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority
In accord with the Telecommunications Law, the Telecommunications Regulatory
Authority officially came into being on the 23rd of October 2002, entrusted to protect
the interests o f the consumer and ensure each and every sector o f the
telecommunications market became characterised by fair and effective competition
between all licensed operators both new and incumbent, thus ending the monopoly o f
Batelco. The TRA outlines its directives in three categories: consumer protection,
regulatory framework and regulatory policy. The regulator is financially and
administratively independent from government, while ‘...enjoying all advantages o f
ministries, governmental entities, and official public sector organisations’ {The
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Telecommunications Law 2002, p. 11). A board of four directors and a chairman head 
the TRA, with members to the board appointed by the Government’s Council of 
Ministers. The board meets at least four times a year and decisions are taken by majority 
vote and, in the event the votes are split equally, the chairman casts the deciding vote. 
Among the duties mandated of the TRA, as laid out in the Telecommunications Law:
• Protect the interests of subscribers and users regarding tariffs charged for 
services, the availability and provision o f service, the quality o f services and 
protection of personal particulars and privacy of services.
• Give final decisions as to applications for licences.
• Promote effective and fair competition among new and existing licensed
operators.
• Monitor and enforce compliance with licence terms by licences.
• Set and collect application, initial, annual and renewal fees for licences,
collect fines and fees under any licence and, where appropriate, collect fees 
for services provided by the TRA.
TRA Development Review Panel report
An assessment o f the TRA’s independence and regulatory performance was 
commissioned by the TRA’s general director near the end o f 2004 to see whether the 
regulator was fulfilling its mandate and to offer recommendations as to how to future 
operations should proceed. The three-person TRA Development Review Panel 
consisted of the following independent experts: Professor Martin Cave, director o f the 
Centre for Management Under Regulation at Warwick Business School in the UK; 
Christopher Wright, a special advisor on regulated industries at the lawyers Slaughter & 
May, also from the UK, and Ian Martin, a financial strategist and analyst at ABN 
AMRO Bank in Australia (Cave et al. 2005, p. 2). In the course o f their review the panel 
consulted government officials, business leaders, consumer groups and held a public 
meeting including representatives from all these groups and other interested person, 
culminating in the final Report on the operations o f the Bahrain TRA, issued in March 
2005.
In the report the panel noted that the TRA needed to adhere more to its legislated 
mandate rather than set its own priorities, while shifting its emphasis from licensing to
177
‘facilitating competitive entry... it has a sophisticated framework for making 
competition assessments but it should not allow this to impede its ability to make 
practical progress in key areas after all, Batelco is overwhelmingly dominant in almost 
every sector o f its operations’ (Cave et al. 2005, p. 13). The panel also remarked how 
the TRA’s mechanisms for settling disputes between operators was deficient, that the 
TRA needed to involve itself more in dispute resolution to try and solve the issue before 
it went to arbitration, and the TRA needed to greatly expedite and introduce flexibility 
to the entire dispute resolution process. Among the other recommendations the of 
review panel, as appeared on the front page o f the Gulf Daily News on March 9, 2005:
• There should be a fast track for determining the key elements o f access and 
interconnection for new entrants to the fixed line market.
• There should be a joint project established with the ministry o f transportation 
on spectrum demand and availability.
• Price control should move to a non-objection process based on price capping 
with floors and ceilings for individual price changes.
• A timetable for tariff rebalancing should be established which is sensitive to 
the potential for consumer hardship.
• The key gaps in TRA resources need to be filled in.
• A less labour intensive way of issuing licenses is needed, especially for class 
licenses (where an authorisation process might be considered).
TRA Work Plan 2007-2009
In May 2007 the TRA release its so-called Work Plan 2007-2009. Based on 
consultations with the Government, current and potential licence holders, the business 
community, consumer groups and other stakeholders in the telecommunications 
industry, the Work Plan outlined the regulator’s strategic trajectory for the next three 
years. As stated in the plan, the TRA identified six aspects o f the market it saw as 
needed to be addressed (TRA 2007 Annual Report, p. 16):
• Enhancing the environment for sustainable competitive services.
• Fostering competition through proportionate regulatory intervention where 
necessary.
• Increasing customers’ basic rights and interests
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• Developing a regulatory framework that supports national development 
policies.
• Ensuring regulatory procedures are streamlined, appropriate, open and 
transparent so they support, not hinder, competitive and technological 
advances
The Work Plan goes further to identify specific initiates the regulator intends to 
undertaken by 2009, including: duct sharing and construction; international access 
facilitation; granting o f an additional mobile license; creating an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism and a wholesale tariff control mechanism; a number portability 
project for fixed-lines and mobiles; a consumer awareness campaign and establishing 
structures for ensuring consumer rights (TRA 2007 Annual Report, p. 17).
Impact of liberalisation on Batelco
Batelco, despite losing dominance over the mobile sector, so far appears to be showing 
no ill affects from the liberalisation process, in fact quite the opposite. Between 2003 
and 2004, the company’s year-on-year gross revenues rose six per cent to BD203- 
million (US$550-million), with net profits increasing to BD84-million (US$224- 
million) from BD61-million (US$164-million), and earnings rising to 83fils (US$0.22) 
from 61 (US$0.16) per share3.
Figure 7:10 Batelco’s revenue and net profit (in US$-million)
Year Revenue Net profit
1996 275 75
1997 307 86
1998 356 116
1999 383 129
2000 410 143
2001 461 145
3 ‘fils’ are a subdivision o f Dinars, as cents are to dollars; 1000 fils = 1 Bahraini Dinar = US$2.65
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Year Revenue Net profit
2002 502 156
2003 518 164
2004 550 224
2005 610 240
2006 635 n/a
(Extract from  Batelco’s official website http://batelco.com)
As Batelco’s chairman Hassan Juma put it, ‘These figures are outstanding by any 
standards; the fact that they were posted during the first year of competition in 
Bahrain’s lucrative mobile sector illustrates Batelco’s strength, depth and knowledge of 
its market and customers’ {Broadband Bahrain 2005). As the Figure 7:10 shows above, 
Batelco’s ‘outstanding’ performance under liberalisation has continued. Batelco’s total 
revenue from 1996 until the end of the first quarter of 2006 was US$4.5-billion, and 
profit for the same period was US$1.5 billion.
Flexing market dominance
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in May 2006 Batelco removed the unlimited 
downloading option from the list of packages Broadband Internet customers could 
choose from, instead enforcing a 15GB cap on monthly downloads and charging a lOfil 
(US$0.27) fee for every MB downloaded above this limit, in effect forcing consumers 
to restrict their internet use or pay substantially more. As an article on the consumer 
protest website boycottbatelco.com explained ‘...this is not an optional transition, as 
you will be forcefully migrated and have no option of staying with your current 
packages, even if you have an unlimited bandwidth package. Every ADSL user in 
Bahrain will be subscribed to the new threshold packages by 25th May, 2006’ {Boycott 
Batelco 2006).
Moreover, Batelco continued to advertise its unlimited ADSL downloading package, 
with all customers who signed up then ‘forcefully migrated’ to the new limited package. 
The TRA intervened in June 2006, forcing Batelco to apologise publicly and refund
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customers who had unknowingly signed up for the unlimited packages. In a press 
release which appeared on page one o f the Gulf Daily News on June 15, 2006, the 
company stated:
Batelco failed to meet its obligations under the Telecommunications Law and its 
Licence. Batelco apologises to its consumers in that it has misled them through 
the advertisements issued that it could offer such packages when it was aware 
that it could not do so legally. This announcement is issued pursuant to the order 
to the Authority.
The above scenario demonstrates the importance o f an effective and independent 
regulator in ensuring monopoly operators do not abuse their dominant position, as well 
as the need for the regulator to begin implementing effectual liberalisation policies to 
foster healthy competition in the market and give consumers alternatives. In this context 
the words of William Melody, managing director for Learning Initiative on Reforms for 
Network Economies (LIRNE), are meaningful:
The success o f the US incumbent telecom mergers and the re-emergence o f  
monopoly power may have more severe consequences elsewhere, especially in 
developing countries. Most countries have neither large enough markets nor 
sufficiently liberalised markets to provide the diversity o f opportunities 
necessary to develop their networks and services adequately in the face o f an 
expansion o f monopoly power by incumbent fixed and mobile operators. 
Incumbents are likely to be far more effective at creating and maintaining 
barriers to participation here than in the US. Thus the challenge o f telecom 
reform and information infrastructure development facing developing country 
policymakers and regulators will remain a formidable one for the foreseeable 
future (Melody 2006, p. 2).
What are the challenges faced by the Kingdom of Bahrain? This chapter is consolidated 
by reviewing the obstacles and opportunities evolving within the telecommunications 
liberalisation effort.
Obstacles and opportunities in Bahraini telecommunications liberalisation
As stated earlier in Chapter 7, the TRA Development Review Panel noted a major fault
of the TRA was its focus on granting licences as opposed to the bigger issue o f
reforming the market and introducing effective means to ensure fair competition.
Although the TRA’s Work Plan 2007-2009, if  fully implemented and successful in the
initiatives it has laid out, would likely help spur competition, it is yet to be seen how
effective these undertakings will be. In seeking to lead the region in telecommunications
181
development and establish itself as an ‘information hub’ -  with all the associated 
competitive advantages accompanying such -  it is imperative for the Kingdom of 
Bahrain that the TRA reorient its focus as well as give force to the ‘pro-competition’ 
rhetoric it exposes. While in long-distance markets Batelco is no longer the dominant 
player and competition seems to have some vigour, liberalisation has yet to fully take 
hold in any domestic sector, with mobile services so far showing the most significant 
results, though the entry of a third operator could stimulate even greater benefits. The 
review panel also noted that for liberalisation to create a vibrant telecommunications 
environment, there are two ‘strategic issues’ that need to be settled. One is that it is still 
rather vague where the authority for spectrum management rests in regard to allowing 
new competitors to participate in the market (Cave et al. 2005, p. 9). The panel 
concluded that prolonged wait times in allocating frequencies for new competitors to 
use discourages companies from pursing entry into the market, and that a definite 
schedule should be implemented for this process. The other strategic issue is the 
Kingdom needs to substantially increase its broadband capacities and related services in 
order for the banking, financial and other tertiary sectors o f the economy to fully realize 
the potential o f the Internet in enhancing their growth (Cave et al. 2005, pp. 9-10). 
While the TRA’s Work Plan 2007-2009 makes note o f issues concerning spectrum 
management, details on how these issues are to be addressed is still lacking, and thus 
one must question the likelihood that these issues will be resolved under the Work Plan.
Highlighting the need for the expanded telecommunications services in the banking 
sector, a 2007 report by the OBG noted Bahrain’s banks are facing increasing 
competitive challenges for other GCC states, notably Dubai and Qatar, which are 
quickly expanding their of financial capacities {Banking on Success 2007, p.3). The 
same report noted that ‘Yousef al-Essa, CEO of Addax Investment Bank, recently told 
OBG that Bahrain needs to address these challenges. He cautioned that Bahrain risks 
losing business to Dubai and other cities in the region, citing the recent decisions by 
Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and Carlyle to base their regional operations in 
Dubai’.
Despite concerns regarding Bahrain’s telecommunications market, it has also been seen 
as an attractive prospect for investors, as the TRA has issued some 117 licences in 12 
categories in the past three years {Licensing 2007, pp. 1-19), though most o f these are
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currently inactive. As options to Batelco’s service would be well received by companies 
across the economy, new players are beginning to develop strategies to be able to 
operate under Batelco’s oppressive market power -  ‘There are still a range o f options 
for service provisions; new entrants can target big corporate clients by sector or location 
to find opportunities... Having read the writing on the wall, Batelco is chalking out its 
long term strategies to face the possible loss o f market share’ (Dial Tones at the Ready 
2006, p. 165). A report by the Oxford Business Groups (OBG) outlines how Batelco is 
expanding operations regionally using a subsidiary called Batelco ME [Middle East] 
{Dial Tones at the Ready 2006, p. 165). Created in 1998, Batelco ME has thus far 
established joint ventures for Internet provision in Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt. While 
Batelco’s 2006 revenue from foreign operations amounted to 10 per cent o f gross 
income, the OBG notes the company is planning boost this to 30 per cent by 2009 
through acquiring new licences and companies abroad. Whether Batelco will be able to 
accomplish this goal is still not clear -  though a dominant player in the Bahrain Market, 
Batelco is relatively small in terms of the telecommunications industry globally and a 
study by Yale Braunstein, Meheroo Jussawalla and Stephen Morris points out the 
difficulties smaller telecommunications companies encounter when trying to expand 
beyond their domestic markets:
Smaller corporations are at a disadvantage in the move to globalization for 
several reasons. The existing international telecommunications alliances have 
been created by some o f the world’s largest carriers, and they have exhibited a 
preference for dealing with others o f a similar nature. There is a Teaming curve’ 
when it comes to entering new markets internationally, and often the 
investments needed are quite large (Braunstein et al. 1999, p. 15).
At the same time however, Braunstein, Jussawalla and Morris also note that expanding 
to capture a major portion o f a regional market is strategically important for smaller 
telecommunications companies to remain competitive (Braunstein et al. 1999, p. 20).
Conclusion
With the promulgating o f the Telecommunications Law, the Telecommunications Plan 
the creation of the TRA, and the Second National Telecommunications Plan, it would 
appear government intends there to be a liberalised and competitive environment for 
telecommunications in Bahrain. Some six years after the liberalisation process was 
begun however, there would also seem to be a significant disparity between
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government’s ambitions and the effectiveness o f the mechanisms created to see those 
ambitions realized, as a quick overview o f the different telecommunications sectors 
shows. Batelco is effectively the only fixed-line operator in the Kingdom, with an 
almost complete monopoly over services and network infrastructure; the mobile sector, 
which has seen the greatest results from liberalisation, is still not overly competitive as a 
duopoly, and in Internet service provision, while there is growing potential for an open 
market, Batelco still effectively operates as a near monopoly. As the TRA Development 
Review Panel Report outlined, the TRA has largely focused on more technical issues 
such as licensing, while it is apparent that a more useful approach for the purposes o f  
liberalising the market would be for the TRA to begin facilitating some degree of 
competition, ‘...after all, Batelco is overwhelmingly dominant in almost every sector of 
its operations’ (Cave et al. 2005, p. 13).
That the current telecommunications situation is what has evolved in the Kingdom 
should be unsurprising given that the enforcement activity of the TRA, the actions of 
Batelco and the resulting telecommunications environment are analogous with 
discussions, theories and case studies examined earlier in this thesis whereby a weak 
regulatory environment following on from market reform saw incumbent firms use 
strong-arm tactics to assert dominance and crush competition -  to the detriment of 
services development and pricing for consumers.
A more thorough examination o f the opinions of policy makers, industry players and 
consumers regarding the economic privatisation and liberalisation reforms underway in 
the Kingdom, and specifically in regards to the telecommunications environment, will 
further inform this study, and is the subject of the next chapter.
* *  *
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Chapter 8:
Attitudes regarding liberalisation and privatisation 
among policy makers, industry stakeholders and consumers
Introduction
Telecommunications liberalisation in the Kingdom of Bahrain is not an isolated reform 
policy, but part o f a general movement on behalf o f the government to make the 
economy more open and prosperous. King Hamad’s vision has pushed forward many o f  
the reforms, with the cabinet and ministers enacting laws and regulations to further the 
changes. Thus in this Chapter it is important to begin with the views to the heads of 
state regarding the overall reform process to put in context the comments which follow 
regarding telecommunications liberalisation specifically. This chapter will examine the 
opinions o f ministers, government employees, and important players in the industry and 
consumers in Bahrain to develop a perspective that encompasses many o f the facets 
across the spectrum of who is involved in and impacted by the changes in the 
telecommunications environment. This will include the successes o f the current policy, 
its failures, its future potential and suggestions as to how the process can be changed to 
help ensure that potential is fulfilled.
Views of the king, the prime minister and the cabinet
In an interview with the Oxford Business Group, King Hamad and Prime Minister 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, stressed a crucial objective for the long term 
prosperity o f Bahrain was raising the public living standard by creating more jobs 
through higher private sector participation in the economy (Transforming Through 
Reform 2005, p. 18). In this context, the prime minister said there are three challenges 
facing the Kingdom:
First, to create an economic vision for a sustainable future for Bahrain; second, 
for its citizens to have the right education and training processes to equip 
Bahrainis to fill the jobs created from this vision; and third, to have effective 
labour market policies and practices.
The OBG reported that the prime minister regarded it as essential that sustainable 
economic development be driven by the private sector, with government’s role being 
primarily as a ‘facilitator and regulator rather than service provider’. The prime minister
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also outlined that the most significant goals o f opening the market were to increase 
competition and efficiency in the economy and attracting investment from local and 
foreign sources:
The private sector is seen as a true partner with the government in these new 
initiatives which reflect the overall objectives o f the government. With the 
introduction o f the new economic reforms the private sector will bring in new 
cutting edge technologies, business practices, and investment and employment 
opportunities in the Kingdom (Transforming Through Reform 2005, p. 19).
The prime minister also stated that the primary vehicle for government’s reform 
programme to privatise and liberalise the Bahraini economy is the Economic 
Development Board (discussed in Chapter 4). With the aim of spurring greater private 
sector participation, the prime minister pointed out that government has loosened 
market regulations and has, to varying degrees, taken steps towards the privatisation and 
liberalisation o f a number of sectors, including telecommunications, higher education, 
health services, public transport, municipal waste collection and power and water 
generation.
While the prime minister has made broad public statements concerning the intention of 
the government to further a market based economy in Bahrain, the realities of 
implementing this vision have met with cautious support from many within the 
government. Among leading officials interviewed as part o f this research there was 
clearly an awareness o f the difficulties that may result from rapidly pursuing a more 
open market based policy. According to Sheikh Khalid bin Abdullah al-Khalifa, 
Minister for the Prime Minister’s Cabinet1, interviewed in October 2004;
[The] government still needs to have a clear vision and strategy for the 
privatisation programme... I totally agree that we should have independent 
institutions with clear strategies and implementation plans -  there is a need for 
higher involvement of the private sector in the economic development, because 
the government can’t continue in the role o f provider... [We’ll also] have to start 
considering imposing income tax laws to support the government’s budget in 
order to continue to invest in capital projects.
He added that prior to holding a ministerial meeting to discuss the privatisation 
strategies, it would be meaningful to study the experiences o f other countries with the
1 Ministers o f the Prime Minister’s Cabinet in Bahrain need not always have a specified ministerial 
portfolio over which they have authority and are general cabinet ministers.
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idea of adopting from them their best practices, especially in regard to the issues that 
match Bahrain’s culture and best suit its needs. Comments from Cabinet Minister 
Mohammed al-Mutawa, interviewed in January 2005, parallel the views expressed by 
Sheikh Khalid bin Abdullah al Khalifa. Referring to Bahrain’s entry into WTO and 
FTA arrangement with the US, he stated that:
Monopoly affects the development o f services, especially telecom, which is an 
important sector in the economy. That’s why we joined the WTO and signed the 
Free Trade Agreement with the US, in order to open the telecom market and 
[establish] Bahrain as a regional IT centre. Thus [we should] open all borders to 
enable international free trade practices in the country by inviting private sector 
to participate in the economy’s development. The main aim behind all these 
changes is to diversify the economy.
With regards to the government’s marketing efforts for liberalisation, Mr. al-Mutawa 
was in favour the EDB being an independent entity equipped and empowerment to lead 
the liberalisation drive. As for the MPs’ role, he was o f the view that parliament 
shouldn’t be more than a monitor of government’s performance and legislation, as 
outlined in the constitution. Mr. al-Mutawa remarked that government should continue 
to invest in the public sector to raise its performance and productivity level to be 
comparable and competitive with that of the private sector. In liberalising and 
privatising the economy, he also thought it necessary that government maintains due 
diligence regarding its revenues and expenditures, entailing that government retains 
sizable share-portions in its divested companies and explores the possibility o f  
implementing some form of tax collection. Mr. al-Mutawa added:
In the telecom sector a well defined national plan is needed to supplement our 
information and communication technology as a tool for income generation. A 
year after liberalisation o f the telecom market, we noticed as a direct result the 
competition changes in the prices and improvement in the customer services. 
That’s considered the first harvest o f the TRA. I totally agree that in order for 
privatisation and liberalisation [to succeed], a sound government policy for 
economic growth is needed. To be successful it requires a setup o f a well 
defined strategy implemented by an entity independent from the government.
Two other ministers2 interviewed who were instrumental in the government’s early 
stages o f formulating a privatisation strategy expressed similar views. One o f them was 
then Minister o f State Abdul Nabi al-Shoala, (interviewed in October 2004), who also is
2 While Abdul Nabi al-Shoala and Saleh Ali Saleh were both cabinet ministers when these interviews 
were conducted in 2004, both have since departed their posts and been replaced.
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an entrepreneur. In his view privatisation is a psychological phenomenon that aims at 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness o f governmental bodies so as to approach 
those o f the private sector. He believes that the government has to put more effort into 
research and development which, as the basis for economic growth, can be introduced 
by liberalising government procedures and regulations. Mr. al-Shoala also supported the 
idea o f the sale o f government shares to private companies in order to employ the 
revenue generated to create more job opportunities elsewhere. His conclusion on the 
socio-economic impacts o f liberalisation was that ‘...it supports the labour market and 
improves performance’. To complement the liberalisation of the telecommunications 
sector, Mr. al-Shoala stated that the government must set its e-govemment strategy so 
that all services are diverted to the private sector. Saleh Ali Saleh, the Minister of 
Commerce at the time o f his interview in November 2004, also noted his support for 
government’s liberalisation strategies:
Privatisation plays a great role in economic development. While the government 
supports the private sector involvement in the economy to the benefit o f the 
society, the private sector has responsibilities towards the society. The missing 
link is the government has to have income in order to spend and so there should 
be a system of taxation on profits generated and licence fees.
However, unlike other ministers who agreed with government’s approach to the 
liberalisation strategies, he was not quite in agreement with the way the policy was 
being implemented. Mr. Saleh stated:
We as a government don’t have a clear strategy. We need to look into other 
countries experiences and implement only those related to us and also focus on 
improving the rules and regulations...Government should be a controller and 
regulator with a well planed privatisation programme which could include 
introducing direct or indirect taxation in the future. The government should 
concentrate on ensuring just and transparent implementation o f these laws.
Mr. Saleh’s remark about ‘just and transparent’ laws is significant, as he likely 
anticipated a scenario wherein political factors could affect the transparency o f  
implementation strategies. This assumes relevance in the backdrop o f doubts raised in 
the Bahraini press about the lack o f transparency in MTC-Vodafone being selected as a 
second operator, as well as questions raised in the press about the so called 
‘independence’ enjoyed by the TRA. Among the events that raised these issues to 
salience was, in its deliberations regarding the awarding o f the second mobile license,
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the government’s own Financial and Economic and Financial Affairs Committee had 
recommended that the winning bidder be required to offer up 60 per cent o f its shares 
for sale to Bahraini nationals and that the Bahrainisation minimum for employees be set 
at 80 per cent. Within a week o f these recommendations being issued however, the TRA 
awarded the license to MTC-Vodafone without observing these two conditions, with 
both the committee that made the recommendations and the wider government 
authorities remaining silent and refraining from launching any investigation into 
allegations that officials involved in awarding the tender had been bribed (Shreef 2004). 
Such allegations need to be addressed as transparency and confidence in the even- 
handedness o f governments institutions will likely be significant factor in creating a 
competitive telecommunications market. Mr. Saleh also noted the following:
After the era o f industrial revolution, now comes the age o f information and 
communication technology where nations advance by effectively utilising them. 
Bahrain is a service providing country; we have to improve its standards to 
create a distinguished information service centre, looking at Ireland as an 
example. We should have the long term vision to open the market and develop 
competition... In the telecom market, the role o f the TRA is to encourage and 
create competition, not demolition, taking into consideration that almost all 
sectors rely heavily on the telecom sector. The service has to be o f exceptional 
quality and should provide a platform for e-commerce aimed at achieving 
improved economic efficiency.
In the view o f this former minister o f commerce, the socio-economic impact o f 
liberalising the telecommunications industry is in creating a well-trained, versatile 
workforce capable o f dealing with advancements in technology. In noting Ireland’s 
example, Mr. Saleh pointed out the usefulness in setting up an independent Ministry for 
Information and Communication, separate from the present Central Statistics 
Organisation (CSO), to develop a national ICT strategy and implementation agenda. 
The comments made by both former ministers appear to be much more specific with 
regards to the weaknesses o f the government in its liberalisation drive. While current 
and former ministers supported the intention o f the government to liberalise, the 
message is clear: transparency and a willingness to learn from the experience o f other 
countries are some of the critical determinants in the success o f the privatisation and 
liberalisation strategy.
Views of members of Parliament
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As observed in Chapter 4, in 2002 the Kingdom of Bahrain adopted a parliamentary 
system of government through elections as part o f the country’s modernisation 
programme. Spear headed by King Hamad’s objective o f giving citizens a role in the 
administration o f their country and to ensure transparency in the government’s 
administrative practices, parliament was given general powers through the constitution. 
It is now therefore meaningful to seek the views of members o f parliament. Among 
those who were interviewed was Khalifa al-Dhahrani, President o f the Parliament , who 
stated during an interview on December 19, 2004 that:
As a parliament, we must review and change the regulations to aid economic 
liberalisation and make Bahrain a major investment and business centre. We 
believe in having more involvement o f the private sector, in the economic 
development and the liberalisation efforts. Privatisation helps ease the fiscal 
burden and creates more job opportunities... Privatisation should be extended to 
cover all government owned entities, with the telecom sector liberalisation being 
a good example in this context.
The author, on the recommendation of the president o f the parliament also selected three 
parliamentarians to be interviewed. The MPs noted their support for market 
liberalisation; however, all o f them were o f the view that the role o f the government 
should be limited to that of regulator. When asked about their role in the privatisation 
programme, they stated that they have so far not heard anything about a vision or plan 
for the parliament regarding the privatisation programme, though they were in favour of 
government share holdings through holding companies listed on the stock exchange and 
added that the revenue o f such companies should be directed to the needs o f the less- 
privileged in the Kingdom.
When asked about the perception of their role in privatisation and economic 
development, none of the MPs gave a meaningful response. A search o f the proceedings 
of parliamentary sessions since its inception in 2002 shows no evidence o f a motion 
seeking government’s strategic vision for its privatisation moves. The records also show 
that the majority o f the issues tabled were social concerns with relatively little 
significance regarding fiscal policy or structural reform. For instance in 2005 Parliament 
wanted to force garment shops to stop displaying mannequins, claiming that it distracts
3 In Bahrain the president o f the parliament’s role is much the same as that o f the speaker in the English 
parliament.
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the minds o f young males in Bahrain. There have also been many ‘letters to editor’ 
published in the press criticizing the behaviour adopted by the parliament.
The members o f parliament were o f the view that, in respect to the role o f the private 
sector in the development o f the economy, preference must be given to Bahraini 
nationals and they have not witnessed much interaction in this regard between 
government and private sector. The MPs also supported the initiation o f a separate 
ministry for privatisation, whose responsibility could be to formulate the strategies and 
visions for privatisation of the public sector’s investments. The government, according 
to the MPs interviewed for this thesis, must make the private sector a partner in progress 
rather than simply a means to an end in economic development. Views of the MPs 
regarding Bahrain’s WTO commitments were quite positive, in which they generally 
expressed a belief that such trade deals would help to speed up liberalising the 
economy. In specific regard to the telecommunications market, the MPs seemed upbeat 
about its affects on the economy and society, noting that it could create more 
employment.
In this regard one must look at the example of MTC-Vodafone which committed itself 
publicly to composing its workforce o f a least 75 per cent Bahraini nationals, pledging 
US$2-million to train and educate locals for employment at the company, while actually 
achieving a 83 per cent Bahrainisation in its 208-person staff by the time the company 
began operations {History o f Mobile Telecommunications Company 2004). MTC- 
Vodafone also claims that its extensive use o f local suppliers and contractors will 
support ‘secondary and tertiary employment’. The MPs however remarked that despite 
MTC-Vodafone’s entry as the second mobile operator, effectively monopoly still exists. 
In their opinion, the government should have definite policies regarding privatisation 
and liberalisation so as to avoid substituting monopoly with duopoly.
Views of senior government servants
Mumtaz F. al-Ada, advisor at the Ministry o f Statistics, was interviewed in August 2005 
and made the following comments regarding the Bahrain government’s privatisation 
initiatives:
To implement privatisation programmes, we have to look at other countries
experiences, especially the US’. Privatisation in the Gulf countries revolves
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around national unity with a mix of political, social and economic 
considerations. To begin with, the government should separate finance from 
economy, because privatisation is an economic process by itself and not to be 
run by finance ministry.
Here Mr. al-Ada was referring to the previous scenario (until 2004) wherein there 
existed a ministry which combined the economy and finances of the country under the 
label o f Ministry o f Finance & National Economy. The point made by the advisor is 
pertinent since the Ministry acted as a central agency for collecting government revenue 
from all other ministries and practiced a centralised system of payment using a 
budgetary control method. The Ministry functioned solely as a finance ministry and 
little or no work was carried out for economic development. However, King Hamad, as 
part o f his liberalisation moves, detached the economic developmental activity from the 
above Ministry and assigned the role to the EDB.
Mr. al-Ada continued with these comments:
There should be emphasise placed on the private sector’s involvement in the 
preparation process o f the government’s national economic development plan. 
To be able to reach the ultimate goal intended from the privatisation, the country 
has to have social stability. The promotion and marketing o f the privatisation 
programmes should be done properly to deliver the overall objectives (interview 
August 2005).
When asked about the liberalisation o f telecommunications market, he stressed that 
there should be a well designed and reliable e-govemment system to create an 
information technology platform to support the economy and facilitate investor entry 
into the market. For a legal perspective, Salman Seyadi, the director general o f Legal 
Affairs, was also interviewed in August 2005:
Legal Affairs has issued the privatisation law, the Telecom Law and the 
National Telecommunications Plan in coordination with the concerned parties. 
The laws are advanced and comprehensive and include social considerations 
with regards to protecting the employees affected by the implementation o f these 
laws. The laws also defined the regulations concerning the selling o f  
government owned shares, de-monopolisation competition and creation o f an 
independent body to regulate the market.
A legal framework o f the nature described by the director general gives the society the 
assurance of security when they do business with companies. However, in terms o f the 
effectiveness o f the privatisation moves, including telecommunications liberalisation,
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no situation has arisen whereby the legality was challenged. Thus, this aspect has so far 
had no direct impact on telecommunications liberalisation.
Views of stakeholders
No amount o f research would add value to this thesis unless the views o f the 
stakeholders in the telecommunications system were taken into consideration. To 
ascertain the extent to which stake holders view the opening of the telecommunications 
market as a boost to economic development in the Kingdom, the research focused on 
three main sources o f data:
• Meetings and interviews with the concerned stakeholders.
• A survey conducted by the Bahrain Centre for Studies and Research.
• Data collected from other sources such as interviews with newspapers,
journals and economic magazines.
A good majority o f stakeholders expressed optimism regarding telecommunications 
liberalisation and its expected outcomes -  i.e. everyone seemed hopeful there will be 
more competition and a greater variety o f services for users. Operators noted how 
following from liberalisation mobile services grew rapidly, and while confident the 
same would happen in Internet service provision they also agreed the future penetration 
rate o f the fixed telephone service would slow down. The impact o f liberalisation is 
reflected in a report commissioned by MTC entitled ‘How mobile telecommunications 
in the MENA4 region are creating jobs and improving everyday life 2006 \  where it 
noted that five per cent o f Bahrain’s increase in GDP between 2002 and 2004 came 
from mobile telecommunications revenues. In response to the report, Dr. Saad Al 
Barrak, chief executive officer o f the MTC Group, is quoted as saying:
The report shows the potential of mobile communications to enhance not only 
the economic potential o f countries and people but also to change the social 
fabric of our communities. At MTC, we have always believed that mobile 
communications are part o f the framework o f societies and the daily lives o f  
people and this report attests to that fact {How mobile telecommunications in the 
MENA region are creating jobs and improving everyday life 2006).
4 MENA -  Middle East and North Africa
193
Dr. Mohammed al-Ghatam, chair o f the TRA’s board o f directors, at the launch of the 
Bahrain Telecommunications Market in July 2004 stated that:
Liberalising the [telecommunications] market is one o f the most important 
accomplishments in Bahrain’s recent history, as the first country in the region 
fully liberalised for all investors to operate their services in a healthy 
environment with competition and transparency (Al Ayam News 2004, July 1, p. 
12).
Also speaking at the opening o f the Bahrain Telecommunications Market was Andreas 
Avgousti, the general director o f the TRA at the time who noted the economic benefits 
of liberalisation included increased FDI, technological advancement in the quality of 
services and imbuing the local workforce with the skills to participate in the modem 
economy. With the banking and tertiary sectors demanding state-of-the-art 
telecommunications services to grow their businesses, Mr. Avgousti noted the TRA’s 
responsibility to shape a competitive market able to provide these services, and to that 
end had established '...a highly developed regulatory environment that is in line with 
international standards emphasizing on transparent processes and procedures,' 
(Liberalising Climate 2005, p. 149). With respect to the TRA’s interactions with 
Batelco, Mr. Avgousti remarked:
We deal with them, as well as other operators as required by law. For other 
service providers Batelco provide us with their retail prices, we then cross check 
them with other compatible services in other countries. New entrants will 
approach Batelco for the specified service and should they disagree on price, the 
TRA intervenes to set up the final price (Liberalising Climate 2005, p. 149).
Mr. Avgousti commented that the entry o f a third mobile operator should be decided by 
the market, with ‘spectrum availability’ being the major issue. The TRA Development 
Review Panel noted much the same in their 2005 report: ‘The crucial factor in this case 
is that spectrum availability -  i.e. the allocation o f ‘space’ through which operators can 
deliver services over a wireless network...’ all o f which is dependent on Batelco to 
deliver these opportunities through a fair and non-discriminatory process, and on time, 
which, as the review panel notes: ‘this is our chief point’ (Cave et al. 2005, pp. 7-8). Mr. 
Avgousti’s response to the review panel’s comments was:
The TRA, with the Transportation Ministry, are in the process o f formulating 
their final policy on all telecom spectrum related issues... As with all TRA
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decisions, we will carry out a consultation on the proposals and in due course 
announce the final spectrum policy to the public as soon as the decision is made 
(Bahrain imposes "temporary" Wifi licenses 2005).
However since Mr. Avgousti’s comment in September 2005, there is still yet to be any 
TRA decision announced as to final spectrum policy, leaving Batelco with monopolistic 
control over spectrum availability and thus the leverage to effectively exclude 
competition from the market. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, one 
possible method to hobble Batelco’s ability to flex its market dominance may be the 
establishment o f an independent holding company to take ownership o f Batelco’s 
telecommunications infrastructure networks and the authority to rent, or otherwise make 
available, spectrum to competitors. This would solve the problem the TRA review panel 
raised in their 2005 report concerning the vagueness over where responsibility for 
spectrum availability lies, and Batelco could no longer indefinitely delay the entry o f  
competitors. Allowing the current situation to continue would put at risk the future 
socio-economic prospects of the Kingdom and therefore should not be among the 
acceptable options.
Batelco has not been completely quiet regarding the spectrum issue as in December 
2005 the company announced with much grandeur a 50 per cent cut in the cost o f  
broadband services for a select category o f businesses. In a press statement Batelco’s 
senior manager for voice and data product marketing, Adel Daylami, remarked that the 
new package was ‘designed for single-user’ businesses, and the ‘ideal choice for a small 
enterprise where only one person uses the service’. He added that:
The reduced prices aim to transform the company’s competitiveness, and to 
continually deliver better customer experience. Batelco aims to stay ahead o f the 
competition in this market and has earmarked an investment o f BD21-million 
(US$57-million) over the next three to five years towards their Broadband 
Bahrain initiative, which will provide faster and more affordable internet not 
only for businesses but residential customers as well (Batelco slashes broadband 
business tariffs up to 50 per cent 2005).
It remains vague which companies constitute the ‘competition’ referred to in this
statement however, as Batelco has not allocated spectrum to any rivals, and thus
maintains its position o f sole service provider. What could be more likely is their
announcement is a type o f pre-emptive pricing strategy which would further discourage
any competitors from seeking entry into the market. As the independent regulatory
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body, it would seem the TRA should be involving itself in these matters, and if  it is not, 
questions regarding the TRA’s independence and integrity should be asked. The 
interview with the former Commerce Minister Saleh Ali Saleh mentioned earlier in this 
chapter brought up these same issues, which have also been raised in the press, casting 
doubt on the actual ‘independence’ the TRA operates under. However, Mr. Avgousti, 
the Director General of TRA commented that:
We have also faced problems getting the consumers, whether government, 
business or individuals, to understand the role o f the body, how it is different, 
and that the body is totally independent. It does not answer to parliament, and it 
does not answer to the government or the prime minister. It does, however, 
answer to the general public because everybody is a customer and they are 
entitled to come and complain if  they aren’t happy about something 
(Liberalising Climate 2005, p. 149).
As long as Batelco owns the infrastructure and retains authority over making spectrum 
available -  thus deciding if  and when competitors can enter the market -  the benefits o f 
competition will remain elusive to the Bahraini customer. The TRA seems unwilling to 
effectively intervene, and it could be suggested the current scenario results from the 
absence of a well thought out liberalisation strategy from the policy makers in the 
National Telecommunications Plan. It also appears that with the growing dissatisfaction 
among some of the stakeholders regarding TRA’s lack o f independence, Batelco’s 
monopolistic practices could cast a shadow over the liberalisation policies o f the 
government. The author’s interview with Saleh Tarradah, general manager information 
systems at Batelco, revealed the company's view on this issue:
The opening o f the market was fast just to break the monopoly o f Batelco... 
Batelco deals with the TRA as a regulator, as per the law. We provide wholesale 
prices to the TRA and the TRA in turn imposes its own prices on all operators. 
TRA did not give sufficient time for Batelco to study the impact o f the new 
service competition, and as a result [Batelco] was forced to establish a new 
department related with whole sale just to satisfy the requirements o f the TRA 
and be able to respond within the time frame allocated. This new department 
also deals with the Bahrain Internet Exchange.
In Tarradah’s view, the National Plan was little more than an implementation strategy 
with target dates and did not incorporate any visionary aspects as to how the future 
telecommunications industry in the country should look or its impacts on other sectors
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of the economy. Responding to the question related to the company’s satisfaction with 
the current competitive environment in Bahrain, Mr. Tarradah replied that:
Long before the introduction o f market liberalisation policies the company has 
developed internationalisation strategies that have helped it to enter into 
international markets by forming new subsidiaries for operating in other 
countries.
Dr. Marwan al Ahmadi, CEO of MTC-Vodafone at the time o f his interview in 
December 20055, said the TRA appears to be managing reasonably well with the legal 
aspects o f government’s liberalisation initiative and is considered the best regulator 
among GCC, though he indicated the TRA is soft pedalling with certain operators in 
stating:
The TRA should minimize the regulations governing the operators and instead 
concentrate on tackling issues related to competition and be stricter when 
dealing with the operators. The TRA should focus more in meeting the end user 
needs which calls for a shift in its current trend o f acting as a mediator. The 
Kingdom should offer more resources for all operators in order to facilitate their 
operations, and should have clear vision for opening the telecom market. 
Bahrain being a small country, the TRA should own the infrastructure and make 
it available to the new entrants by way o f leasing or other means. Such a 
provision could result in elimination o f Batelco’s monopoly and better services 
for the consumers arising from a competitive telecom market. Such a change 
will be welcomed by the industry and would accelerate FDI flows into the 
country, resulting in accelerating the economic growth of the country.
Fixed-line service
Both mobile operators grasp the complexities o f the telecommunications market, 
including the penetration rate and distribution o f services, both noting fixed telephone 
services are nearly saturated in the profit-making area. Mr. Tarradah o f Batelco stressed 
that they have penetrated the fixed lines market almost fully and only the new 
construction developments may require new entrants. [As will be noted later in this 
Chapter however, only two-thirds o f Bahrainis have access to fixed-line telephones in 
their households]. Mr. al Ahmadi of MTC-Vodafone stated that through utilising the 
mobile network capabilities, they could also become competitors in the fixed-lined 
market.
5 Dr. al-Ahmadi left this post in November 2006 when Khalid Al Farkh became the current CEO of MTC- 
Vodafone Bahrain.
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However no company other than Batelco has o f yet ventured far into the field o f fixed- 
line service, despite national telecommunication plan clearly indicating the market be 
fully liberalised by 2004. This is likely due to the heavy start-up investment 
requirements for new entrants, the low volume o f business and the subsequent long pay 
back period. However former the TRA general director, Mr. Avgousti, contends that the 
authority is setting the groundwork for new entrants to place a network parallel to, or 
operate through, Batelco’s.
Customer views on liberalisation of the mobile telecommunications market.
While the government and business leaders may support the theory o f liberalisation as a 
means to provide a more efficient telecommunications service, the extent to which 
theory operates in practice needs to be evaluated in the context o f consumer opinion. 
This can only be ascertained by a survey of a representative sample of consumers within 
Bahrain. There are two surveys o f note that have been conducted regarding the 
telecommunications market in Bahrain in recent years. Perhaps the first independent and 
thorough review of telecommunications in Bahrain was undertaken by the Bahrain 
Centre for Studies and Research (BCSR) in 2004, while in 2007 the Nielsen Company 
released a second study, commissioned by the TRA, which examined 
telecommunications usage in the Kingdom through customer surveys. These are the 
data which will be primarily used in this study to evaluate consumer attitudes 
concerning the extent to which liberalisation may have improved services, and they will 
be examined sequentially below:
The BCSR survey
The BCSR conducted a study in 2004 entitled The Economic Impact o f Liberalizing the 
Telecommunications Market in the Kingdom o f  Bahrain, in which a random sample o f 
550 individual mobile phone users of different age, social status and economic strata 
were selected. The study did not indicate a margin or percent o f error. The fixed phone 
users were not included in the survey because, though fixed-line service were also 
officially liberalised, no alternative operator came forward to offer fixed-line 
services. The sample included users of both Batelco (84.2 per cent) and MTC-Vodafone 
-  now called Zain -  (15.8 per cent). Since a customer’s nature o f employment impacts 
on their call duration, the type o f connection and expenditure on mobile phones, the
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survey accounted for the following occupational groups with their percentage 
composition shown in brackets:
• Employee or worker (61.8 per cent) -  74.7 per cent o f the working class 
mobile phone users belonged to the government sector while the financial 
sector represented only 4.2 per cent. The rest belonged to the services, oil 
and gas, manufacturing industries, and construction sectors.
• Department Manager or senior staff (6.2 per cent).
• Entrepreneur or businessman (5.3 per cent).
• Student (21.3 per cent).
• Unemployed, retired or housewife (5.5 per cent).
The field survey showed that 47.6 per cent o f the sample used their mobile phone for 
private use, while 52.4 per cent used their mobile as an aspect o f their employment, 
business and service dealings. Out o f this 52.4 percent, 26.7 per cent used it for business 
dealings very little, 11.1 per cent medium use, 9.3 per cent frequent use, and 5.3 per 
cent more frequently. Private mobile phone users were also noted to use their mobiles 
for other purposes, such as administrative purposes and other services, though the extent 
of usage in this respect varies from one individual to another. The BCSR stated in the 
survey that the various characteristics o f the sample are representative o f all the 
demographic groups studied. The following tables have been put together by this author 
from the findings o f the BCSR survey in order to present a summary o f the customer 
views. Comments associated with each table, corresponding by number, can be found in 
the list following the tables:
Table 8:1 Quality of service
Interview question Yes No Undecided
Any improvement in mobile 
phone service noticed?
69.5% 21.8% 8.7%
Table 8:2 Quality of service -  to what extent improvement is noticed?
Interview question Very big Big Medium Poor
Extent o f improvement in 
service noticed:
52.6% 31.2% 3.1% 13.1%
Table 8:3 Any decrease in the cost of mobile phone calls during 2004?
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Interview question Yes No drop 
noticed
Reduction in cost of mobile phone calls 
during 2004 noticed:
59.6% 40.4%
Table 8:4 Extent of decrease in the cost of mobile phone calls during 2004
Interview question Substantial Medium Small
Extent to which the cost has decreased: 7.9% 49.7% 42..4%
Table 8:5 Increase/drop in the average number of mobile phone calls during
2004
Interview question Increase Drop No
change
Increase/decrease in number o f mobile 
calls:
55.1% 7.1% 37.8%
Table 8:6 Extent of the increase in monthly mobile phone calls during 2004
Interview question Large Medium Small
Increase in number o f mobile calls: 48.5% 41.6% 9.9%
Table 8:7 Changes in average monthly expenditure on mobile phone calls
during 2004, as indicated by customers
Interview question Large/very
large
increase
No
change
Decreased
Increase/decrease in average monthly 
mobile calls during 2004:
45.5% 40.9% 13.6%
Table 8:8 Benefits accruing to business as a result of mobile phone during
2004 -feedback from businessmen and staff
Interview question Saving in 
time
Gaining
new
customer
Increase in 
productivity
Boost to 
sales
Impact o f mobile phone 
liberalisation on economy
41% 36% 16.4% 6.6%
Table 8:9 Customer support for telecommunications liberalisation
Interview question Supportive
of
liberalization
Liberalisation 
has negative 
effects
Liberalization 
has no effect
Unsure 
o f the 
outcome
Supportive of telecom 
liberalisation?
75.6% 4%% 9.71% 6.6%
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The results shown in the tables above are analysed below to gamer a more complete 
picture as to what the impacts o f telecommunications liberalisation in Bahrain are, with 
the following derivations apparent from the BCSR survey results:
8:1 - Majority o f the customers (seventy per cent) stated that the quality o f mobile 
phone service has improved which is a sign that the telecommunications 
liberalisation did result in better customer service to some degree.
8:2 - In analysing the extent to which improvement has taken place it was found that 
of eighty-four per cent of the seventy per cent who commented services had 
improved also felt that there was a significant improvement in service. This again 
gives credence to the finding that there was noticeable improvement in services.
8:3 - Sixty per cent o f respondents felt that the cost o f mobile calls has come down 
during 2004. Looking at the cost aspect, it appears that liberalisation has also 
resulted in some amount o f reduction in cost. It could be viewed that sixty per cent, 
as a start, is encouraging and in favour o f the concept o f liberalisation.
8:4 - However, 49.7 per cent of the respondents felt that mobile phone cost 
reduction was medium while forty-two per cent felt it was small. While trying to 
assess the extent o f cost reduction, the study shows that there was no major 
reduction in costs. This finding could be an area that requires more exploration for 
the policy makers as to why liberalisation has not resulted in any substantial 
reduction in costs. Pricing structure o f the operators and TRA’s role in determining 
the prices could be areas for further fact finding and more research is required to 
arrive at a proper conclusion.
8:5 -  Fifty-five per cent felt that the number of calls have gone up while thirty-eight 
per cent felt that there was no change. One reason for this could be the entry o f the 
additional operator has prompted many customers who are already Batelco 
subscribers to also go for an additional mobile number with MTC-Vodafone. In 
addition, many new customers would have been attracted to the aggressive 
marketing strategies o f MTC-Vodafone. Some o f their strategies included the sale o f  
laptops at reduced prices on an instalment basis to those who registered for new 
numbers.
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8:6 - With regards to the number o f calls made, 48.5 per cent felt that the number of 
calls have increased to a large extent while 41.5 per cent felt only a medium increase 
and ten per cent stated only a small increase. Combining ‘large’ and ‘medium’ in 
this finding, ninety per cent have noticed medium or above medium increase in 
calls, which could be taken as a positive sign in relation to the liberalisation 
scenario.
8:7 - For the average monthly expenditure on mobile calls during 2004, 45.5 per 
cent felt there was a large increase, forty-one per cent did not observe any change 
and 13.6 per cent felt there had been a decrease. This response may be related to the 
finding in 8:4 above, showing 49.7 per cent felt there was a decrease in cost o f 
mobile calls (medium reduction), as it is possible that even a relatively medium to 
small reduction in rates (due to competition in the liberalised market) could result in 
a substantial increase in mobile call expenditure.
8:8 - As far as business benefits are concerned forty-one per cent felt that there has 
been savings in time, thirty-six per cent felt it aided in gaining new customers and
16.4 per cent felt an increase in productivity. It appears that businesses gained in a 
number o f ways from the telecommunications liberalisation.
8:9 - Of the total 550 customers interviewed, approximately seventy-six per cent 
were supportive o f liberalisation, ten per cent felt that it has had no effect, and only
4.4 per cent said it has negative effects with 6.6 per cent undecided. This finding 
shows that the majority o f customers hold the telecommunications liberalisation 
process in a positive regard thus far.
Evaluating mobile services according to the user type -  business or personal 
While personal use o f a mobile phone is generally considered consumption, use of 
mobile phones for business is usually noted as a business expense, or factor o f  
production. This differentiation required the author to distinguish between the two in the 
evaluating the economic affects o f the telecommunications market liberalisation and the 
reaction towards it and following three observations resulted: Firstly, the results o f the 
field survey indicated mobile phone users in business firms saw more improvement in 
the services offered by telecommunications companies -  78 per cent of business users 
confirmed an improvement in services compared to 69.6 per cent of private users. It 
could be interpreted that the firms using mobile phones as a factor o f production are
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more acutely aware o f the quality o f service in their business model, and thus are able to 
distinguish improvements in service quickly.
This leads into the second observation, namely that business users accounted for 68.6 
per cent o f those who commented on a drop in prices compared with 59.2 per cent who 
used mobile phones for personal use. Again, as business users likely monitor their costs 
of production closely, they would also tend to notice more the changes in price for 
telecommunications services. Finally, the results o f the field survey further demonstrate 
that business users o f mobile phones are more enthusiastic towards telecommunication 
liberalisation, with 81.9 per cent seeing liberalisation in a positive light, compared to 
75.3 per cent among those who used mobiles for private purposes.
The Nielsen Company survey
In May 2007 the TRA commissioned Nielsen to undertake a market research study 
aimed at obtaining detailed knowledge o f the behaviour of the different customer groups 
in Bahrain, which, broadly speaking, was divided into residential users and 
corporate/business users. [While selections o f the results o f both the residential and 
business customer surveys are discussed below, the emphasis o f the discussion is 
overwhelming on the residential users. This is due to the fact that the sample size for the 
residential module -  1052 persons interviewed -  was deemed by this author to offer 
results endowed with a good deal of statistical value. However the sample size for the 
business survey -  159 interviews -  was deemed by this author to be a rather small. Thus 
while the results gleaned from the business survey may offer points o f interest worth 
examining further, there should be caution taken in placing too much weight in the 
survey results as they stand by themselves.] The study did not indicate margins o f error 
in its results. Responses to the survey questions were gathered from respondents 
through face-to-face interviews. The various topics covered in the survey were fixed- 
line usage, mobile usage, long-distance calling, internet/broadband usage, as well as 
public awareness o f the TRA.
Figure 8:1 Nielsen residential survey demographic makeup
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Socio-economic class (SEC) o f the interviewees was determined on the basis o f  
professional occupation and the income associated with such, with the general 
parameters o f each SEC class outlined below:
• SEC “A” -  Owners, CEOs and senior management of large companies and 
senior government officials.
• SEC “B” -  Airline pilots, physicians, lawyers, judges, university professors, 
senior accountants, etc.
• SEC “C l” -  Teachers, junior scientists, aircraft mechanics, legislative assistants, 
managers of medium-sized businesses (five-10 employees), etc.
• SEC “C2” -  Bank cashiers, typists, clerks, shop-keepers, self-employed artisans 
(carpenters, plumbers, electricians, etc.) non-commissioned officers, nurses, etc.
• SEC “D” -  Policemen, soldiers, firemen, drivers, fishermen, cooks, waiters, 
artisans working for others, barbers, etc.
• SEC “E” -  Watchmen and night guards, street vendors, unskilled labourers, 
servants/maids, etc.
Fixed-line usage
Figure 8:2 Residential fixed-line penetration -  2007
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As noted in Figure 8:2 above, the Nielsen survey found that about two-thirds of 
Bahraini households have a fixed-line subscription. Among those that did not have a 
fixed-lined connection, the reason the majority (85 per cent) gave for such being the 
case is that they had a mobile phone they could use instead. 11 per cent answered that 
the reason they did not have a fixed-line was due to the prohibitive cost, two per cent 
answered that the building they live in does not offer fixed-line connections and one per 
cent said they have a fixed-line at work, thus do not need one at home as well.
Interestingly, only 30 per cent of those who have a fixed-line actually know what the 
monthly rental charge is, with most under the impression -  wrongly -  that they are 
charged per minute of calling. 20 per cent admit to having no idea how their fixed-line 
bill is calculated.
Figure 8:3 Residential customer fixed-line satisfaction -  2007
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In terms o f customer satisfaction rates, of those respondents who answered yes to 
having a fixed-line subscription in their household (693 persons), the majority (68 per 
cent) responded that they were very or fairly satisfied overall with their fixed-line 
service, while just seven per cent said they were not satisfied overall with their fixed- 
line service, as Figure 8:3 above shows. The largest source o f discontentment was in 
regard to overall value for money, with 31 per cent of the sample responding that they 
were not satisfied that they were getting value for their money, while 36 per cent said 
they were very or fairly satisfied they were getting value for their money. In terms of  
suggestions for improvements, 81 per cent responded they would like to see tariffs 
reduced, 42 per cent said would like to see improved quality o f fixed-line service, 41 
per cent would like to see the range o f services improved and 37 per cent would like 
improvement in the quality o f customer care when problems occur related to service.
When asked, if  the option existed, would they be willing to switch carriers, 34 per cent 
said they would be ‘likely’ to switch fixed-line service providers, 39 per cent said they 
were neither likely nor unlikely to switch and 27 per cent responded that they were 
unlikely to switch even if  given the option. When asked how important it was to them to 
retain their existing phone number, 40 per cent said it was ‘important’, 38 per cent said 
it was ‘neither important nor unimportant’ while 22 per cent said it was ‘not important’.
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Mobile service
Figure 8:4 Mobile penetration -  2007
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(Source: Nielsen 2007, ‘Understanding telecom usage in Bahrain, residential module findings')
As shown in Figure 8:4 above, mobile penetration is nearly universal, with 99 per cent 
of those interviewed responding that they owned a mobile number, while 11 per cent 
responded that they had two or more mobile numbers. For those with two or more 
mobile SIM cards, the reasons they gave for this are: 74 per cent have separate business 
and personal use numbers, 17 per cent prefer to call different people from different 
networks, while seven per cent use a second number when travelling overseas.
When asked which mobile connection type they were using, 69 per cent said they used 
Batelco pre-paid services, 14 per cent responded Batelco post-paid services, 20 per cent 
responded Zain pre-paid services and four per cent said Zain post-paid services [the 
total of these percentages is greater than 100 per cent as a result o f some respondents 
using two or more mobile numbers].
In regards to value added services (VAS), the most commonly used is SMS messaging, 
with 80 per cent o f mobile users responding that they regularly send SMS messages. 
The next most commonly used VAS is MMS, with 38 per cent saying they use this 
service regularly. Of the other VAS’ offered in the mobile market (including 
downloading o f wallpaper, ring tones and games, mobile info, email, internet browsing 
and video calling), none was used regularly by a large number o f people, with the most
Mobile Connections
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frequently used being downloading of ring tones, which 16 per cent o f respondents said 
they did with some regularity.
Figure 8:5 Residential mobile consumer satisfaction, by company -  2007
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Figure 8:6 Residential mobile consumer satisfaction by category -  2007
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As shown in Figure 8:5, consumer satisfaction levels between the two mobile 
companies are fairly equivalent. [While there was no margin of error published with the 
Nielsen survey, the differences in the four responses in Figure 8:5 -  i.e. ‘very satisfied’, 
‘fairly satisfied’, ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’ and ‘not satisfied’ -  range between 
two and four per cent when comparing results for the same answer between Batelco and 
MTC Mobile (Zain) -  i.e. 33 per cent are ‘fairly satisfied’ with Batelco and 31 per cent 
are ‘fairly satisfied’ with MTC Mobile -  which is conceivably within, or at least very 
likely close to, what the margin o f error for the survey would be.] As shown in Figure 
8:6, across both companies, overall 62 per cent o f residential customers are either very 
or fairly satisfied with their mobile service, compared to 11 per cent which remarked 
that they were not satisfied with their mobile service. The specific categories o f service
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where the most dissatisfaction was record was in national call tariffs (31 per cent not 
satisfied), SMS tariffs (28 per cent not satisfied) and VAS tariffs (17 per cent not 
satisfied). Unsurprisingly, when asked about areas o f service that could be improved, 82
per cent o f respondents answered ‘reduce charges and tariffs’. Other answers were 
‘improve quality o f mobile service’ (35 per cent), ‘improve range o f services/features 
available for mobile’ (32 per cent) and ‘improve the quality of customer service when 
there is a problem with the service’ (23 per cent).
When asked ‘have you ever switched mobile service providers?’, only seven per cent 
answered yes. Of those that had switched, the main reasons given for switching were: 
cheaper costs (23 per cent), promotional offers (19 per cent) and quality o f services 
offered (14 per cent).
Long-distance calling
Figure 8:7 Residential consumer satisfaction with long-distance service -  2007
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(Source: Nielsen 2007, ‘Understanding telecom usage in Bahrain, residential module findings’)
The Nielsen survey uncovered the interesting statistic that a significant segment -  40 
per cent -  o f the sample group did not make international calls at all. Of those who did 
make international calls, the average was two to three per week, with average call 
duration falling between three to 10 minutes. With regards to respondents’ regular 
method o f making long-distance calls, near two-thirds (60 per cent) uses their mobile 
phone, some 28.5 per cent use a fixed-line, 9.5 per cent use Internet cafes, while the
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remaining two per cent uses payphones. One out o f three respondents used a pre-paid 
calling card when making international calls [, the rest paid for long-distance calls 
through their normal bill payment mechanism].
As can be seen in Figure 8:7 above, 44 per cent o f respondents who make international 
calls are ‘not satisfied’ with the service, with the survey finding that for an 
overwhelming majority, call pricing was their top concern.
Internet usage
Figure 8:8 Residential Internet usage -  2007
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As shown in Figure 8:8, more than half of respondents (53 per cent) said they have an 
Internet subscription at home. Of these, 97 per cent had subscriptions with Batelco -  67 
per cent for broadband and 31 per cent using a dial-up connection (two per cent gave no 
response when asked what type o f connection they were using). 75 per cent o f those 
using a dial-up connection said they would consider upgrading to a broadband 
connection if  the price for a broadband connection was reduced. 27 per cent o f dial-up 
users also noted they may consider upgrading to broadband if  they knew more about the 
service.
Of broadband users, 39 per cent are signed up to Batelco’s 256 Kbps, BD10 (US$27) 
per month package, 30 per cent have the 512 Kbps, BD25 (US$67.5) package, 20 per 
cent have the 1MB, BD40 (US$108) monthly package, two per cent the 2MD, BD60
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(US$162) package, while 10 per cent are not aware o f the package to which they have 
subscribed.
Figure 8:9 Residential Internet service satisfaction rates -  2007
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As shown in Figure 8:9, while overall 57 per cent of survey respondents said they were 
very or fairly satisfied with their Internet service, when asked about specific aspects o f  
their Internet service, there was substantially greater levels o f responses o f ‘not 
satisfied’ -  e.g. 40 per cent said they were ‘not satisfied’ regarding the price o f internet 
service. Unsurprisingly, when asked for suggestions for improvement, 87 per cent o f  
respondents said ‘reduce charges and tariffs’, 61 per cent said improved quality o f  
Internet service and 50 per cent answered ‘improve the quality of customer service 
when there is a problem with the service’.
Awareness o f TRA
82 per cent o f survey respondents were previously unaware of the TRA, as shown in 
Figure 8:10 below. Of those who were aware o f the TRA, 49 per cent said their 
awareness came from newspapers, 37 per cent said ‘friends and relatives’, 32 per cent 
said they knew of the TRA through television, billboards (11 per cent), Internet (eight 
per cent), radio (two per cent) and cinema6 (two per cent).
6 The TRA has run several advertisement campaigns regarding using mobile phones with courtesy, which 
included short commercials which played in cinemas before the feature presentation began.
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Figure 8:10 Telecommunications users awareness of TRA
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Summary offindings from the Nielsen business survey
In regards to business usage, the Nielson survey found the following:
• Regarding companies with fewer than 100 staff, the main concern related to 
telecommunications was the cost o f service. Second was service quality.
• Most companies are relatively satisfied with Batelco in terms o f mobile and fixed-line 
services, with slightly more satisfaction being expressed for mobile provision than for 
fixed-line provision. 30 per cent of companies did, however, have reservations about 
call tariffs.
• There is a pervasive lack o f awareness that any companies other than Batelco exist as 
alternatives for fixed-line service, and thus Batelco has almost complete market share.
• Only 60 per cent of business have mobile numbers registered to the company, and of  
these 90 per cent are with Batelco.
• SMS is the most frequently used VAS for business, but generally there has been low 
uptake of VAS in the regular functioning o f the business day, with low use o f VAS on 
both fixed and mobile -  only 15-18% use voice mail.
• About half o f all local and long-distance calls are shorter than three minutes long.
• 93per cent o f businesses stated it was important that they retain their current number, 
and thus while 18 per cent said they may consider switching providers, this was only 
under the condition that they could migrate with their current number (, other conditions 
were that tariffs must be less and service better).
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• Three-quarters o f all long-distance calls are dialled over IDD on a fixed-line.
• More than 35 per cent o f companies are unsatisfied regarding long-distance calling 
rates.
• Only two-thirds of companies subscribe to broadband internet, or any other form of 
data service. Of these, effectively all o f them are have service contracts with Batelco.
• 18 per cent o f companies continue to use dialup internet connection.
• The area o f greatest dissatisfaction among companies regarding the 
telecommunications services they subscribe to relates to internet and data services, most 
notably in the areas o f speed, service and price.
• Companies’ spending on telecommunications services is currently highest for fixed- 
line services, with mobile and internet coming next, respectively.
Evaluating the Nielsen survey
The most consistent theme identified by the Nielsen survey across all segments o f the 
telecommunications market is respondents dissatisfaction with the price o f services: 31 
per cent o f fixed-line user said they ‘not satisfied they were getting value for money’ 
and 81 per cent wanted to see tariffs reduced; 31 per cent of mobile users were not 
satisfied with national call tariffs and 82 wanted to see charges reduced; 44 per cent of 
long distance callers were dissatisfied with the service, largely due to high tariffs; 75 per 
cent of those using dial-up internet connections said the price o f broadband service was 
preventing them from upgrading, while 11 per cent o f those without a fixed-line 
telephone said it was because the cost was prohibitive. The Nielsen business survey also 
found cost to be the top concern o f companies in regard to telecommunications services, 
with 35 per cent of businesses also unsatisfied with international calling rates. This 
makes it clear that the TRA needs to push ahead with bringing greater competition into 
the market -  or if  it is unable to do that, implement regulation in the best efforts of 
mimicking what the effect of competition would be.
In terms o f what the market potential is for prospective new entrants: in fixed-lines, 
with one-third of respondents saying they had no fixed-line connection, as well as 34 
per cent of those with fixed-line subscriptions saying they would change carriers if  the 
option presented itself, there is definitely market potential available for other fixed-line 
service providers. In terms of the residential mobile market, while this author is hesitant 
to say it is saturated (even at well more than 100 per cent penetration), it is fair to say
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the ‘low-hanging fruits’ have been plucked, and that further market development will 
likely be innovatively and technologically driven, rather than brute expansionism. 
Regarding Nielsen’s business survey however, with only 60 per cent o f respondents 
reporting mobile numbers registered to the company, there would seem to be a degree 
of opportunity left in the business segment for mobile service providers to sign up new 
customers. In regards to Internet subscriptions, there seems to be untapped market 
potential in both residential and business segments, with 47 per cent of respondents not 
having internet at home and a full one-third o f companies without broadband internet. 
Internet services are also the segment o f the telecommunications market where both 
residential and business customers voiced the most dissatisfaction in terms o f speed, 
service and pricing; thus while there is great room for service providers -  until now 
effectively only Batelco -  to expand their customer base, there is perhaps greater room 
for improvement in the services they provide.
Among the issues the Nielsen survey identified that would impact upon competition, in 
fixed-line and mobile sectors at least, is number portability: 40 per cent o f residential 
fixed-line subscribers said it was important for them to keep their present number, while 
93 per cent o f businesses said the same. The need or want to keep the same phone 
number can have the detrimental effect -  from a competition standpoint -  o f holding a 
consumer to a certain service provider when they might otherwise have switched.
Another striking issue the Nielsen survey brought to light -  and that the TRA must 
address -  is the general lack of public awareness regarding aspects o f the 
telecommunications networks they use: only 30 per cent o f fixed-line users know how 
much their monthly rental fee is, or even that they are not being charged by the minute; 
this could be a significant contributor to the high level those who said they are not 
satisfied that they are getting value for their money, as they do not have the proper basis 
from which to accurately judge the charges on their telephone bill. As well, in regards to 
Internet usage, 27 per cent said they would consider upgrading to broadband if  they 
knew more about the service. Perhaps most astonishingly however, even six years after 
its creation, 82 per cent o f respondents were unaware o f the TRA. The Nielsen business 
survey also noted that there is a ‘pervasive lack o f awareness’ among consumers 
regarding options for fixed-line service other than Batelco, which cannot but hamper the 
growth o f competition, as how can companies other than Batelco gain market share if
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no one knows about them? Greater awareness would allow consumers to be better 
informed of their options when purchasing telecommunication products, in regards to 
buying the services that suit their needs and at prices accommodating to their budget. 
An informed consumer base can ‘buy smart’; instead o f feeling there is no choice but to 
accept the price gouging of the dominant market player, the informed consumer can opt 
instead for the cheaper -  though smaller and less well known -  services o f a new market 
entrant. Thus an informed consumer base in itself can help promote competition through 
exercising its purchasing power discerningly.
Comparing the BCSR and Nielsen surveys
It is common and useful in the social sciences to use surveys to measure changes in a 
population over time -  ask a group of people a series o f questions today, then ask the 
same (or a similar) group o f people the same (or a similar) set o f question a year later, 
and one can compare the answers to measure changes in the responses over time. In 
regards to the BCSR survey and the Nielsen survey, while they were conducted through 
interviewing a similar group o f people (a random sampling o f people in the Kingdom of  
Bahrain) and they are separated in time by approximately three years (the BCSR survey 
being conducted in 2004, the Nielsen survey in 2007), it is not valid to compare the 
results and findings o f these surveys with each other. The reason for this is they 
measured different things.
For the most part, the questions in the BCSR survey asked respondents to give their 
assessment o f the changes they had noticed regarding aspects of the telecommunications 
sector, [e.g. ‘Quality o f service -  to what extent improvement is noticed?’ or ‘Any 
decrease in the cost o f mobile phone calls during 2004?’]. What the BCSR survey did 
not ask, for the most part, is for the respondents to qualify their personal experience [, 
e.g. how much do you pay for mobile phone calls?] or what was their level of 
satisfaction.
Conversely, the Nielsen survey did not ask respondents to give their appraisal o f  
whether they had notice change over time. Instead the Nielsen survey for the most part 
asked respondents what their situation was currently [, e.g. do you have a fixed-line 
connection? yes or no], what was their level of satisfaction regarding different 
circumstances [, e.g. what is your level of satisfaction with fixed-line service? ‘Very
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satisfied’, ‘fairly satisfied’, etc.), and what their preferred situation would be [, e.g. what 
improvements would you like to see in fixed-line service? Lower tariffs, better service, 
etc.].
As discussed in Chapter 6, when two sources o f data are quantifications o f different 
things, ‘one cannot validly compare apples with oranges’.
Conclusion
When King Hamad took the throne in 1999 he began a broad process o f political and 
economic reform to liberalise the economy and stimulate continued growth and 
prosperity, with the announcement to liberalise the telecommunications sector coming 
as part o f the optimistic political atmosphere o f that time. It is apparent from the 
statements o f the King, the cabinet ministers and the government officials that they 
support a shift o f government’s role from the provider and supplier o f services to a more 
hands-off regulator, and while expressing support for privatisation and liberalisation 
generally, they support telecommunications reforms specifically. The author’s research 
has, however, failed to locate any evidence o f a link between the ministers’ feedback 
and the formulation of the National Telecommunication Plan, despite the significance of 
telecommunication deregulation in expanding trade and business in the Kingdom, as 
well as its relation to compliance with the WTO free market policy requirements. This 
has led to the criticism expressed in this chapter regarding government’s lack o f a 
‘vision for the future’. As noted in a number o f interviews, among the approaches 
Bahrain can pursue to remedy this is to study the examples o f other countries which 
have pursue much the same policies, and tailor the most suitable best practices to the 
Bahraini scenario.
The mobile sector is different from the other sectors however, in that some successes of 
liberalisation have been realized, as a look at the BCSR survey results shows. While the 
majority o f both private and business customers were of the opinion that the quality o f  
mobile services has increased, a comparatively larger percentage o f business users 
expressed they had noticed greater improvements in service quality. As the Nielsen 
survey found however, there are still large segments o f the telecommunications market 
where greater competition is needed to address dissatisfaction with service provision, as
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well as the fact that market potential exist for new entrants to exploit to acquire market 
share and create competition.
While there are no ready solutions for the lack of desired momentum in the Bahraini 
telecommunication liberalisation process, after an analysis combining the findings from 
the different chapters in this thesis, a model will be proposed in Chapter 9 as a possible 
means to push the liberalisation process forward in Bahrain.
* * *
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Chapter 9:
Analysis of the forces driving telecommunications reforms 
in Bahrain -  the benefits now and for the future
Introduction
This chapter will bring together the finding of previous chapters into an analysis o f the 
development of telecommunications in the Kingdom of Bahrain and the challenges 
regarding regulation. Following from the analysis will be this author’s suggestion for a 
new model through which further developments in the telecommunications environment 
may be best facilitated to realise the fullest benefits of liberalisation and competition for 
Bahrain. This research has resulted in the following findings:
1. The driving forces in Bahrain behind the establishment of a privatised and liberalised 
telecommunications environment.
2. The extent to which privatisation, liberalisation and the regulatory environment of 
Bahrain telecommunications have been and will be beneficial to the Kingdom’s 
economic development.
While these findings were discussed in the earlier chapters, consolidation of the findings 
throws light on the lessons learned by Bahrain and helps in reviewing the current 
strategy.
The forces driving Bahrain’s telecommunications privatisation and liberalisation
Since the 1970s, oil revenues have propped up substantial GDP growth in Bahrain while
at the same time creating a dependence on this finite natural resource and reducing
pressure to diversify the economy into other sectors, thus effectively impeding overall
economic development. Not unaware of the limits o f its oil resource wealth, the
government has been pursing diversification of the economy to increase private sector
activity and foreign investment. Privatisation of the Bahrain Telecommunications
Company in the early 1980s, as discussed in earlier chapters, was part of this
diversification strategy, since a well developed telecommunications infrastructure is one
of the basic ingredients for economic diversification. Government’s grasp o f this fact
was highlighted by former Minister of Commerce Ali Saleh, during his interview as
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reported in Chapter 8, where he stated: “After the era o f industrial revolution, now 
comes the age o f information and communication technology where nations advance by 
effectively utilising them. Bahrain is a service providing country; we have to improve 
its standards to create a distinguished information service centre...”
While the divestment of Batelco was limited in scope to Bahrain, the launch o f the 
UK’s privatisation program in the early 1980s impacted on the global economic 
scenario -  as discussed in Chapters 2 & 3 -  paving the way for privatisation, and later 
liberalisation, to be the future mechanisms o f development in telecommunications 
sectors worldwide. This global trend lent itself to the development o f a more market 
based and liberalised approach to broad international agreements regarding 
telecommunications, such as ONPs in the EU in the late 1980s and 1990s and the 1997 
WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement -  both discussed in Chapter 3 -  as well as 
specific country-to-country agreements, such as the 2004 FTA between Bahrain and the 
US, noted in Chapter 4. As a participant in the global economy and a member o f the 
WTO, Bahrain’s moves to liberalise its telecommunications sector are necessary to meet 
its international commitments, as Cabinet Minister Mohammed al-Mutawa remarked in 
his interview in Chapter 8:
Monopoly affects the development o f services, especially telecom, which is an 
important sector in the economy. That’s why we joined the WTO and signed the 
Free Trade Agreement with the US, in order to open the telecom market and 
[establish] Bahrain as a regional IT centre. Thus [we should] open all borders to 
enable international free trade practices in the country by inviting private sector 
to participate in the economy’s development. The main aim behind all these 
changes is to diversify the economy.
Although the Kingdom’s successes in economic expansion thus far have been
concurrent with Batelco being the sole provider for most telecommunications services,
as Mr. al-Mutawa states above, liberalisation o f Bahrain’s telecommunications sector is
spurred by the knowledge that a monopoly provider is not sufficient to establish the
quality and efficiency o f service Bahrain requires for the healthy diversification and
future prosperity o f its economy. As stated in Chapter 2, the view that privatisation is
the solution to boosting enterprise performance -  as argued by Freidman, Hayek, King,
Niskanen, and Guislain -  needs to be looked at from a different perspective given that
there are cases, including Bahrain, where privatisation has not resulted in overwhelming
improvements. For example, more than 25 years after privatisation, Batelco remains a
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monopoly service provider for fixed lines and Internet, with the company both willing 
and able to exploit its power over customers by charging heavily for limited services, as 
illustrated in Chapter 7. This view also concurs with Cook and Uchida’s 2001 study, 
discussed in Chapter 2, where they found only a minimal link between privatisation and 
economic growth and noted that the former might actually hinder the latter, while 
Jackson et al. (cited in The General Concepts o f  Privatisation n.d., p.32) found that 
increased competition and organisational reforms are more important in generating 
wider economic benefits than making public companies private.
Whereas telecommunications was once regarded at a natural monopoly -  also discussed 
in Chapter 2 -  the technological advancements of fibre-optics and other ICT 
innovations noted in Chapter 3 have made the entry o f competition into the markets 
much more feasible and cost effective, with competition then driving down consumer 
prices, enhancing services and itself spurring greater penetration o f ICTs into society 
and across markets generally. It is this modernising affect that well executed 
telecommunications reforms can bring -  so plainly apparent from the case study o f  
Singapore discussed in Chapter 3 -  which Bahrain was pursuing when it stated in the 
2003 National Telecommunications Plan that ‘government seeks to encourage the 
development and availability of the widest possible range o f information and 
communications technologies and services within Bahrain’, as discussed in Chapter 7. 
Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa was quoted stating much the same 
in Chapter 8: ‘With the introduction o f the new economic reforms the private sector will 
bring in new cutting edge technologies, business practices, and investment and 
employment opportunities in the Kingdom,’ {Transforming Through Reform 2005, p. 
19).
Telecommunications liberalisation is also pushed by the moves the government is 
taking to alter its role in the economy, as the prime minister described in Chapter 8, to 
‘facilitator and regulator rather than service provider,’ with many in government 
adopting the New Right prescripts -  discussed in Chapter 2 -  calling for unburdening 
the public services from the bureaucracy o f the state to usher in a modernisation o f the 
economy. The comments in Chapter 8 of Sheikh Khalid bin Abdullah al-Khalifa, 
Minister in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet, reflect the importance o f private sector 
participation in economic development; telecommunication liberalisation also comes
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under this framework and government expects a liberalised telecommunications service 
to provide the necessary environment to promote business.
In analysing the implications o f this approach, Yale Braunstein, Meheroo Jussawalla 
and Stephen Morris note in Comparative Analysis o f  Telecommunications Globalization 
how ‘freer trade’ in a nation’s telecommunications market has three notable economic 
benefits: the introduction o f new products and services, a decrease in prices for both 
business and residential customers through increased competition, and increased private 
investment in the telecommunications sector (Braunstein et al. 1999, p. 13). These 
authors point to two main trends evident in the modem telecommunications industry: 
the swift progress o f technological advancements and the general understanding that 
liberalisation o f the telecommunications sector is a cornerstone to promoting the 
expansion and enhancement o f the industry (Braunstein et al. 1999, p. 1). Braunstein, 
Jussawalla and Morris also note that telecommunications markets in which direct 
competition is allowed experience greater rates of growth than markets which are 
dominated by a monopoly, and that the introduction o f competition into the markets of  
developing nations may have a more profound impact upon growth than in developed 
countries -  the growth rate of traffic per subscriber between 1990-1999 in developing 
countries with competitive markets was been 11.7 per cent, while in markets with 
monopoly providers this growth rate was been 5.2 per cent (Braunstein et al. 1999, p. 
13). Moreover, Braunstein, Jussawalla and Morris point out how telecommunications 
liberalisation is necessary for the general growth and well-being in a nation’s economy:
Multi-national corporate customers are demanding that regulators in many 
countries allow competition in the provision o f business services in the belief 
that competition will lead to lower prices and a wider range o f services. 
Historically, multi-national corporations will move operations out o f countries 
where access to adequate and reasonably priced telecommunication services is 
lacking (Braunstein et al. 1999, p. 18).
Many businesses currently operating in the banking, financial, tourism and other major 
tertiary sectors o f the Bahraini economy are already demanding this modernisation o f  
the telecommunications network though liberalising the market. In effect businesses in 
the Kingdom are demanding Bahrain move to truly establish itself as the type o f  
information society described in Chapter 2. As noted in Chapter 7, other banking and 
financial centres around the GCC region are gaining momentum with Dubai and Qatar
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among the most notable, while Yousef al-Essa, CEO of Addax Investment Bank, 
warned that the decisions by Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and Carlyle to base their 
regional operations in Dubai could be part o f a continued flight o f business away from 
Bahrain if  the competitive situation in the Kingdom is not improved (Banking on 
Success 2007 p.3). Chapter 4 also raised the 2006 McKinsey Consultants report entitled 
Reforming Bahrain’s Labour Market: The Case for Change which noted, ‘Dubai is 
making great strides in many o f the sectors that Bahrain could once think o f as its own, 
including transport, trade, logistics and even finance’. The demands o f the Bahrain 
Financial Harbour, Bahrain’s newly acquired Formula 1 facilities, the Kingdom’s 
massively expanding luxury-resort living and tourism facilities -  outlined in Chapter 4 -  
all bring pressure to bear on government to create an advanced and efficient 
telecommunications environment through which these businesses can grow and gain a 
regional competitive advantage. As well, the Nielsen survey outlined in Chapter 8 the 
dissatisfaction in the various segments of telecommunications provision for residential 
consumers in the Kingdom, especially in regard to tariffs and charges.
Liberalising telecommunications to accommodate and facilitate this growth in business 
is not only economically preferable, but likely to be socially necessary. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, Bahrain will have 100,000 new job-seekers over the next 10 years and the 
civil services will not be able to accommodate them, and thus private sector growth is 
required to avoid large-scale unemployment. The tension already existing in the 
Kingdom -  explained in Chapter 5 -  where a politically disenfranchised and disgruntled 
Shiite majority is already disproportionately poor, obliges governments to foster private 
sector growth to increased employment opportunities for all its citizens in order to 
maintain social stability. It was also shown in Chapter 5 that concerns regarding the 
preservation o f the Islamic culture o f the Kingdom in the face o f increased exposure to 
Western culture via the Internet are relatively minimal, but that the government also has 
both the regulations and mechanisms in place to protect the Kingdom’s value system if  
it is ever deemed to be threatened.
The current and future benefits of privatisation, liberalisation and the regulatory 
environment of telecommunications for Bahrain’s economic development
The liberalisation reforms, as envisioned by the Prime Minister, are the means to pursue 
‘sustainable economic development driven by the private sector,’ and in the process
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raising the public living standards, creating jobs and easing the fiscal burdens on 
government through higher private sector participation in the economy (Transforming 
through reform 2005, pp 18-19). Concurring with this idea was Zakaria Hijres, the 
former CEO of the EDB, who -  in Chapter 4 -  noted that the vehicle of sustainable 
economic development ought to be the private sector, and that the role o f government in 
Bahrain ought to be that o f a ‘facilitator and regulator, rather than service provider and 
investor,’ Treading the Board 2005, p. 55). This is how, in the words o f the prime 
minister, ‘The private sector is seen as a true partner with the government...’ 
(Transforming Through Reform 2005, p. 19) while ‘...the government supports the 
private sector involvement in the economy to the benefit o f the society...’ as former 
minister o f commerce Mr. Ali Saleh stated in Chapter 8.
Given the above, it should be noted that Bahrain’s government is not pulling out of 
direct participation in private sector economic activity, but instead, it is willing to come 
in as a partner to encourage confidence in major schemes or to push their development 
along. An example o f this is the Bahrain Formula 1 Circuit and associated facilities, 
where the government funded much o f the US$150-million construction costs o f what is 
an essentially private sector project.
The mechanisms through which government is formulating and realizing its economic 
reforms, as noted in several chapters throughout this thesis, is the EDB, currently 
chaired by Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa. Among the EDB’s 
projected results o f the privatisation and liberalisation reforms -  noted in Chapter 4 -  is 
doubling Bahrain’s 2005 level o f GDP by 2015, with GDP growth o f 6-9 per cent each 
year from 2005-2015 concurrent with a five per cent growth in employment for each of 
those years. The forecast o f the consulting firm McKinsey discussed in Chapter 4 noted 
Bahrain could more than double its GDP between 2005-2015, to US$26.5-billion, with 
other 10-year targets including upping per capita income to BD 12,000 (US$31,800) 
from an estimated BD5,108 (US$13,585) in 2004, and creating 150,000 new jobs. [It 
should be noted that all o f these forecasts and targets were arrived at before the world 
descended into severe economic turmoil in September 2008 -  the so-called ‘global 
financial crisis’. As o f the time that this thesis was submitted, it was still unclear what 
the impact o f the global financial crisis would be in Bahrain. However, due to the 
world-wide nature o f the financial crisis and Bahrain’s integration into the global
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marketplace, it is all but assured that there will be some negative impacts in the 
Kingdom, entailing the downward revision of short, and perhaps medium term, 
prospects for growth. The extent of these revisions has yet to be determined however.]
Almost all the current and former ministers and parliamentarians were supportive of the 
government’s liberalisation moves for the reasons stated above. They pointed out that 
telecommunications liberalisation could lead to both a more fertile environment for 
business development and social benefits for Bahrainis. For example former Minister o f  
State Abdul Nabi al-Shoala noted in his comments in Chapter 8 that among the socio­
economic benefits o f liberalisation was that “...it supports labour market and improves 
performance.” The comments o f minister and MPs comments thus support the 
hypothesis that competitive telecommunications market can contribute more effectively 
to the economy and society than a state run or private telecommunications monopoly 
service.
In analysing Bahrain’s progress toward liberalising its telecommunications market, it is 
worthwhile to consider a 2002 World Bank study entitled An Assessment o f  
Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries which noted four factors that are 
important in such a process: (1) privatisation of the SOTE monopoly, (2) introduction of 
competition, (3) opening the market to foreign investors and (4) the establishment o f  
regulations to enforce competition (Fink et al. cited in Sanchez & Hwa 2003, p. 4). In 
regard to the first factor, as stated earlier, Bahrain took the step o f privatising Batelco in 
1981. In regard to the other three factors, there have been varying degrees o f success in 
each and these will be examined below.
Mobile service in Bahrain is the one area o f the telecommunications market where 
liberalisation has resulted in some degree of competition and a relatively significant 
amount of foreign investment. The entry o f Zain seems to have been successful in both 
driving down prices and enhancing service, as noted in the results o f the BCSR survey 
in Chapter 8. The majority o f all interviewees also expressed an optimistic view about 
the liberalisation process while 4 out o f 5 business users commented that they were in 
favour o f liberalisation, a likely sign that liberalising the telecommunications market is 
good for businesses across the economy. As noted in Chapter 7, it is hoped that Batelco 
and Zain could be spurred to develop and enhance their service further with the entry o f
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a third mobile operator into the market, which was initially planned for 2005, but had 
only entered the tendering process by the time this research was completed in the 
autumn of 2008. Another expectation is that a third provider would drive down prices 
for services and will slim existing margins for Batelco and Zain, forcing them to find 
new sources of revenue to compete and driving a wave o f new efficiency reforms 
through the technological infrastructure they have developed.
Fixed-line services opened for full competition on July 1, 2004, and to date there has 
been only limited erosion o f Batelco’s market share and limited foreign investment in 
the sector. As noted in Chapter 7, growth in recent years has been modest but steady in 
the fixed-line market. The impacts o f the Second National Telecommunications Plan 
enacted in 2008 have yet to materialize however, and should the Government follow 
through with the section which ‘requires TRA to ensure that there is a full rebalancing 
of tariffs of fixed telephony’ [quoted from Chapter 7], there may be a downward 
alteration in the trajectory o f the market. With potential weaknesses in prospective 
customers base and expensive infrastructure investments to start up due to delays in 
being able to access Batelco’s pre-existing infrastructure, the TRA Development Panel 
Report 2005 noted that Batelco will likely retain its fixed line monopoly, and thus the 
TRA has to act as a counter-weight to balance the company’s market dominance in this 
sector (Cave et al. 2005, p.7).
Internet service provision, like fixed-line telephone service, is at least theoretically open 
for competition. However, Batelco is still the only effective player in the market 
through its monopoly on infrastructure and the company’s control over competitor 
access to its infrastructure networks. Unlike fixed-line service though, the subscriber 
rate for internet service is growing rapidly and demand is expected to continue to be 
strong in the future -  as outlined in Chapters 3 and 7 -  suggesting a more viable option 
for foreign investment than fixed-line service offers, but such investment has yet to 
materialise significantly.
The development of competitive markets in all the above segments o f the 
telecommunications market -  and the ensuing improvement in prices and services such 
would spur -  would undoubtedly be welcome by respondents to the Nielsen survey who 
voiced their dissatisfaction with the current state o f telecommunications provision in the
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Kingdom, especially in regards to charges and tariffs. In assessing the regulations the 
Government o f Bahrain has enacted to create competition in the telecommunications 
market, the role of the telecommunications regulator entrusted to enforce these 
regulations must be scrutinized.
The crucial role o f the TRA in liberalisation
TRA chairman Dr. Mohammed al-Ghatam endorsed the government’s liberalisation 
moves in his interview with this author in December 2004 -  noted in Chapter 8 -  
highlighting that through liberalisation Bahrain has provided investors a healthy, 
competitive environment to operate in with a developed and transparent regulatory 
framework, while the TRA’s general director, Andreas Avgousti, noted direct 
investments in the telecommunications market will create additional job opportunities 
for local manpower and foster a high tech environment in the Kingdom.
As discussed above and in previous chapters, members o f the government at all levels, 
consumers in general and businesses from various sectors of the economy regard a 
modem and competitive telecommunications network as the essential nervous system of 
the new economy in Bahrain, but a crucial element in its establishment is the regulation 
of the market by the TRA. In this regard it is important to re-state the point from 
Chapter 3 that a coherent and effective strategy to shape the positive progressive 
development o f ITC infrastructure and services within a nation can spur ‘sustainable 
development in the fields of public administration, business, education and training, 
health, employment, environment, agriculture and science’ {World Summit on the 
Information Society 2005, p. 11). At the same time it is worthwhile to note the examples 
of Mexico and Sri Lanka from Chapter 3, where weak regulation led the incumbent 
telecommunications monopolies to flex their market dominance for self-benefit at the 
cost o f general detriment.
As the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has observed, ‘it is one thing for 
countries to make a policy decision to create an independent regulatory agency, and 
quite another to empower the agency to act independently and effectively’, while 
Sanchez and Hwa note:
[This] rings particularly true when it comes to developing countries... because
the staff o f new regulatory agencies in developing countries tends to be
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relatively inexperienced, the regulated industry is likely to challenge the 
legitimacy o f the new agency if  the following effective regulatory practices are 
not followed: accountability, adherence to legislative mandate, efficiency, 
fairness, independence, objectivity, and transparency. Among these practices, 
transparency seems to be the most important because it promotes the legitimacy 
of a regulatory agency and helps it avoid regulatory capture [i.e. being too 
dependant on the industry being regulated]. Given the watch-dog effect of public 
scrutiny, an agency whose actions are transparent is more likely to be 
accountable, efficient, fair, objective, independent, and can more easily adhere 
to its legislative mandate (Sanchez and Hwa 2003, p. 5).
The ITU also lists transparency among the crucial factors o f success for 
telecommunications liberalisation reforms, noting that ‘only those governments that 
established and implemented sound regulatory frameworks could expect to attract long­
term, stable private investments in their ICT sectors’ (ITU cited in Sanchez and Hwa 
2003, p. 6).
The former minister o f commerce Mr. Saleh Ali Saleh, in Chapter 8, emphasized the 
need for complete transparency on the part o f government with regard to the 
implementation o f the regulatory framework, noting that while privatisation and 
liberalisation are the proper means to pursue economic development, he was critical 
about the lack of a clear strategy on the part o f the government. Dr. Marwan al Ahmadi, 
CEO of Zain, also noted the lack of a “...clear vision for opening the telecom market,” 
pointing out that the TRA is rather hands-off in its approach [i.e. the TRA Review Panel 
noted how the TRA has thus far seemed more concerned with the semantics of 
regulation -  such as establishing a ‘sophisticated framework for making competition 
assessments’ -  rather than taking concrete steps to ensure competitor entry].
As outlined in Chapter 7, in theory the mechanisms government created to bolster a
liberalised market should work but have so far been either ineffective or delayed in their
implementation, with the TRA being less than ‘transparent’ about the reasons for these
delays, leading the TRA’s independence to be questioned. As the TRA Development
Review Panel report outlined, the TRA has largely relegated itself to more passive roles
such as licensing while sidestepping substantive action to bring about genuine
competition in the market. Among the more direct actions the TRA has so far taken was
to intervene in 2006 when Batelco continued to advertise unlimited internet access
when in fact it no longer allowed customers this option, as was outlined in Chapter 7.
However this episode again highlights the need for the TRA to take concrete steps
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towards creating the conditions for a competitive market, as consumers are at the mercy 
of Batelco’s whims with regard to the company’s internet policy and fees, and can 
either accept the new, limited access packages o f Batelco, or go without internet service. 
The BIX, as described in Chapter 7, would significantly alter the make-up of the ISP 
market in favour o f competition and curb Batelco’s ability to abuse its dominant market 
position, but for reasons unspecified it has yet to begin operations.
Among the factors for success for other countries around the world regarding 
telecommunications liberalisation has been the effectiveness and transparency o f an 
independent regulator. In Bahrain it is apparent that the TRA has been neither effective 
in creating a competitive telecommunications market nor transparent regarding how it 
goes about its business, which erodes the perception that TRA is acting independently 
and damages the credibility o f the regulator. This is especially important regarding 
spectrum availability as competitors need spectrum made available to enter the market, 
Batelco has a monopoly on spectrum allocation and appears to be delaying granting 
competitors access and the TRA has either been unable or unwilling to intervene as of 
yet. The TRA is not naive to these issues either -  as recently as May 2007 the TRA 
published a consultation document where it stated:
[C]urrent and prospective licensees have identified that one o f the most critical 
obstacles to the deployment of alternative telecommunications networks and the 
development of competition is the restricted ability of licensees to construct 
ducts [accessing Batelco’s network]. This is perceived as being mainly due to 
the fact that Batelco continues to enjoy unique rights with respect to the 
planning, building, maintenance and protection o f the telecommunications 
network infrastructure (TRA 2007).
Despite knowing why there is no effective competition in most areas o f Bahrain’s 
telecommunications provisions, the TRA is still only in the ‘consulting’ stage and is 
refraining from commitment to take action.
With regard to a third mobile telecommunications operator entering the market, Mr.
Avgousti stated in Chapter 8 that it will depend on the spectrum availability, which in
turn depends on Batelco since they own the lines. However, because there is no
competitor, it is up to Batelco to decide about the broadband spectrum and the TRA is
yet to address this issue. It is unclear whether government has taken this up in their
strategy as a significant policy issue, though this scenario indicates that Bahrain’s
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liberalisation scheme ought to be formulated better, with a proper regulatory framework 
based on the Kingdom’s telecommunications setup.
As was made apparent by the comments in Chapter 8 o f Mr. Avgousti, the TRA does 
not seem to feel it is under any immediate pressure to solve these issues either, as ‘.. .the 
body is totally independent. It does not answer to parliament, and it does not answer to 
the government or the prime minister. It does, however, answer to the general public 
because everybody is a customer and they are entitled to come and complain if  they 
aren’t happy about something’. And complain the public has, yet the changes are still 
yet to substantially materialise. The definition of ‘independent’ which Mr. Avgousti is 
using in the above statement is likely misplaced as ‘the term “independence” as used in 
the context o f telecom reform... does not imply independence from government policy, 
or the power to make policy, but rather independence to implement policy without 
undue interference from politicians or industry lobbyists’ (Melody cited Sanchez and 
Hwa 2003, p. 5). As noted in Chapter 7, the TRA review panel has stated that 
‘regulation should retreat as the tide o f competition advances. But at the moment 
competition is only prospective.’ If the Kingdom is to realize its goals for a liberalised 
telecommunications sector, future economic prosperity and social development 
generally, both the TRA and the BIX must begin to fulfil their mandate as stipulate 
under the Telecommunications Law, while a lack o f action will jeopardise the success 
of the Bahrain’s telecommunications liberalisation reforms. With the stakes so high, it is 
imperative that the TRA be held to account for it performance in regulating the 
telecommunications market, such that continued failure to inject a competitive dynamic 
into the market place will be met with consequence.
It has been more than six years since the telecommunications liberalisation process 
began and the benefits have so far only trickled in for customers in the Kingdom 
because o f Batelco’s ability to exclude competitors from using its infrastructure and the 
TRA’s unwillingness or inability to facilitate competitor entry into Batelco’s networks. 
Thus it would appear that the very structure o f the liberalisation model was not designed 
to promote competition and facilitate new entrants into the market. This has prompted 
this author to develop an alternative model for liberalisation -  one which also takes into 
consideration the small size o f the market, the effective utilization o f Batelco’s 
infrastructure availability, and the holding company which the Government launched in
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2006 to manage and administer the shares o f all the companies in which the Kingdom of 
Bahrain owns stake.
Alternative model for telecommunications
The first Telecommunications Law was promulgated in January 2002, and since then 
except for long-distance calling cards and Zain cellular services other operators have 
been unable to enter the market. This is largely a factor o f Batelco’s ability to delay 
giving competitors access to its networks and thus preventing customers from enjoying 
the real fruits o f liberalisation. Thus it would seem there is a need to develop a 
meaningful model that would place all operators at par without giving an opportunity 
for monopolistic practices to hinder the progress o f liberalisation.
In creating a foundation upon which to form a new model for the structure of  
telecommunications in Bahrain, this author has researched and examined case studies o f  
telecommunications reforms undertaken in countries around the world, as outlined in 
Chapter 3 and elsewhere in this thesis. There is a limit to which any one example can be 
applied to the situation in Bahrain however. Even among European nations pursing the 
common goal o f the ONPs in the 1990s, the diversity of cultural, geographic and 
economic conditions in each nation led to a diversity o f means by which 
telecommunications reform was pursued, as well as the varying levels o f accessible 
capital and consumer affluence causing the pace at which new telecommunications 
developments unfolded to be staggered across the various countries. Similarly, while 
nations the world over have pursue the common goal o f telecommunications 
privatisation and liberalisation -  and there are certainly commonalities between the 
circumstances under which it is being attempted in the Kingdom and the circumstances 
within which it has been attempted elsewhere -  the intersection o f all the various factors 
at play in the Bahraini scenario have, in certain meaningful ways, the cumulative effect 
of placing the Kingdom in a fairly novel place in the documented history o f  
telecommunications reform.
Even when looking to Bahrain’s neighbours in the GCC, it is difficult to draw heavily 
from any one o f their individual experiences to inform the path Bahrain should pursue, 
given the fact that Bahrain was by decades the first GCC state to privatize its SOTE and 
was several years ahead of all o f its neighbours in liberalizing its telecommunications
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market. While Bahrain may have smallest domestic telecommunications market in the 
GCC, the Kingdom is the at vanguard of the region’s telecommunications market 
reforms and as such it is conceivable that neighbouring states are watching the progress 
of Bahrain’s reforms -  and their successes and failures -  to inform their own market 
reform policies.
Thus, instead o f adapting to the Bahraini context any one model for telecommunications 
reforms, this author has instead selected, where appropriate, from several successful 
models o f reform from around the globe and used these in the construction of a new 
model for telecommunications in the Kingdom. This new model also has incorporated 
within it certain structures which are fairly new and without extensive precedent in the 
history of telecommunications reforms. As will be shown below, it was necessary to 
utilize these new structures in the new model to address certain challenges the Kingdom 
faces for which, due to the intersection o f the various factors at play in the Bahrain, this 
author found there to be a lack o f historic precedent from which to glean substantial 
guidance.
In view o f the limited market that Bahrain offers to competitors, the model should be 
developed in such a way that, when applied to real life, it offers an attractive 
opportunity from investment and expansion. It should offer the potential o f enticing 
rates o f return for well-placed and strategic investments, offers competitors speedy 
approvals and licensing processes, ease o f operations, a transparent set o f regulations, 
and most important o f all, an independent regulatory body that ensures fair business 
practices. More importantly, this model should be able to deliver the fruits o f liberalised 
telecommunication services to the customers and alleviate the present duopoly scenario. 
The model, shown in Figure 9:1 (below) is based on the present liberalised environment 
and is formulated based on the following framework:
The Economic Development Board of Bahrain has set up a holding company to hold the 
shares in various companies where the Bahrain government has a stake. Accordingly the 
shares held by the Government in Batelco would also be held by the holding company -  
i.e. the Government must divest o f all direct stakes in Batelco. As stated by Ramamurti 
earlier in this chapter, and shown in the examples o f the UK and Jamaica, 
telecommunications reform is much more effective and credible when the state no
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longer has a vested interest in protecting the incumbent monopolist. As well, such 
divestment would seem to give an independent regulator even more independence to 
move strongly against a private company’s market manipulations. In the 2008 Second 
National Telecommunications Plan, the Government o f Bahrain seems to have 
recognized the need for it to divest of its shares in Batelco, noting that it plans to have 
the divestment completed o f most, if  not all o f its shares, within the next three years. 
This should allow the TRA a freer hand in dealing with Batelco and give its threat o f 
sanctions against the company for non-compliance greater credibility -  assuming, of 
course, the TRA chooses to take up the opportunity to move forcefully to open the 
market for competition, which is an issue which will be dealt with below.
Figure 9:1 Model for accelerating liberalisation in Bahrain
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(Figure 9:1 above is only a generic guideline. A detailed model that addresses specific issues including 
legal and contractual issues, which involves all the stakeholders — TRA, Bahrain Government, and the 
operators -  will have to be formulated and simulated before implementation.)
Thus the holding company plays a key role to play under this proposed model. For 
operational and accounting purposes, Batelco must be segregated into two functional 
units -  one could be termed as a Network Batelco Company and the other, Operating 
Batelco Company, with the former holding all the current infrastructure o f Batelco such 
as hardware, software, licenses etc., while the latter would handle the operations related 
to providing telecommunications services to the customers.
The Network Batelco would provide its infrastructure to the new operators based on 
their needs to provide services to customers. In turn, the Network Batelco would be 
given a percentage shares in each of the new companies, which acts as an additional 
motivational factor for Batelco to allow them use o f its infrastructure -  Network Batelco 
is thus a company that holds a percentage o f shares o f all operators. The advantage o f  
this arrangement is the new operators do not have to worry about investing in 
infrastructure required to offer fixed-line, Internet and mobile services -  which would 
thus avoid the situation described in Chapter 2 o f ‘a host o f smaller businesses investing 
heavily in functionally identical yet operationally independent networks covering the 
same areas [which] would likely be painfully costly, economically inefficient and 
ultimately unsustainable for all involved’. [The above arrangement would also fulfil 
Finger’s ‘regulation o f scarce resource’ objective o f regulation, noted in Chapter 2]. 
Instead it is more cost effective, thus more profitable, for them to lease the infrastructure 
from Batelco at rates prefixed by Batelco -  explained below -  for a share o f profit in 
return for using the infrastructure. Thus this model is likely to encourage more operators 
to enter the market and compete in both mobile and fixed lines, unlike the present 
scenario where new entrants hesitate to enter the fixed-line service due to their 
apprehension about the large infrastructure investments required and uncertainty o f  
earning a fair return on their investments.
The new model for telecommunications also adapts a version of what has been in
practice in the UK since 1994, when BT was required to supply separate accounts for
each of its divisional segments, as discussed by Cave in Chapter 2. As well, the new
model incorporates the principle of non-discrimination, which plays an important role in
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both the UK and the ‘common carrier’ legislation o f the FCC in the US, as discussed by 
Horwitz, also in Chapter 2. The new model for telecommunications would necessitate 
that Network Batelco and Operational Batelco supply different accountings o f their 
businesses to the Government o f Bahrain. The TRA would then hold Network Batelco 
to the principle o f non-discrimination in the supplying o f its services -  i.e. Network 
Batelco would be forced to sell its services and access to its infrastructure [for Internet, 
fixed-lines and mobile] to Operational Batelco at the same price it charged other 
competitors in the market. The TRA would also set a bracket o f minimum and 
maximum rates operators would be allowed to charge customers. This model would 
help to promote competition by denying larger companies the ability price smaller 
competitors out o f business (i.e. set prices below cost and absorb the loss with larger 
financial resources until smaller companies can no longer compete and are forced out o f 
the market), at the same time that this model would prevent operators from charging 
customers unreasonable high rates.
As happened with Singapore, the pervasiveness o f regulation in the different areas o f  
the telecommunication sector would be rolled back as competition took hold and grew 
to healthy, sustainable levels -  i.e. the Singapore case studied in Chapter 3 noted how 
the IDA, recognizing in 2003 that SingTel’s one-time monopoly in the long-distance 
market had been reduced to a 30 per cent market share through blossoming competition, 
saw fit to release SingTel from its regulatory shackles and allow free-market 
mechanisms to function unrestrained in that sector. Similarly, in Bahrain, over time and 
with the successful introduction of competition into the market, the new models for 
price bracketing mechanisms will focus less on specific price controls and more on anti­
competitive pricing policies generally, [in line with the Chapter 2 discussion on the 
normalisation o f regulation over time]. The new model must allow for the space for 
competition to grow, but it must also avoid the damage to the markets which over­
regulation can cause, as out-lined by Crandall & Hausman in Chapter 2, or, as 
Littlechild remarked:
Regulation is essentially a means o f preventing the worst excesses o f monopoly; 
it is not a substitute for competition. It is a means o f ‘holding the fort’ until the 
competition arrives. Consequently, the main focus of attention has to be on 
securing the most promising conditions for competition to emerge, and 
protecting competition from abuse. (Littlechild 1983, p. 11).
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As a first step in the process o f entering the Bahrain telecommunications market, all 
operators would approach the TRA for licensing (Operational Batelco already has been 
issued licenses for providing the various services). After the TRA issues the license, a 
new operator would approach Batelco for selecting infrastructure for the services the 
operator proposes to offer, which Batelco must supply using the principle of non­
discrimination. In case o f any dispute that arose between new operators or undue delays 
in connections being established to Network Batelco’s networks, the TRA will be the 
arbitrator and empowered to extract the appropriate penalties for non-compliance.
Network Batelco will be responsible for the international operations o f Batelco such as 
alliances with overseas operators etc. The whole methodology would be implemented 
with total transparency and in compliance with the regulatory provisions o f the TRA, 
thus the TRA would have to shift its strategic approach towards enforcing its regulatory 
authority and fulfilling its government bestowed mandate.
Along with the benefits likely to arise from this new model for telecommunication in 
Bahrain, this author also recognizes that the new model has the potential to facilitate 
collusion among telecommunications companies operating in the Kingdom. To forestall 
this possibility, the TRA must be vigilant in its scrutiny o f industry players and 
empower itself to extract penalties and take antitrust measures should collusion become 
apparent. To ensure this, the TRA must be held to some form of accountability to make 
certain it is fulfilling its mandate and has not become ‘captured’ by players in the 
industry it is meant to be regulating -  a concept discussed in Chapter 2 and currently a 
Bahrain-specific issue in regard to the TRA’s relationship with Batelco. Among the 
options policy-makers in Bahrain ought to consider for regulator accountability are the 
suggestions of Baldwin & Cave -  such as requiring the TRA to submit periodic reports 
or ‘rolling plans o f action’ to special committees and/or ministers o f the government for 
approval, as well as holding TRA reforms to cost-benefit analysis requirements -  as 
discussed in Chapter 2. These moves would also greatly increase the transparency o f the 
TRA and offer it enhanced credibility. Additionally, as Stirton and Lodge noted in 
relation to the Jamaica case study in Chapter 3, success in regulatory policy in itself 
helps to strengthen the authority o f the regulator. Just as the Jamaican judiciary played a 
role in the countries telecommunications reform successes -  in presiding over lawsuits 
in which C&W attempted to reestablish its monopoly power -  the Bahraini judiciary has
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also shown itself fairly efficient and effective in its handling o f business and 
commercial law -  as noted in Chapter 4 -  which is an asset that could also be 
incorporated into regulatory and/or regulator accountability mechanisms. The optimal 
apparatus and process through which to elicit regulator accountability is, however, the 
subject o f additional study and will not be determined by this thesis.
In looking to a model o f successful telecommunications reform, what becomes apparent 
in an analysis o f the Singapore case study is that the success of the city-state’s reforms 
did not come about as a result o f timid half-steps in approaching policy and regulation. 
Rather, the Singapore has shown, and continues to prove today, that it is both willing 
and able to implement bold and sweeping reforms where and when it deems such is 
necessary to bring about the ends it seeks. Singapore recognized early on that to be a 
world leader in ICT, vibrant competition in its telecommunications market was 
necessary; thus the government and the regulator staunchly imposed change upon the 
structures of telecommunications environment in the country -  adapting their blueprints 
for development to circumstances as they unfolded -  to make this competition a reality. 
For Bahrain to succeed in its own telecommunications reforms and to become the ICT 
hub of the Middle East, such vision and commitment must be shown on the part o f the 
government and the TRA -  i.e. to resolutely do what is necessary for the establishment 
of thriving competition in telecommunications.
While Bahrain seeks to emulate the same success o f Singapore, a major difference 
between the countries that would makes unwieldy a simple transplantation o f the 
Singapore model into the Bahraini context is underlying business environment o f the 
two countries -  as noted in Chapter 3, Singapore scores among the most competitive 
and free economies of the world, and while the reality in Bahrain is that, though 
aspiring to greater things, the Kingdom is currently a relatively undiversified, resource- 
based economy.
In this context, the fairly unique crossroads Bahrain is at in the documented history of  
telecommunications reforms becomes apparent. While Bahrain’s GDP per capita ratio 
would portend the affluence of a developed nation, the Kingdom’s infrastructural and 
private sector development, while both expanding rapidly, place the Bahrain in 
developing country status. As mentioned above, to attract investment by
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telecommunications companies, the opportunity must have an enticing potential profit. 
While the general wealth o f the Kingdom would is an attractive asset, as is the growth 
potential Bahrain has shown, the currently underdeveloped private sector and the small 
population base may lead to questions as to whether the potential return on investment 
in Bahrain’s telecommunications sector is appetizing enough to feed in one’s capital. 
This is what the profit-sharing aspect o f the model is meant to counter, as the degree to 
which the model is profit-sharing it is also risk-sharing, thus helping to ease the 
apprehension o f companies considering market entry. Risk-sharing and the holding 
company model would also help uphold the integrity and coherence of the system -  i.e. 
the diversified sources of financing upon which the telecommunications network is 
based would offer it increased fiscal durability -  thus helping to fulfill the second o f  
Finger’s ‘Objectives of Regulation in Network Industries’. The above, coupled with a 
credible, accountable and transparent regulator to ensure that the interconnection 
commitments o f the incumbent operator are enforced -  and at a fair price -  and the 
result is a telecommunications environment much more alluring for investment from 
competing companies. By attracting new investment, the new model would also help to 
ensure there is adequate capital available to for the deployment o f new infrastructure 
and greater development o f product and services.
As noted earlier in this thesis, increased competition in the telecommunications market 
will help increase the competitiveness o f the economy generally, fueling greater 
economic diversification and growth o f the private sector, which in turn will create a 
more lucrative market for the telecommunications companies to provide services in. As 
the profitability o f the telecommunications sector becomes ever more apparent, there 
will arise the need to assess the degree to which the risk-sharing elements o f the new 
model are still necessary, or, whether they should be scaled back to allow greater play in 
the mechanisms of the free market, as the TRA must take care not to coddle 
telecommunications operators.
Furthermore, the results of the Nielsen survey in Chapter 8 show it is imperative that 
there be a multi-pronged approach to fostering a competitive telecommunications 
market in Bahrain. In addition to this author’s new model for restructuring the 
telecommunications sector and implementing TRA accountability, such things as 
introducing number portability -  as Singapore undertook to implement in 2007 -  could
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have a major impact on market competitiveness; this derives from the fact that, as 
outlined in the Nielsen survey, there are significant numbers o f both residential and 
business customers who would consider changing services providers, but are essentially 
trapped with the service provider they have due to the importance maintaining the same 
phone number has for them. As well, the Nielsen survey showed that the TRA must 
undertake effective awareness programs in order to foster an environment in which 
consumers are properly informed and thus able exercise their purchasing power in a 
pro-competitive fashion; or, to put that conversely, it is difficult to see how a healthy, 
competitive market can come into being when large proportions the market’s 
foundations -  i.e. the consumers who buy the products and services -  are unaware how 
their bills are calculated, do not know the difference between dial-up and Broadband, 
are oblivious to the fact that there are -  albeit nascent -  alternatives to Batelco in fixed- 
line and Broadband services, and are ignorant that there even is a TRA to which they 
can voice their many grievances regarding telecommunications provision.
As Singapore did in 2005, Bahrain also needs to take a special interest in, and establish 
a coherent strategy for, the development and deployment o f Broadband to wire the 
island into a technologically advanced communications web, or the Kingdom’s own 
‘super-highway’ for data. As was noted in Chapter 7, while talk o f such development -  
in the form of the BIX and otherwise -  is easily lauded, actual developments are lagging 
and Bahrain’s ‘high-tec revolution’ is still very much in its infancy. As was pointed out 
in the Nielsen survey, the top complaint o f both business and residential users in regards 
to telecommunications provision is internet data services, which is the necessary 
nervous system of any country hoping attain the status o f an ‘information society’. 
Thus, the TRA must follow the lead of Singapore’s regulator and establish performance 
targets for Batelco Network, backed by credible threats o f painful sanctions should 
these targets not be met.
In outlining this new model for telecommunications, this author means to offer only 
basic parameters or guidelines, and before these new structures could be implemented, 
there would need to be many specific legal, regulatory and contractual issues worked 
out in detail. As well, this author is by no means attempting to lay claim to a framework 
that will solve all challenges regarding the regulation o f telecommunications in Bahrain 
for all time. As has been discussed throughout this thesis, telecommunications is an
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industry which is relentlessly advancing -  in technological capacity, in global reach and 
in penetration o f almost every facet o f human beings’ personal and professional lives. 
To assume any regulatory structure attempting to oversee such an industry could remain 
static would be folly; as was noted in Chapter 3, ‘regulators must acclimatize quickly to 
the rapidly shifting markets over which they are responsible so as not to stifle 
advancements by the application of outdated and, at best ineffective and at worst 
detrimental, policies.’ Therefore this author recognizes that his proposed model for 
restructuring the telecommunications market in Bahrain must be dynamic in nature, 
incorporating mechanisms to allow it to adapt and be responsive to the needs of 
consumers and companies as they arise in the continuous evolution o f the industry. 
Exactly what these mechanisms are and how they would function must be determined 
through further study,
Having consolidated the finding o f this author’s research into an analysis in this chapter, 
the following section will now conclude this thesis study.
*  *  *
Conclusion
Chapter 1 outlined the aims o f this study were to (1), ascertain the driving forces in 
Bahrain behind the establishment of a privatised and liberalised telecommunications 
environment; (2) ascertain the extent to which privatisation, liberalisation and the 
regulatory environment o f Bahrain telecommunications have been and will be beneficial 
to the Kingdom’s economic development.
Liberalisation drivers - policy decisions o f the government
In the course o f this thesis it has been determined that there are a number o f forces 
driving the privatisation and liberalisation process, many of them related. It was found 
that the government’s desire to diversify its economy away from heavy dependence on 
oil revenues to be among the major factors in its sweeping economic reforms, among 
them being telecommunications privatisation and later liberalisation. The desire to 
modernise the economy to facilitate and accelerate economic growth by establishing 
Bahrain as an ‘information hub’ and dominant regional financial centre is also driving 
the telecommunications reforms. Businesses such as banking and financial services 
already operating within the Kingdom are also demanding a competitive 
telecommunications environment, with the subsequent lower prices and enhanced 
services, to maintain their own competitive edge over regional rivals. While interviews 
with Government Ministers offered their vision for Bahrain as one o f building an 
economically sustainable future through facilitating the education and training Bahrainis 
need to fill the jobs created in this modernising economy, further fuelling economic 
diversification.
In the aim of pursing freer markets, the Kingdom has also obliged itself undertake 
telecommunications reforms through the international trade agreements to which it is a 
signatory, such as the WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement and the FTA with 
the US. These agreements, along with liberalisation and privatisation reforms taking 
place across the entire Bahraini economy, are part o f a broader agenda the government 
is trying to implement in order to shift its role in the economy from that o f being the 
main provider and supplier o f services, to one o f being a facilitator and regulator o f 
market mechanisms. This shows the government has adopted, to a degree, the prescripts
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of New Right philosophy regarding withdrawing the state’s presence from actively 
participating in the functions o f the economy and to allow free market mechanisms 
latitude to determine the path to economic progress. The government has signalled 
through adopting its new economic model that the private sector will be given a wide 
birth in Kingdom’s future economy, though at the same time government has 
recognized the need for market regulation and that it would be negligent and 
irresponsible for government to take on a completely laissez faire approach to the 
Kingdom’s economic development. The aim is to create the desired sustainable 
economic development through increased private sector participation in the economy 
and thus more jobs for Bahrain’s growing population -  a modem, competitive 
telecommunications environment is essential in achieving these economic goals, and 
thus government’s economic ambitions are driving forces behind telecommunications 
liberalisation.
In regard to the extent to which privatisation, liberalisation and the regulatory 
environment o f Bahrain telecommunications have been and will be beneficial to the 
Kingdom’s economic development, it can be concluded from this study that properly 
restructuring competition into the telecommunications market can indeed promote the 
economic goals o f government, namely increasing private sector participation in the 
sustainable development o f a modernised economy. Telecommunications is the nervous 
system of the modem economy and thus a healthy telecommunication market where 
competition spurs efficiencies, lower prices and enhanced services, bodes well for the 
economy as a whole -  both in attracting new business and allowing existing businesses 
to expand and enhance their services.
The research findings have also led this author to believe that Bahrain’s moves towards 
an open economy have not brought about notable friction with regards to the Islamic 
nature of the Kingdom and its social values, largely due to the predominantly liberal 
character o f the population. This author acknowledges, however, that since the 
Governments o f Bahrain’s efforts to bring competition into the provision o f Internet 
services have thus far been unsuccessful (i.e. Batelco is still effectively the monopoly 
provider o f Internet services), it is not possible at this time to determine if, in the event 
that a proliferation o f competition occurs and the price of an internet connection 
decreases to the point where the vast majority o f the population can afford Broadband
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access, whether the resultant increase in exposure to Western values would create 
tension with the more religious or traditional segments o f Bahraini society.
This study has found, however, that government has already developed both the ways 
and means to resolve issues o f cultural concern should any inadvertently arise from its 
telecommunications liberalisation reforms. This would imply that even in the event o f a 
proliferation o f competition and ready access to the Internet for every Bahraini, the 
government will be able to protect the Islamic nature o f the Kingdom to the degree that 
it sees fit. Moreover, the findings o f this study suggest that level to which the 
government would be opposed to an increased influx o f new cultural perspectives 
resulting from increased internet usage is relatively low. Reinforcing this point is King 
Hamad’s pronouncement in 2003 that Bahrain must develop an open society which can 
cope with a world o f rapid change and that the government is committed to ensuring 
human security, the rights of women and children and the right to freedom of  
expression.
Impact o f  telecommunication reform on Bahrain’s economic development 
As noted in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the Arab World Competitiveness Report (Sulaf 
Zakharia cited in Augusto Lopez-Claros, pp. xii-xiii) applauded Bahrain for its 
achievements on telecommunications liberalisation and opening its market through 
multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, remarking ‘.. .policies matter a great deal for 
economic outcomes, and Bahrain’s example is an encouraging message for the region.’ 
In concrete terms, as laid out by the EDB, telecommunications liberalisation is expected 
to help facilitate growth in the private sector to the point of doubling GDP between 
2005 and 2015, with a subsequent 5 per cent growth in employment for each year over 
the same period. [These estimates, however, were made before the global economic 
crisis began to unfold severely in September 2008. Given the global nature o f the crisis 
and Bahrain’s integration into the global financial system, it can be expected that these 
estimates will be lower than currently stated. At the time o f the publishing o f this thesis, 
it was still undetermined what the impact o f the worldwide financial crisis would be in 
the Kingdom.] This study has also shown that there is a direct correlation between the 
competitiveness of telecommunications market and the level o f ICT infrastructure 
investment in that market, with both o f these factors contributing to the competitive 
ability o f that nation to attract multinational companies to establish themselves within 
its borders.
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While evidence shows positive results growing from Bahrain’s overall privatisation and 
liberalisation reforms, there are certain obvious weaknesses regarding 
telecommunications, especially in regards to market regulation. The major success of 
the telecommunications reforms thus far has been the introduction o f Zain (formerly 
MTC-Vodafone) as the second mobile service provider that has led, according to the 
BSCR customer survey, to lower prices and better service, though the mobile market is 
still only a duopoly. Batelco’s monopoly in fixed-line service appears to be solid and 
will likely be maintained for the foreseeable future. Regarding Internet service, while 
there is increasing potential for a competitive market, especially if  and when the BIX 
comes online, for now Batelco is still the only effective service provider. The TRA has 
not been able, or is possibly reluctant, to intervene and speed up the process o f opening 
the telecommunications markets to greater competition.
This study has identified that among the factors most important for the effectiveness of  
a regulator in a telecommunications market is the transparency with which that regulator 
conducts itself. The TRA in Bahrain has not been forthcoming or revealing about the 
process by which its decisions are made, nor the reasons why more than five years after 
the market in Bahrain was “liberalised”, there is still only one effective competitor to 
the incumbent monopoly telecommunications operator, and that competition is solely in 
the provision o f mobile service. The result o f this lack of transparency has been that the 
level o f independence the TRA exercises has been questioned as speculation arises as to 
what interests the regulator is actually beholden -  i.e. whether the ‘regulatory capture’ 
has occurred.
All this leads to the conclusion that to make the liberalisation process a meaningful one 
which achieve its objectives, Bahrain needs to develop a better model for liberalisation 
based on its long term vision.
Future Research
The fact that there are no standardised models that can be adapted opens up further 
opportunities for Bahrain to re-engineer its liberalisation program, creating a sound 
model built on attributes specific to the Kingdom, including: its long term economic 
growth vision and current economic realities, size o f the country, population, social and
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cultural facets, and the monopolistic trends of incumbent operators. The new model for 
telecommunications in Bahrain and the other changes in market policy discussed in 
Chapter 9 could be developed in such a way that when applied to real life, they would 
attract competitors by offering a healthy potential return on investments, speedy 
approvals and licensing processes, ease o f operations, transparency in regulation, and be 
in full compliance with the provisions the laid down by the government in legislation to 
create a vibrant and competitive telecommunications sector in the Kingdom.
While this author believes the model suggested in Chapter 9 provides a useful 
foundation upon which to based future investigations regarding improvements in 
Bahrain’s telecommunications liberalisation reform agenda, it is important to note that 
the proposed model is a generic one which requires further research since it involves 
many strategic issues, while fundamental shifts in both the TRA’s approach to enforcing 
regulatory provisions need to be undertaken. Determining the means o f actualising the 
new model, as well as its broader economic, political and social implication, requires 
further research and examination, and thus is material for future study. Another crucial 
area for future research raised in this thesis is a determination o f the optimal apparatus 
and process through which to elicit accountability, and thus greater transparency, from 
Bahrain’s Telecommunications Regulatory Authority.
*  *  *
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